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Modern economic and social activities are dependent on a complex network of 
infrastructure systems that are highly interdependent. Electric power systems form the 
backbone of such complex network as most civil infrastructure systems cannot function 
properly without reliable power supply. Electric power systems are vulnerable to extensive 
damage due to natural hazards, as evident in recent hazard events. Hurricanes, earthquakes, 
floods, tornados and other natural hazards have caused billions of dollars in direct losses 
due to damage to power systems and indirect losses due to power outages, as well as social 
disruption. There is, therefore, a need for a comprehensive framework to assess and 
mitigate the risk posed by natural hazards to electric power systems. Electric power 
systems rely on various components that work together to deliver power from generating 
units to customers. Consequently, any reliable risk assessment methodology needs to take 
into account how the different components interact. This requires a system-level risk 
assessment approach. This research presents a framework for system-level risk assessment 
and management for electric power systems subjected to natural hazards. Specifically, risk 
due to hurricanes and earthquakes, as well as the combined effect of both is considered. 
The framework incorporates a topological-based system reliability model, probabilistic and 
scenario-based hazard analysis, climate change modeling, component vulnerability, 
component importance measure, multi-hazard risk assessment, and cost analysis. Several 
risk mitigation strategies are proposed; their efficiency and cost-effectiveness are studied. 
The developed framework is intended to assist utility companies and other stakeholders in 
making a risk-informed decision regarding short- and long-term investment in natural 
hazard risk mitigation for electric power systems. The framework can be used to identify 
certain parts of the system to strengthen, compare the efficiency and cost-effectiveness of 
various risk mitigation strategies using life-cycle cost analysis, compare risks posed by 






Civil infrastructure systems such as electric power systems, water distribution systems, 
transportation networks, gas supply systems, etc. are the backbone of modern economies 
and essential for public wellbeing. For safety, security, prosperity, and social welfare, such 
critical infrastructure systems need to be reliable, robust, and resilient. Most civil 
infrastructure systems cannot function properly without reliable power supply. Emergency 
response units, telecommunication networks, traffic control systems, healthcare facilities, 
etc., all depend on the electric power system to function. As such, the electric power system 
is among the most critical of all the civil infrastructure systems. Thus, the loss of electricity 
can cause billions of dollars in direct and indirect economic losses. 
 
Electric power systems are subjected to numerous disturbances ranging from small 
disturbances caused by common cause failures to major disturbances caused by natural 
hazards. Natural hazards that threaten power systems include hurricanes, earthquakes, 
floods, severe thunderstorms, and tornadoes. In the event of natural disasters, continuous 
supply of electricity is essential not only to critical buildings such as hospitals and fire 
stations but to the public as a whole. Hurricanes and earthquakes are among the most 
devastating natural hazards that can cause extensive damage and prolonged power outages 
(Stewart, 2004; Pasch et al., 2005; Blake et al., 2013; Romero et al., 2015; Noda, 2001b). 
 
The extensive damage potential of hurricanes on power systems has been well documented 
historically. From the four major hurricanes that hit Florida in 2004 to the 2008 hurricane 
season in Texas, the cost of hurricane damage to power systems is in the billions (USDOE, 
2005; Hoffman et al., 2009). In 2004, four major hurricanes struck Florida causing a 
combined economic loss of over $20 billion and damaging every segment of Florida’s 
electricity infrastructure which resulted in a power outage to over 9.6 million customers 
combined (USDOE, 2005). In 2005, hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma struck the U.S. 
causing extensive damage to power systems across several states (Knabb et al., 2005; 
NOAA, 2005; Pasch et al., 2006). Recently in 2012, hurricane Sandy caused severe damage 
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to the power system of several coastal states causing over 8.5 million customers to lose 
power for weeks and even months in some areas (Blake et al., 2013). When it comes to 
damage due to hurricanes, the distribution part of the power system is the most vulnerable 
(Davidson et al., 2003). For example, between 1998 and 2009, electric utility companies 
in Texas incurred about $1.8 billion in restoration costs due to hurricanes with 80% of the 
costs attributed to the distribution system (Brown, 2009). 
 
Investment in the power sector is considered a long-term investment due to the service life 
of the assets, which can be as long as 100 years (Mendiluce, 2014). It is, therefore, 
imperative for utility companies to consider the uncertainties inherent in such long-term 
investments that will impact return on investment as well as customer satisfaction. One 
such uncertainty is the potential impact of climate change on hurricane hazard. In a 
National Climate Assessment report which summarizes the impacts of climate change on 
the United States, it is stated that “the intensity, frequency, and duration of North Atlantic 
hurricanes, as well as the frequency of the strongest (Category 4 and 5) hurricanes, have 
all increased since the early 1980s… Hurricane-associated storm intensity and rainfall rates 
are projected to increase as the climate continues to warm” (Walsh et al., 2014). With the 
potential increase in the intensity of hurricanes in the long-term due to climate change, the 
cost of damage to power systems is expected to rise. 
 
Electric power systems are also vulnerable to damage due to earthquakes. For example, the 
1994 Northridge earthquake caused over 2.5 million customers to lose power and resulted 
in direct losses of about $138 million to Los Angeles Department of Water and Power 
(Dong et al., 2004; Schiff et al., 1995). Similarly, the 1995 Great Hanshin earthquake, 2008 
Wenchuan earthquake, as well as the 2010 Chile earthquake caused various levels of 
damage to electric power systems (Noda, 2001a; Eidinger, 2009; Romero et al., 2015). 
When it comes to damage due to earthquakes, brittle substation components with 
considerable weight are the most vulnerable (Vanzi, 1996; Eidinger & Kempner, 2012). 
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The extent of damage to electric power systems due to natural hazards depends not only 
on the frequency and intensity of such hazards but also on the number of different types of 
hazards that the systems are exposed to. Most parts of the world are vulnerable to multiple 
hazards that can be concurrent/non-concurrent and dependent/independent (Li et al., 2012). 
Over the lifespan of electric power systems located in regions affected by more than one 
hazard, such systems can be affected by multiple hazards that differ in nature and can occur 
simultaneously or otherwise. For example, hurricanes and earthquakes have a very low 
probability of occurring simultaneously and are considered independent non-concurrent 
hazards. However, the life cycle cost of systems located in areas vulnerable to both 
hurricanes and earthquakes depends on the combined effect of both hazards. Therefore, 
long-term risk mitigation strategies need to consider the effect of multiple independent 
hazards as certain mitigation strategies for one hazard might be ineffective or even increase 
the risk for other hazards (Bell & Glade, 2004).  
 
Aging infrastructure has also been determined to be one of the main issues facing the power 
system (ASCE, 2013). Aging of components increases the vulnerability of the system in 
cases of natural disasters such as hurricanes. Wood distribution poles, for example, are 
susceptible to decay as they age which causes a reduction in strength. This is of particular 
concern as most of the distribution poles in the U.S. are wood poles (Gustavsen & 
Rolfseng, 2000).    
 
Damage to infrastructure such as electric power systems due to natural hazards needs to be 
reduced as recovery period is longer when the system is severely damaged which in turn 
can exponentially increase losses (Tierney et al., 1999). As such, cost-effective risk 
mitigation strategies need to be identified. This requires a comprehensive risk assessment 
framework that incorporates hazard identification and characterization, consequence 
analysis, risk evaluation, and risk mitigation. Such framework can be used for pre-disaster 
preparation, mitigation, and post-disaster response planning. Additionally, such framework 
is required to guide decision makers to prioritize investment on risk mitigation strategies 
in the face of limited resources.        
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Studies have been conducted towards risk assessment for electric power systems subjected 
to natural hazards. The effectiveness of various mitigation strategies such as targeted 
hardening has also been studied (e.g. Han et al. (2013), Shafieezadeh et al. (2014a), 
Bjarnadottir et al. (2013), Ryan et al. (2014b)). Brown (2009) studied the hardening of 10% 
of distribution poles in Texas and estimated the net benefit derived from it. Bjarnadottir et 
al. (2014) studied targeted hardening of distribution poles in Florida using four strategies: 
(i) replacement of poles that reach threshold of strength; (ii) replacing failed poles with 
poles that are one class stronger; (iii) replacing poles that fail with stronger poles plus 
replacing poles that reach strength threshold; and (iv) proactive measures for foreshore 
locations by using stronger poles. The above studies, however, focused on component-
level risk assessment. 
 
Similarly, studies on the potential impact of climate change on risk of power system 
subjected to hurricanes are limited to component-level performance (e.g. Francis et al. 
(2011), Bjarnadottir et al. (2013), Bjarnadottir et al. (2014)). Francis et al. (2011) presented 
a hybrid economic input-output life cycle cost analysis method for evaluating the cost-
effectiveness of climate change adaptation strategies of distribution systems. Failure of 
distribution poles, spans, and pad-mounted transformers was considered in the study. The 
effect of climate change was modeled through the use of count regression analysis and data 
mining techniques that describe the relationship between climate variability and North 
Atlantic tropical cyclone counts in the U.S.  
 
Multi-hazard assessment and mitigation were investigated for residential construction (Li 
& Ellingwood, 2009), bridges (Kameshwar & Padgett, 2014), and commercial buildings 
(Wen & Kang, 2001). While development of multi-hazard risk analysis framework for 
buildings and bridges have been ongoing in recent years, risk analysis of spatially-
distributed civil infrastructure systems such as electric power and water systems have so 
far been limited to mostly single-hazard considerations (e.g. Adachi and Ellingwood 
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(2010), Winkler et al. (2010), Song and Ok (2010), Duenas-Osorio and Hernandez-Fajardo 
(2008), Kim and Kang (2013), Ryan et al. (2014a)).    
 
Davis and Clemmer (2014) suggested shifting to renewable energy sources to diversify the 
electric system and make it more resilient. This is because the use of renewable energy can 
turn the power system to smaller-scale and more distributed system. Renewable energy 
sources can be used for smart grid systems where generation and transportation of 
electricity can be decentralized and failure in one part of the system will not affect other 
parts. However, though the use of renewable sources of energy can help in improving the 
resilience of power systems, the current extensive system needs upgrading and 
strengthening as it is likely to stay in place for years to come before the gradual adaptation 
of smart grid systems.  
 
Based on the review of existing literature, the following observations can be made: 
 
1.  While component-level risk assessment methodologies have been well established, 
efficient utilization of limited risk mitigation resources requires identifying critical 
parts or components of a system that when strengthened, will have a greater impact 
on overall system reliability. To determine the critical parts or components of a 
system, some form of component importance measure is required. This, in turn, 
requires system reliability modeling that relates structural components failure and 
power delivery. 
 
2. Previous research on climate change impact did not couple climate change 
modeling and system reliability. Decision making regarding appropriate climate 
change adaptation strategies based on component-level risk analysis might not be 
accurate.   
 
3. Damage to electric power systems can lead to significant indirect monetary loss to 
residential, commercial, and industrial customers. However, most existing studies 
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did not consider indirect losses in the form of societal economic losses due to power 
outages. 
 
4. Risk analysis of electric power systems has so far been limited to mostly single-
hazard considerations. As these systems usually cover large areas and can be 
subjected to multiple hazards within their lifetime, there is a need to develop a 
framework to study the impact of multiple hazards on such systems. This is 
essential for decision making regarding investment in long-term mitigation of risks 
due to all possible hazards that can affect the system over its entire lifespan. There 
is also a need to investigate the cost-effectiveness of mitigation strategies in 
reducing the overall risks to infrastructure that are vulnerable to multiple hazards. 
This requires a comprehensive multi-hazard risk-based approach. 
 
      
1.1 Research Objectives 
 
The main objective of this dissertation is to develop a system-level risk-based framework 
for assessment and strengthening of electric power systems subjected to natural hazards. 
The focus of the framework is on the distribution as well as the transmission parts of the 
electric power system. The natural hazards considered are hurricanes and earthquakes, as 
well as the combined impact of both on the life cycle cost of systems located in areas 
vulnerable to both hazards. Specific objectives include: 
 
1. Develop a probabilistic system reliability approach that relates structural 
components failure with power delivery for radially operated distribution systems 
as well as networked transmission systems. 
 
2. Develop and demonstrate a framework for risk-based assessment and strengthening 
of distribution systems subjected to hurricanes. 
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3. Incorporate climate change model to risk assessment of power systems subjected 
to hurricanes to study the impact of variation in both intensity and frequency of 
future hurricanes. 
 
4. Develop and demonstrate a framework for multi-hazard risk assessment of electric 
power systems subjected to independent non-concurrent hazards through their 
lifespan.  
 
5. Propose and investigate the cost-effectiveness of various risk mitigation strategies 
for distribution and transmission systems considering both direct and indirect costs.     
 
The developed framework can be utilized in decision making regarding the design of new 
electric power systems, investigating the effectiveness of various mitigation in terms of 
system reliability improvement and monetary benefit, comparing various mitigation 




1.2 Organization of Dissertation 
 
This dissertation has been organized into nine chapters. The content of each chapter is 
outlined below: 
 
Chapter 1 introduces the subject, discusses the need for risk assessment of electric power 
systems subjected to natural hazards, reviews existing literature on the subject, and 
highlights the motivation for the research. Finally, the objectives of the research are 
presented. 
 
Chapter 2 gives a general background on electric power systems and discusses the 
different sub-systems that work together to deliver power to customers. Natural 
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hazards, specifically hurricanes and earthquakes, are introduced together with a 
discussion of different regions of the U.S. vulnerable to such hazards. Finally, the 
concept of infrastructure risk assessment is introduced. 
 
Chapter 3 develops a topological-based system reliability approach for distribution and 
transmission systems. This includes discussion of system reliability theory, modeling 
accessibility of system components in radial and networked systems, and line failure 
models. 
 
Chapter 4 presents a framework for studying the effectiveness of targeted hardening 
strategies for distribution systems subjected to hurricanes. The framework includes 
probabilistic and scenario-based hazard modeling, time-dependent component fragility 
model, component importance evaluation, and cost analysis. The framework is 
demonstrated using a notional distribution system assumed to be located in Florida. 
 
Chapter 5 extends the framework from chapter 4 to integrate the potential impact of 
climate change on hurricane risk. Several climate change scenarios are integrated into 
a hurricane simulation model to investigate the impact of variation in both intensity and 
frequency of hurricanes on risk. Cost-effectiveness of adaptation strategies is also 
evaluated using a notional distribution system. 
 
Chapter 6 evaluates the effectiveness of adding redundancy to distribution systems to 
reduce hurricane risk by constructing additional distribution lines with normally open 
(NO) switches to connect various independent substations. A system consisting of 20 
independent distribution systems in central Florida is used. 
 
Chapter 7 presents a framework for multi-hazard risk assessment of electric power 
systems subjected to hurricanes and earthquakes. The framework includes probabilistic 
and scenario-based hazard modeling and different methods of multi-hazard risk 
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assessment. A notional electric power system assumed to be located in Charleston, SC, 
New York, NY, and Seattle, WA, is used to demonstrate the proposed framework. 
 
Chapter 8 extends the framework in Chapter 7 to investigate the effectiveness of various 
multi-hazard risk mitigation strategies. Probabilistically weighted deterministic hazard 
scenarios approach is also introduced. Finally, a new component importance measure 
appropriate for networked systems such as transmission systems is developed. A 
notional electric power system is used to investigate the cost-effectiveness of the 
proposed mitigation strategies. 
 
Chapter 9 summarizes findings of the previous chapters, states conclusions from this 
study, and suggests future avenues for research in the area of risk assessment of 





















2.1 Electric Power Systems 
 
The electric power system can be broadly divided into three subsystems: generation, 
transmission, and distribution. The basic structure of a power system showing these sub-
systems is shown in Figure 2.1. Electric power is produced by generating units which 
convert mechanical energy into electricity. The generation plants produce electricity by 
using fossil fuels, nuclear energy, wind, hydro, or solar energy. Power plants produce 
electricity at a line-to-line voltage of between 11 kV and 30 kV (Brown, 2008). However, 
this range of voltage is not sufficiently high to transport electricity over long distances. 
Hence, generation substations are used to step up the voltage to transmission levels. 
 
Electric power from generating units is carried by the transmission system over long 
distances to the distribution system. The voltage levels for the transmission system ranges 
from 69 kV to as high as 1100 kV in the transmission and sub-transmission lines in the US 
(Brown, 2008). The sub-transmission system carries electric power at lower voltages and 
over shorter distances than the transmission system and is used to connect the transmission 
system to multiple distribution systems (Kassakian et al., 2011). The transmission system 
is composed of power lines and substations. The conductors in the power lines are 
supported by structures that can be lattice steel towers or H-frames for transmission 
systems and single pole structures for sub-transmission systems. 
 
Topologically, the transmission and sub-transmission systems have mesh-like designs to 
provide multiple paths from one node (substation) to another. This increases flexibility and 
improves reliability so that power can be delivered to loads even when a transmission line, 
substation, or generating unit goes offline. Transmission security assessment is routinely 
carried out to determine whether a system can deliver peak demand after one or more pieces 
of equipment or components are disconnected (Brown, 2008). After removing a piece of 
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equipment, power flow is run to check if all voltage levels are within limits and equipment 
are not loaded above emergency ratings. This ensures that the transmission system is at 











Figure 2.1 Schematic of an electric power system 
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The distribution system starts from a distribution substation that is fed by one or more sub-
transmission lines (Kersting, 2012). The main function of the distribution substation is to 
step down the voltage to distribution level by utilizing a transformer. The stepped down 
power leaves the substation through feeders that can be either overhead or underground 
system. The feeders eventually branched off to smaller lateral lines that deliver power 
directly to customers. Overhead distribution systems utilize wires that are carried by wood, 
steel or concrete poles that are 30 to 40 ft high and spaced 100 to 150 ft in the suburbs and 
300 to 400 ft in rural areas (Short, 2006). The voltage is usually between 4.16 kV to 34.5 
kV in the distribution system and is mostly carried by Aluminum Conductor Steel 
Reinforced (ACSR) and All Aluminum Conductor (AAC) wires (Brown, 2008). 
 
Unlike the transmission and sub-transmission systems, the topology of the distribution 
system is mostly radial or radially operated in the U.S. (Kersting, 2012; Brown, 2008). 
Radial implies there is a unique path for power flow from a substation to each customer. 
Radially operated distribution systems have ring (or loop) topology where there is more 
than one path from the power source to customers. The radial nature of the system is 
maintained by using normally open (NO) switches which can be closed to provide an 
alternative path in the case of a fault. This increases reliability by allowing customers 
downstream of a fault to receive power using a combination of NO switches and 
sectionalizing switches. 
 
Electric power grids are among the most extensive and complex engineering systems in 
modern societies. The generation, transmission, and distribution systems work together to 
supply electricity to millions of different types of customers ranging from residential, 
commercial, and industrial customers. Table 2.1 gives a summary of some of the 
characteristics of the U.S. electric grid.  





Table 2.1 General information on the U.S. electric grid 
Description  Approximate value Source  
Total number of customers 147 million EIA (2016b) 
Number of residential customers  128 million (37% of consumption) EIA (2016b) 
Number of commercial customers  17.8 million (36% of consumption) EIA (2016b) 
Number of industrial customers  839,000 (27% of consumption) EIA (2016b) 
Number of transportation customers 79 (0.2% of consumption) EIA (2016b) 
Total revenue (2014) $393 million EIA (2016b) 
Revenue from residential customers 45% of total EIA (2016b) 
Revenue from commercial customers 37% of total EIA (2016b) 
Revenue from industrial customers 18% of total EIA (2016b) 
Revenue from transport customers 0.2% of total EIA (2016b) 
High voltage transmission lines 200,000 miles NERC (2015) 
Low voltage distribution lines 6 million miles 
Kassakian et 
al. (2011) 
Primary energy consumed 40% of total EIA (2016a) 
 
 
2.2 Natural Hazards 
 
Natural hazards that threaten the power system include hurricanes, earthquakes, floods, ice 
storms, severe thunderstorms, tornadoes etc. Each of these hazards causes failure in a 
different way and to different parts of the power system. The duration of the resulting 
interruption also usually depends on the type of hazard with some causing considerably 
long interruptions. Utility companies are required to submit reports to both U.S. 
Department of Energy (DOE) and the North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC) 
when there is a sufficiently large disturbance in their territories. Between 1984 and 2006, 
there were 438 events that resulted in interruptions of more than 300 MW or affected at 
least 50,000 customers. A summary of the causes of such interruptions is given in Table 
2.2 (Hines et al., 2009). 
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Table 2.2 Summary of causes of major power outages in the U.S.  
(1984 – 2006) 
Cause of outage % of events 
Mean MW 
lost 
Mean number of 
customers affected 
Wind/rain 31.4 679 235,840 
Equipment failure 19.9 767 248,643 
Ice storm 11.1 1664 431,184 
Hurricane/tropical storm 10.1 2684 912,870 
Other cold weather events 8.8 1045 271,924 
Lighting  8.8 794 200,617 
Operator error 8.5 1226 358,440 
Fire  5.6 972 294,994 
Other external cause 3.6 1518 823,691 
Tornado  3.6 721 227,073 
Supply shortage  2.3 600 896,432 
Earthquake  1.6 1124 526,260 
Intentional attack 0.7 2154 165,000 
 
 
It can be seen from Table 2.2 that even though hurricanes and tropical storms constitutes 
only about 10% of the total number of events, they resulted in the highest damage in terms 
of mean megawatts (MW) lost and mean number of customers affected. While earthquakes 
constitute only about 1.6% of events, which is second to last, they are 4th in terms of 
average number of customers affected and 6th in terms of mean MW lost. Considering only 
natural hazards, earthquakes are only second to hurricanes/tropical storms in terms of 
number of customers affected and third in terms of MW lost. Generally, natural hazards 






2.2.1 Hurricanes  
 
All circulating weather systems over tropical waters are generally referred to as tropical 
cyclones. There are three classes of tropical cyclones: tropical depressions, tropical storms, 
and hurricanes. Tropical depressions have maximum sustained winds ≤ 38 mph while 
tropical storms have maximum sustained winds of 39 to 73 mph. Hurricanes are intense 
systems with a well-defined circulation and maximum sustained winds ≥ 74 mph (NOAA, 
2016a). In western pacific, hurricanes are referred to as “typhoons”. All Atlantic and Gulf 
coastal areas of the US are prone to hurricanes. On average, the US coastline is hit by five 
hurricanes in a typical 3-year period, of which two will be major (≥ category 3) (NOAA, 
2016a).      
 
The Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Scale is used to categorize hurricanes into five categories 
based on their 1-minute sustained wind speeds. Table 2.3 shows the five categories of 
hurricanes and their range of wind speeds as well as the total number of hurricanes that 
directly hit the U.S. between 1851 and 2015 (NOAA, 2016c, 2016b; Jarrell et al., 2001). 
 
Table 2.3: Saffir-Simpson hurricane scale and summary of hurricanes that hit the U.S. 
Category 
Sustained wind speed Number of hurricanes 
(1851 – 2015) mph m/s 
1 74 – 95 33 – 42 117 
2 96 – 110 43 – 49 76 
3 111 – 129 50 – 58 76 
4 130 – 156 58 – 70 18 
5 ≥ 157 > 70 3 
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Hurricanes are among the major causes of power outages in the U.S. Since 2002, 58% of 
power outages and 87% of outages affecting 50,000 or more customers were caused by 
severe weather such as hurricanes, thunderstorms, and blizzards (DOE, 2016). Table 2.4 
summarizes hurricanes that damaged the U.S. electric power system and the number of 
customers affected (DOE, 2016). Hurricanes rarely affect power generation stations and 
cause little to moderate damage to the transmission system. This is because generation and 
transmission systems are designed to withstand high wind loads. The distribution system, 
however, can be significantly affected by hurricanes. Much of the damage to the 
distribution system is done by high winds which can uproot distribution poles and damage 
distribution lines due to flying debris or falling trees. For example during the 1989 
Hurricane Hugo, falling trees knocked out thousands of distribution poles and lines cutting 
power to over 1 million customers (NOAA, 1990).  
 
Table 2.4 Summary of damage to power systems caused by hurricanes 
Year  Hurricane 
Approximate number 
of customers affected  
Approximate MW 
lost 
2002 Hurricane Lily 242,000 Not Reported (NR) 
2003 Hurricane Isabel 3.9 million 15,000 
2004 Hurricane Charley 2 million 4,200 
2004 Hurricane Frances 4.2 million 14,700 
2004 Hurricane Ivan 1.3 million 2,000 
2004 Hurricane Jeanne 1.2 million 4,300 
2005 Hurricane Dennis 278,000 96 
2005 Hurricane Katrina 2 million NR 
2005 Hurricane Ophelia 60,000 215 
2005 Hurricane Rita 2 million 3,200 
2005 Hurricane Wilma 3.7 million 10,800 
2008 Hurricane Gustav 1.3 million NR 
2008 Hurricane Ike 5.9 million NR 
2012 Hurricane Isaac 1.4 million NR 




Earthquakes are among the most devastating natural hazards. The extent of damage from 
earthquakes depends on population density and level of development of infrastructure such 
as power systems in an area. Most of the US has some seismic risk with some areas being 
more prone than others. Figure 2.2 shows the U.S. seismic hazard map with PGAs having 
a return period of 2475 years (USGS, 2016). As discussed in the previous section, the entire 
east coast of the U.S. is vulnerable to hurricane hazard. It can be seen from Figure 2.2 that 
some areas on the east coast such as South Carolina are also vulnerable to seismic hazard. 




Figure 2.2 U.S. seismic hazard map (PGA, 2% in 50 years)  
[Image courtesy of USGS (2016). See Appendix A] 
 
Earthquakes can cause damage to power generation facilities depending on the intensity of 
the earthquake and size of the power plant. Most power plants are usually designed to have 
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good seismic resistance. The 1989 San Francisco earthquake caused damage to the Moss 
Landing Facility which is a large generating plant located about 20 miles from the epicenter 
(U.S. Congress, 1990). Transmission towers are rarely damaged by the actual shaking of 
the ground during earthquakes. This is because the towers are designed for severe loads 
such as combined wind and ice, extra loads due to the collapse of adjacent towers and so 
on. Instead, the damage is mostly due to foundation failures caused by landslides, ground 
fracture and liquefaction (Shinozuka et al., 2005). 
 
Substations have several brittle components that have considerable mass which makes 
them prone to earthquake damage (Vanzi, 1996; Eidinger & Kempner, 2012). Unanchored 
rail-supported transformers in substations can fall from elevated platforms which can result 
in severe damage. Lack of adequate slack in conductors connecting equipment is another 
source of damage in substations. Current design guidelines require anchoring of substation 
equipment to the foundation or first-support, either by welding or bolting. There are, 
however, a large number of existing substation equipment across the US that are not 
retrofitted and anchored (Knight & Kempner Jr, 2009b). The 1971 San Fernando 
earthquake, for example, damaged many high-voltage substations causing power outages 
(U.S. Congress, 1990). The 2011 Christchurch earthquake in New Zealand also caused 
severe damage to substations due to ground shaking and liquefaction causing a power 
outage for several days (Massie & Watson, 2011). Earthquakes usually cause little damage 
to distribution lines because of their sizes and nature. A summary of some earthquakes and 










Table 2.5 Summary of damage to power systems caused by earthquakes 
Year Earthquake Approximate number of customers affected  Source  
1989 Loma Prieta earthquake 1.4 million NRC (1994) 
1994 Northridge earthquake 2.5 million Dong et al. (2004) 
2001 Nisqually earthquake 217,000 Creager et al. (2001) 
2003 San Simeon earthquake 109,000 DOE (2016) 
2010 Eureka earthquake 28,000 Valencia et al. (2010) 
 
 
2.3 Infrastructure Risk Assessment and Management 
 
In general terms, risk is defined as a measure of probability and severity of harm or adverse 
effects (Lowrance, 1976). In the context of infrastructure risk assessment, risk can be 
defined as the potential for loss or damage to infrastructure due to exposure to uncertain 
hazards. Uncertainties are inherent in both the occurrence of future hazard events as well 
as the consequent losses. Prediction of occurrence of hazard events is usually based on 
available historical data. Therefore risk analysis is prospective, anticipating scientifically 
credible future scenarios (Cardona et al., 2012). Due to uncertainties in both hazard 
occurrence and consequent losses, risk analysis of infrastructure is usually based on 
probabilistic formulations that incorporate the uncertainties into the risk analysis. In simple 
mathematical form, risk can be expressed as (Ayyub et al., 2009):  
 
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 = 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑅𝑅𝑝𝑝𝑅𝑅𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝 × 𝑒𝑒𝑣𝑣𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑅𝑅𝑝𝑝𝑅𝑅𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 × 𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒 (2.1) 
 
The probability of event is a measure of the likelihood of occurrence of hazard event of a 
given intensity and in a given area and time period. It is, therefore, a function of hazard 
source, location, and intensity. Vulnerability is the susceptibility of exposed components 
or systems to damage. For structures and infrastructure system components, this can be 
quantified through fragility analysis. Consequence is the potential loss due to damage 
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caused by the hazard. It can be measured in monetary terms, casualties, downtime, or 
power outage and duration in the case of electric power systems. 
 
Assessment of risk involves asking three basic questions (Kaplan, 1997):  
 
1. What can go wrong?  
2. How likely is it to go wrong (probability/frequency)  
3. What are the consequences? 
 
To answer the above three questions in the context of civil infrastructure risk assessment, 
the framework in Figure 2.3 is developed. The first stage of any risk assessment involves 
identification of any or all hazards that can impact a system and quantifying the hazard in 
terms of intensity and frequency. The second stage is exposure analysis which involves 
identifying assets that are exposed to the identified hazards. The likelihood of damage and 
the consequence of such damage is then quantified. The final stage of the framework 
involves evaluating whether the level of risk is within acceptable/tolerable limits. This last 
stage of the risk assessment framework leads to the decisions regarding mitigation and 
management of risk.  
     
 
Figure 2.3 Risk assessment methodology 
 
Risk mitigation involves reducing one or more of the three components of risk in Equation 
(1). For infrastructure subjected to natural hazards, reducing the probability of occurrence 
of the hazard events is not feasible. Hence, mitigation strategies usually involve reducing 













is level of risk 
acceptable? 
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reliability of infrastructure systems through hardening of existing components, introducing 
redundancy in the system etc. One way to reduce consequence is to provide alternative to 
the exposed infrastructure. For example, microgrids and distributed generation can reduce 
power outage during or after natural disasters in case of damage to the main power grid.   
    
Risk management can be summarized in three questions (Haimes, 2015; Ezell et al., 2000):  
 
1. What can be done? 
2. What options are available and what are their corresponding cost, risks, and 
benefits? 
3. What will be the impact of current risk management decisions on future options? 
 
Risk management involves four main steps as shown in Figure 2.4: (1) estimating the level 
of risk under the status quo (without mitigation); (2) identifying possible risk mitigation 
strategies and their associated cost; (3) re-evaluating risk to estimate reduction in losses 
due to mitigation strategies; and (4) calculating the cost-effectiveness of mitigation 
measures. The risk management framework shown in Figure 2.4 forms the basis for all the 
frameworks developed in this dissertation for different sub-systems of the electric power 
system subjected to different natural hazards.  
   
 






















3. System Reliability Model 
 
Civil infrastructure systems are made up of components that work together to serve a 
specific purpose. Electric power systems, for example, rely on components in the 
generation, transmission, and distribution sub-systems to deliver electricity to customers. 
The functionality of the system at any particular time depends on the state of the 
components. Therefore, risk analysis of such a system requires consideration of the 
interaction among its components.    
 
A critical part of any system-level risk analysis process is quantifying the consequence of 
damage to the system. This can be done using various performance measures such as 
system reliability. System reliability is defined as the ability of a system to perform a 
required function for a stated period of time under given environmental and operating 
conditions (Rausand & Høyland, 2004). System reliability theory can be used to assess the 
risk to infrastructure systems subjected to natural hazards, evaluate the efficiency of 
disaster mitigation methods, design maintenance plans, and design layout of system 
components.  
  
For electric power systems, models of performance measure can range from purely 
topological-based models to complex alternating current (AC) power flow models. 
Topological- or connectivity-based models only consider the manner in which system 
components are arranged (topology) to describe the behavior of the system. Physical 
constraints that govern power flow within the system is ignored. Power flow-based models, 
on the other hand, take into account the physics of power flow, power capacity limits of 
components and other engineering details of the system (LaRocca et al., 2014). 
 
Topological-based models have two main advantages: (i) they are computationally 
efficient especially for complex systems or in a case where system performance under 
various scenarios is desired, and (ii) significantly less data about a system is required to 
evaluate reliability. While power flow-based models provide more accurate description of 
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system performance, they are computationally complex and often impractical (LaRocca et 
al., 2014; Duenas-Osorio & Hernandez-Fajardo, 2008; Kim & Kang, 2013; Cavalieri et al., 
2014; Albert et al., 2004). Furthermore, detail information about engineering properties of 
system components is required for such analysis. As this study focuses mainly on structural 
components of the power system, which define the topology, the topological-based method 
will be used. 
 
 
3.1 Review of Existing Topological-Based Methods 
 
While topological-based system performance models have not been applied to distribution 
systems, few models for transmission (networked) systems have been proposed. Albert et 
al. (2004) proposed a measure of system performance termed connectivity loss (CL) for a 
grid-like system. The method was developed to investigate the impact of removing nodes 
(generators and substations) from the North American power grid and to determine whether 
the grid is reliant on a small set of hubs whose removal will cause large-scale breakdown 
of the power grid. Nodes are modeled with binary functions, i.e., either functioning or 
failed. The connectivity loss is given by Equation (3.1). The connectivity loss measures the 
decrease in the ability of a distribution substation to receive power from the generators. 
 




where 𝑁𝑁𝐺𝐺  is the total number of generators; 𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐷 is the total number of distribution 
substations; and 𝑁𝑁𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖  is the number of generators connected to substation i. 
 
LaRocca et al. (2014) introduced a topological-based system performance measure termed 
efficiency, which is calculated based on the shortest path between a pair of nodes in a 
network. The method was demonstrated by randomly removing nodes and edges from the 
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network and studying the impact on efficiency. The efficiency of a network is given by 
Equation (3.2).     
 
𝐸𝐸 = 1
𝑁𝑁(𝑁𝑁 − 1) � 1𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑖𝑖∈𝑁𝑁𝐹𝐹,𝑖𝑖∈𝑁𝑁𝐿𝐿  (3.2) 
 
where 𝑁𝑁 is the total number of nodes in the network; 𝑁𝑁𝐹𝐹 is the set of in-feed nodes; 𝑁𝑁𝐿𝐿 is 
the set of load nodes; and 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the length of the shortest path between node i and node j. 
In another approach, Johansson et al. (2007) used power connection loss (PCL) to evaluate 
system performance. PCL, given by Equation (3.3), is defined as the aggregate load at 
nodes that do not have any connection to a power source. 
 




where 𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶 is the set of nodes that do not have any connection to a power source and 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 
is the load at node i.      
 
The vulnerability of structural components subjected to natural hazards is usually evaluated 
using fragility curves. Fragility curves give the probability of failure between 0 and 1 for a 
component given a specific hazard level. The probability of failure is, therefore, a 
continuous random variable. However, the above methods assigned a probability of failure 
or probability that power will not be supplied to customers of either 0 or 1. As such, the 
above topological methods fail to capture the true stochastic nature of risk assessment 
under natural hazards. In the following two sections, a topological-based method that 




    
26 
3.2 Accessibility of System Components 
 
The ability of a component in a system to perform its function depends invariably on its 
reliability as well as the reliability of other components. Even if a system component is not 
physically damaged after a hazard event, damage to other components can prevent it from 
performing its intended function. Accessibility of a component is therefore defined here as 
the probability that commodity (power) will be supplied to the component.  
 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, the topology of distribution and transmission systems differ 
significantly. Most distribution systems have radial topology such as the one shown in 
Figure 3.1(a). Power delivery starts from the substation through main feeder lines. The 
feeders eventually branched off to smaller lateral lines that deliver power directly to 
customers. Transmission systems, on the other hand, have a networked topology with 
several paths from one node to another. The accessibilities of the two different topologies 







Figure 3.1 Topology of electric power sub-systems  
(a) Distribution system (radial or tree-like) (b) Transmission system (networked or grid-
like) 
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3.2.1 Radial Systems 
 
In radial distribution systems, a line is defined as a switchable section with one or more 
isolator elements at its ends. Isolator elements, commonly known as sectionalizers, are 
usually installed at several points within a system so as to allow parts of the system to be 
isolated in case of any disturbance at any point along a line (Brown, 2008). The presence 
of isolator elements within a distribution system allows each line to be considered 
individually as a ‘switchable section’. All components in a switchable section have the 
same reliability characteristics and failure of any component have the same impact 
regardless of the location of the failed component. Consequently, switchable sections can 
be reduced to single component equivalent. A failed line is assumed to be isolated from the 
rest of the system by activating the isolator element upstream of the line. 
 
Due to the radial nature of most distribution systems, the accessibility of lines in the system 
can be modeled as a series system in which the failure of any line or component along a 
path can lead to failure of power delivery to lines downstream of the failed line. Consider 
the simple radial system shown in Figure 3.2. The failure probability of power delivery to 
each lateral line is calculated by considering power flow. For example, considering line 7, 
power will be cut off to the line if line 1, 3, 5, 6 or 7 itself fails. The accessibility of line 7 














Figure 3.2 Schematic of a radial distribution system 
 
1 3 5 6 7
 
Figure 3.3 Reliability block diagram for power delivery to line 7 
 
The probability that power is not delivered to line 7 (complement of accessibility) is 
therefore given by Equation (3.4). 
 
𝑄𝑄𝐿𝐿7 = 1 − ��1 − 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝐿𝐿1��1 − 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝐿𝐿3��1 − 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝐿𝐿5��1 − 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝐿𝐿6��1 − 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝐿𝐿7�� (3.4) 
 
where 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝐿𝐿1, 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝐿𝐿3, 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝐿𝐿5, 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝐿𝐿6, and 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝐿𝐿7  are probabilities of failure of lines 1, 3, 5, 6, and 7 
respectively. Note that in Equation (3.4), the failures of the lines are independent due to 
the isolator elements.  
 
In a situation whereby a line can be supplied by more than one substation as will be seen 
in Chapter 6, all paths from source to the line are considered in formulating the 
accessibility. In systems with more than one power source, normally open (NO) switches 
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are used to maintain the radial nature of the system. If one path of power delivery fails, the 
NO switch can be closed to initiate the flow of electricity through alternative paths. For 
example, considering the simple schematic in Figure 3.4, power will be cut off to lateral 
line 4 if line 3 fails, or both lines 1 and 2 fail, or if line 4 itself fails. Failure of power 












Figure 3.4 Simple schematic of distribution system with redundancy 
 
Power not delivered to Line 4
Failure of Line 4 Failure of Line 3
Failure of Line 1 Failure of Line 2




Figure 3.5 Fault tree diagram for failure of power delivery to Line 4 
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The probability that power is not delivered to Line 4 is then calculate using Equation (3.5). 
 
𝑄𝑄𝐿𝐿4 = 1 − ��1 − 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝐿𝐿4��1 − 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝐿𝐿3��1 − 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝐿𝐿1∙𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝐿𝐿2�� (3.5) 
 
where 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝐿𝐿1, 𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿2, 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝐿𝐿3, and 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝐿𝐿4  are probabilities of failure of lines 1, 2, 3, and 4 respectively. 
 
 
3.2.2 Networked Systems 
 
Consider the simple schematic in Figure 3.6 with 2 supply stations (gate stations) and 3 
demand substations (low voltage substations). Whether substation S1 remains functional 
depends not only on its own reliability but on the reliability of gate stations G1 and G2, 
















Figure 3.6 Schematic of a networked power system 
 
Now consider a situation where only the edges (transmission lines) are assumed to be 
vulnerable to failure. The problem of calculating the probability that power is not delivered 
to any node (substation) reduces to a terminal-pair reliability problem. A terminal-pair 
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reliability problem aims to determine the probability of successful communication between 
any pair of nodes in a network, given the reliability of each edge in the network. In such a 
case, the accessibility or terminal-pair reliability of any node (which is the complement of 
the probability that power is not delivered to that node) is the union of the reliability of all 
the minimal cut sets from supply nodes to the node in question. 
 
A cut set here is defined as the set of components such that if these components fail, the 
system fails (i.e., power is not delivered to the intended node). A cut set is minimal if, when 
any component is removed from the set, the remaining components collectively are no 
longer a cut set.  
 
Considering power delivery to S1 and only edge failure, there are three paths for power 
flow to S1: (i) through T1, (ii) through T3, and (iii) through T5 and T4. Failure of a 
combination of one element from each path will result in power not being delivered to S1. 
The minimal cut sets are, therefore: 
 
1. T1, T3, and T4 
2. T1, T3, and T5 
In other words, the system will fail if T1, T3, and T4 fail OR if T1, T3, and T5 fail.  
 
Defining the probabilities of failure of T1, T3, T4, and T5 as 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓1, 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓3, 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓4, and 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓5, 
respectively, and assuming failure of the lines to be independent, the probability that power 
will not be delivered to S1 is then: 
 
𝑄𝑄𝑆𝑆1 = �𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓1𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓3𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓4� ∪ �𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓1𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓3𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓5� (3.6) 
 
Denoting �𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓1𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓3𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓4� as P(A) and �𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓1𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓3𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓5� as P(B), 
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𝑄𝑄𝑆𝑆1 = 𝑃𝑃(𝐴𝐴 ∪ 𝐵𝐵) = 1 − 𝑃𝑃(𝐴𝐴 ∪ 𝐵𝐵) (3.7) 
 
From de Morgan’s rule, 
 
𝑄𝑄𝑆𝑆1 = 1 − 𝑃𝑃�?̅?𝐴 ∩  𝐵𝐵� = 1 − [1 − 𝑃𝑃(𝐴𝐴)] ∙ [1 − 𝑃𝑃(𝐵𝐵)] (3.8) 
 
A and B (minimal cut sets) in the above equation are assumed to be independent. This will 
be clarified later. Substituting A and B with the original probabilities, 
 
𝑄𝑄𝑆𝑆1 = 1 − �1 − �𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓1𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓3𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓4�� ∙ �1 − �𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓1𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓3𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓5�� (3.9) 
 
The terminal-pair reliability of S1, which is the complement of 𝑄𝑄𝑆𝑆1 is then 
 
𝑅𝑅𝑓𝑓 = 1 − 𝑄𝑄𝑆𝑆1 = ��1 − 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓1𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓3𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓4��1 − 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓1𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓3𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓5�� (3.10) 
 
Considering a situation where only the nodes (substations) are assumed to be vulnerable to 
failure, power will not be delivered to S1 when S1 itself fails or when both G1 and G2 fail. 
The probability that power is not delivered to S1 is then given by Equation (3.11) based 
on the minimal cut sets from source nodes to S1. 
 
𝑄𝑄𝑆𝑆1_𝑠𝑠 = 1 − ��1 − 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑆𝑆1��1 − 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝐺𝐺1𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝐺𝐺2�� (3.11) 
 
In a situation where both the nodes and edges are vulnerable to failure, the minimal cut sets 
for power delivery to S1 are: 
 
1. S1 
2. G1 and G2 
3. G1, T3, and T5 
4. G1, T3, and S2 
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5. G1, T3, and T4 
6. T1 and G2 
7. T1, T3, and T5 
8. T1, T3, and S2 
9. T1, T3, and T4 
The probability that power will not be delivered to S1 is then given by: 
 
𝑄𝑄𝑆𝑆1 = �𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑆𝑆1� ∪ �𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝐺𝐺1𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝐺𝐺2� ∪ �𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝐺𝐺1𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓3𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓5� ∪ �𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝐺𝐺1𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓3𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑆𝑆2�
∪ �𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝐺𝐺1𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓3𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓4� ∪ �𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝐺𝐺2𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓1� ∪ �𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓1𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓3𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓5�
∪ �𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓1𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓3𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑆𝑆2� ∪ �𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓1𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓3𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓4� 
(3.12) 
 
where 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑆𝑆1 and 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑆𝑆2 are the probabilities of failure of S1 and S2, respectively; 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝐺𝐺1 and 
𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝐺𝐺2 are the probabilities of failure of G1 and G2, respectively. Using the same steps as 
before, it can be shown that 𝑄𝑄𝑆𝑆1 is given by Equation (3.13) considering both node and 
edge failure. 
 
𝑄𝑄𝑆𝑆1 = 1 − ��1 − 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑆𝑆1��1 − 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝐺𝐺1𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝐺𝐺2��1 − 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝐺𝐺1𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓3𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓5��1
− 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝐺𝐺1𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓3𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑆𝑆2��1 − 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝐺𝐺1𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓3𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓4��1 − 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝐺𝐺2𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓1��1
− 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓1𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓3𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓5��1 − 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓1𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓3𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑆𝑆2��1 − 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓1𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓3𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓4�� (3.13) 
 
Note that in formulating Equations (3.10), (3.11) & (3.13), it was assumed that the failure 
of minimal cut sets occurs independently. This is not always true as one component may 
appear in several minimal cuts. Therefore, system reliability evaluated using the formulated 
accessibilities (probability of power being delivered) in Equations (3.10), (3.11) & (3.13), 
will be the lower bound of the actual reliability. It has been shown that for coherent systems 
with components that have small probabilities of failure, which is often the case in practice, 
the lower bound of the reliability is very close to the actual reliability (Esary & Proschan, 
1963). Coherent systems are defined as systems in which (i) if all components are 
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functioning, the system is functioning, (ii) if all components are in a failed state, then the 
system failed, and (iii) higher components’ reliability implies higher system reliability. 
 
 
3.3 Topological-Based System Reliability Formulation 
 
Given the accessibilities of system components, a single measure of system reliability is 
required. A simple topological-based approach is to use the weighted reliabilities of system 
components (Volkanovski et al., 2009). The system reliability is thus given by Equation 
(3.14). 
 




where 𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖 is the probability that power is not delivered to the ith component (lateral lines 
or demand substations); 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 is the load served by ith component (kVA, kW, or number of 
customers); 𝐶𝐶 is the total load served by the system (kVA, kW, or number of customers); 
and 𝑁𝑁 is the total number of demand components in the system. 𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖 as evaluated in the 
previous section explicitly considers the actual probability of failure of each component in 
a system.  
 
If detailed information about customer power consumption is available, then 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 and 𝐶𝐶 can 
be defined as the average power supplied by ith component and the average total power 
supplied by the system, respectively. Doing this will ensure that a line that supplies one 
customer for example with high power consumption will have a relatively similar effect on 
system reliability with a line that serves several customers with low power demand. 
However, due to the varying nature of power consumption, the reliability can only be 




3.4 Line Failure Model 
 
Failure of distribution and transmission lines here is defined as service failure which is the 
inability of a line to deliver power to the intended target. Service failure is assumed to occur 
when the conductor wires are dropped to the ground. For distribution lines, the failure 
model proposed by Taras et al. (2004) is adopted and is explained here. A distribution line 
is defined as a switchable section with isolator elements at its ends. 
 
Consider the distribution line shown in Figure 3.7, service failure is defined as the failure 
of two consecutive poles in a system of three poles. Failure of 2 consecutive poles in any 
line constitutes service failure regardless of the total number of poles in the line. In the 
model, a ‘system of 3 poles’ in a line of n poles is considered because the failure of a central 
pole, i, can cause the failure of either of the adjacent poles (i+1 or i-1). The failure of the 
adjacent poles is conditional on the failure of the central pole. 
 
Figure 3.7 Distribution line model 
 
i i - 1 i + 1 
Adjacent Adjacent Central Pole 
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To determine the probability of service failure in a system of three poles, the following are 
defined Taras et al. (2004): 
• Probability of service failure of a system with three poles is defined as 𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼 
• Probability of failure of the central pole “i” is defined by 𝑃𝑃(𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖) ≡ 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 
• Probability of failure of an adjacent pole conditional on the failure of the central 
pole is defined by 𝑃𝑃(𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖−1|𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖) = 𝑃𝑃(𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖+1|𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖) ≡ 𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎 
• The conditional probability of failure of the adjacent poles is evaluated by 
increasing their applied load by 50% to account for load sharing after the failure of 
the central pole. Note that increasing the load means increasing the wind pressure 
area or the ground line moment, rather than increasing the wind speed.  
 
The probability of service failure in the system with three poles is: 
 
𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼 = 𝑃𝑃(𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖) ∙ 𝑃𝑃[(𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖−1 ∪ 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖+1)|𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖] (3.15) 
 
𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼 = 𝑃𝑃(𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖) ∙ {𝑃𝑃[𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖−1|𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖] + 𝑃𝑃[𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖+1|𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖] − 𝑃𝑃[(𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖−1 ∩ 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖+1)|𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖]} (3.16) 
 
Assuming that the failures of the adjacent poles are independent of each other, then 
 
𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼 = 𝑃𝑃(𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖) ∙ {𝑃𝑃[𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖−1|𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖] + 𝑃𝑃[𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖+1|𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖] − 𝑃𝑃[(𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖−1|𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖)] ∙ 𝑃𝑃[(𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖+1|𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖)]} (3.17) 
 
The above equation can be rewritten as: 
 
𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼 = 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 ∙ {2𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎 − 𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎2} (3.18) 
 
Equation (3.18) is applied to each pole along a line. The number of all possible failure 
modes in a line is the same as the number of poles in the line. Assuming all failure modes 
are fully independent, the overall failure probability of an entire line is given by Equation 
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(3.19). This is also the upper bound of the probability of failure. If all the failure modes are 
fully dependent, the probability of failure is the lower bound given by Equation (3.20). 
Note that the exact failure probability of a line lies between the given bounds. 
Determination of the exact failure probability requires a knowledge of the correlation 
coefficient between poles in a line which can vary depending on the location of each pole 
relative to a failed pole. In subsequent life cycle cost analysis in this study, the upper bound 
of the probability of failure of the lines is used so as to be conservative. 
 
𝑈𝑈𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑣𝑣𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑:      𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝐿𝐿 = 1 −�[1 − 𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼]𝑚𝑚
𝑖𝑖=1
 (3.19) 
𝐿𝐿𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑣𝑣𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑:     𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝐿𝐿 = max[𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼] (3.20) 
 
where 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝐿𝐿 is the probability of failure of an entire line and m is the total number of poles 
in the line.  Using the above concept, the probabilities of failure of the lines in a power 
system can be calculated. The reliability of a line is the complement of the probability of 
failure.  
 
Transmission line ends are assumed to be between two substations, between a substation 
and a branching point, or between any two branching points. The span between support 
structures of transmission lines is usually long enough that the failure of one support 
structure will lead to service failure of the line. This is unlike in distribution system where 
the spans are relatively short and the failure of one pole may not necessarily lead to service 
failure of the line. If a transmission line is modeled as a series system, the lower bound of 
the probability of failure of the line is obtained by assuming that the failure modes are fully 
dependent. The upper bound, on the other hand, is obtained by assuming that the failure 
modes are fully independent. The lower and upper bounds of the probability of failure are 
given by Equation (3.21). 
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where 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝐿𝐿 is the probability of failure of the line; 𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆 is the probability of failure of a single 
support structure; and N is the total number of support structures in the line. In this research, 
full independence is assumed between the modes and hence the upper limit in Equation 
(3.21) is used for evaluating transmission line failure. This is reasonable due to the long 

























Over the years, several methods of hardening the distribution system have been studied. 
One of the methods studied extensively is undergrounding the system (e.g. Francis et al. 
(2011), Brown (2009), Xu and Brown (2008b), CVSCC (2004), FPSC (2005), LIPA 
(2005), TDA (2006)). However, most of these studies concluded that undergrounding is 
not cost-effective. Another method being currently studied is targeted hardening of current 
overhead distribution systems. Targeted hardening involves strengthening important 
support structures as well as structures with very high probability of failure. Important 
structures include distribution poles that serve a large number of customers, poles that serve 
critical customers (hospitals, fire stations, police stations, economic centers) and poles that 
are difficult to access. Brown (2009) studied the hardening of 10% of distribution poles in 
Texas and estimated the net benefit derived from it. Bjarnadottir et al. (2014) studied 
targeted hardening of distribution poles in Florida by replacing poles that fail with poles 
that are one class higher.  
 
The above studies did not attempt to identify risk-critical parts of the system to be 
strengthened or evaluate the effect of the targeted hardening on overall system reliability. 
To determine the critical parts or components of a system, some form of component 
importance measure is required. This, in turn, requires evaluating the reliability of the 
whole system. However, previous studies (e.g. Han et al. (2013), Shafieezadeh et al. 
(2014a), Bjarnadottir et al. (2013), Ryan et al. (2014b)) conducted on the vulnerability of 
distribution systems to hurricane and extreme wind damage focuses on evaluating the 
reliabilities of individual poles rather than the whole system.    
                                                 
1 A version of this chapter was previously published in Reliability Engineering & System Safety and is re-
used herein with permission from Elsevier. The permission is presented in Appendix B. 
40 
 
This chapter presents and demonstrates a framework that can be used to evaluate the 
effectiveness of targeted hardening measures. The framework includes fragility analysis 
considering decay of poles, hurricane hazard analysis, system reliability evaluation, 
component importance measure, and cost analysis. The flow chart of the general 
framework is shown in Figure 4.1. The framework is explained and demonstrated at the 
same time using a notional power distribution system.  
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Figure 4.1 Flowchart of proposed framework 
 
Define Distribution System 
Evaluate Fragility of Poles Considering Decay 
Evaluate Component Importance Index 
Re-evaluate System Reliability 
Select Targeted Hardening Measure 
Required 
Improvement Met? 
Evaluate System Reliability 














Hurricane Hazard Analysis  
Select Probabilistic- or Scenario-Based 
Analysis 
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4.2 Power Distribution System Model 
 
The power system model adopted for demonstrating the framework is shown in Figure 4.2. 
It is the power system of a virtual city called “Micropolis” developed at Texas A&M 
University for use in infrastructure risk research and planning (Brumbelow et al., 2007; 
Bagchi, 2009; Bagchi et al., 2009). The city has approximately 5000 residents in a 
historically rural region. The city is assumed to be located on the east coast of Florida, with 
the middle of the city located at 27.6oN and 80.4oW. The city has one substation supplied 
by a sub-transmission line (138 kV rating) running through the city. Two three-phase 
feeders emanate from the substation to deliver power to the entire city by branching off to 
smaller three-phase sub-branches and single-phase laterals. The dots in Figure 4.2 represent 
the poles while the conductor wires are represented by solid lines. Most of the left side of 
the city is served by an underground system. However, in this research, the underground 
system is transformed to an overhead system so that the entire system can be considered. 
 
Figure 4.2 only shows poles carrying distribution transformers and directly serving 
customers. However, the city is approximately 2 miles by 1 mile. Therefore, there are a lot 
more poles in the city than shown in Figure 4.2. The number of poles in each line is found 
based on the span of the poles which is taken as 46 m as will be discussed subsequently. 
The total number of poles in the city is approximately 661. The total circuit line is 
approximately 30.3 km. There are an estimated 434 residential, 15 industrial, and 9 
commercial/institutional customers in the city including 3 schools and 3 churches 
(Brumbelow et al., 2007). Figure 4.3 shows the line diagram of the power distribution 
system. The system is assumed to be radially operated at all times. Radially operated 
implies there is a unique path from the source of power to each component or customer.      
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Figure 4.2 Micropolis power distribution system 
[© IEEE. Reprinted, with permission, from Bagchi et al. (2009). Modeling the impact of fire 
spread on the electrical distribution network of a virtual city. Paper presented at the North 
American Power Symposium (NAPS), 2009. See Appendix C] 
 
 
Figure 4.3 Micropolis power distribution system line diagram 
[© IEEE. Reprinted, with permission, from Bagchi et al. (2009). Modeling the impact of fire 
spread on the electrical distribution network of a virtual city. Paper presented at the North 
American Power Symposium (NAPS), 2009. See Appendix C] 
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4.3 Design of Poles 
 
The poles supporting the distribution lines are assumed to be southern pine wood poles as 
they are the dominant used in the U.S. (Gustavsen & Rolfseng, 2000; Wolfe & Moody, 
1997). The poles are designed using the reliability-based method recommended by ASCE-
111 (2006). Figure 4.4 shows the distribution poles layout. A typical distribution pole that 
is 13.7 m high is considered. The three-phase main feeder poles are assumed to support 
three Aluminum Conductor Steel Reinforced (ACSR) conductor wires with diameters of 
18.3 mm. They are also assumed to support one all-aluminum conductor (AAC) neutral 
wire with a diameter of 11.8 mm. The single-phase laterals are assumed to support two 
ACSR conductor wires and one AAC neutral wire. All the poles are assumed to have a 
span of 46 m for wind pressure calculations (Short, 2006). 
 
 
Figure 4.4 Distribution poles layout  









Ground line Ground line 

















The poles are designed for NESC (2002) grade C construction for weather-related loads 
which are often the controlling conditions (ASCE-111, 2006). The design equation that 
controls reliability of weather-related events is given by (ASCE-111, 2006): 
 
𝜙𝜙𝑅𝑅𝑛𝑛 > 𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝 𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜 [1.1𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿 𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑 𝛾𝛾𝑄𝑄50] (4.1) 
 
where ϕ is strength factor, Rn is the nominal strength, DL is dead loads, γ is load factor, and 
Q50 is 50-year return period wind load. The design 50-year return period 3-sec gust wind 
speed for the chosen location is about 52 m/s based on ASCE-7 (2010). Based on the wind 
speed, the wind force acting on the pole and the wires can be calculated using Equation 
(4.2) from ASCE-74 (1991). ASCE-111 (2006) recommends the use of this equation for 
both transmission and distribution support structures.  
 
𝐹𝐹 = 𝑄𝑄𝐾𝐾𝑧𝑧𝐾𝐾𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧(𝑉𝑉)2𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝑓𝑓𝐴𝐴 (4.2) 
 
where F is force (N), Q is air density factor, Kz is exposure coefficient, V is basic 3-sec 
gust wind speed, G is gust response factor, Cf is force or drag coefficient, Kzt is topographic 
factor, and A is the area projected on a plane normal to the wind direction (m2).  To account 
for P-Δ effect, ASCE-111 (2006) recommends using the method developed by Gere and 
Carter (1962). The method involves determining an amplification factor to account for the 
P-Δ effect. The amplification factor is given by Equation (4.3). 
 
𝐴𝐴𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑅𝑅𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑅𝑅𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒 𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 = 11 − �𝑉𝑉𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐� (4.3) 
 
where VL is total factored vertical load, Pcr is buckling load given by Equation (4.4). 
𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 = �𝜋𝜋2 × 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸 × 𝐼𝐼𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡[2𝐿𝐿]2 × 144 ��𝐷𝐷𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝐷𝐷𝑧𝑧𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 �2.7 (4.4) 
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where MOE is the mean modulus of elasticity, Itop is the moment of inertia at top of pole, 
L is the distance from the ground line to centroid of horizontal loads, Dbottom and Dtop are 
the bottom and top diameters, respectively.  Class 4 and class 5 southern pine poles are 
initially assumed to be sufficient for the three-phase and single-phase lines respectively. 
The values of the variables in Equation 4.2 are given in Table 4.1 while the parameters 
related to the poles are given in Table 4.2. Note that the initial strength and geometry of 
the poles are found in ANSI-O5.1 (2002). Comparing the required and actually ground line 
circumferences from Table 4.2, it can be seen that the class 4 and class 5 southern pine 
poles are adequate for the three-phase and single-phase lines, respectively as assumed. 
 
Table 4.1 Design variables 
variable Mean values for pole Mean values for wires 
G 0.948 0.85 
Cf 0.9 1.0 
Kz 0.951 1.029 
Q 0.613 0.613 
Kzt 1.0 1.0 
A (m2) 
2.644 for class 4 and 2.439 for 
class 5  
0.842 per conductor 
















Strength, Rn (MPa) 55.2 55.2 
Strength factor, 𝜙𝜙 0.79 0.79 
Top circumference (m) 0.53 0.48 
Circumference at 1.8 m from butt (m) 0.89 0.83 
Total ground line moment (N-m) 69,212 55,760 
Amplification factor 1.1 1.1 
Design ground line moment (N-m) (Amp factor * total GLM)  76,133 61,336 
Required section modulus (m3) 0.00175 0.00141 
Required circumference at ground line (m) 0.82 0.763 
Actual circumference at ground line (m) 0.884 0.824 
 
 
4.4 Decay of Wood Poles 
 
Wood poles are susceptible to decay due to fungal attack and are also vulnerable to attack 
by insects and woodpeckers. Decay usually occurs at the ground level or just below the 
ground. The rate of decay of wood depends on several factors such as timber species, 
climatic conditions (temperature, rainfall, and humidity), initial preservative treatment, and 
nature of fungal/insect attack. This means that any decay model can only be an 
approximation. The decay model from Li et al. (2005) and Shafieezadeh et al. (2014b) is 
adopted in this research. The strength of poles as a function of time is given by Equation 
(4.5).   
 
𝑅𝑅(𝑝𝑝) = 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡[1 − min(max(𝑝𝑝1𝑝𝑝 − 𝑝𝑝2, 0) , 1) × min(max(𝑝𝑝1𝑝𝑝𝑏𝑏2 , 0) , 1)] (4.5) 
 
where R(t) is the strength at time t, Ro is the initial strength. The values of 𝑝𝑝1, 𝑝𝑝2, 𝑝𝑝1, and 
𝑝𝑝2 were found from regression analysis as 0.014418, 0.10683, 1.3 x 10-4, and 1.846 
48 
respectively by Li et al. (2005) and Shafieezadeh et al. (2014b). Figure 4.5 shows the 
residual strength remaining as a function of time for southern pine poles calculated using 
Equation (4.5). According to the NESC (2002), wood poles should be replaced or 
reinforced when their strength falls below 67% of the initial strength. From Figure 4.5, this 
will happen when the poles are around 73 years old. The long service life of the poles from 
the decay model might be because the poles used to develop the model are in-service poles 
that have undergone periodic maintenance. 
 
 
Figure 4.5 Residual strength of poles as a function of time 
 
Shafieezadeh et al. (2014b) also used the data from Li et al. (2005) to plot the variation of 
c.o.v of southern pine poles with age. The plot showed that as the poles age, the uncertainty 
in the strength increases. The figure developed by Shafieezadeh et al. (2014b) is used to 
obtain the c.o.v of the pole strength at different ages in this study.  The above decay model 
has shortcomings because it does not incorporate variation in soil properties as well as 
variation in decay rate due to wood specie. Due to these shortcomings, location-specific 





























4.5 Fragility Analysis 
 
Fragility analysis is required to calculate the probability of failure of the power lines. 
Fragility is the probability of failure of a structure subjected to a given load. Monte Carlo 
simulation is used to calculate the probabilities of failure of the poles while varying the 
basic 3-sec gust wind speed. For each random variable with uncertainty, 1,000,000 random 
values were generated. Only flexural failure due to wind load is considered in the analysis. 
It is acknowledged that other failure mechanisms such as foundation failure and failure 
caused by falling trees and flying debris are also important in practice. However, there is a 
lack of data to include these failure mechanisms in the structural reliability formulation. If 
such data become available, these failure mechanisms can be easily included.  
 
The probabilities of failure were calculated by counting the number of cases where the 
stress demand at the ground line exceeds the corresponding stress capacity. Even though 
the poles are tapered, the critical stress for short poles, such as the ones normally used in 
distribution systems, is commonly at the ground line (ASCE-111, 2006). The limit state 
function for the fragility analysis is given by: 
 
𝐺𝐺(𝑝𝑝) = 𝑅𝑅(𝑝𝑝) − 𝑆𝑆 (4.6) 
 
where R(t) is the strength of the poles at any time t and S is the stress demand at the ground 
line caused by wind speed. The steps of the fragility analysis are summarized in the flow 




Figure 4.6 Fragility analysis flowchart 
 
The initial strength of the poles is determined from ANSI-O5.1 (2002) while the strength 
as the system ages is determined by considering decay of the poles as described previously. 
The stress due to applied wind load is determined using the force from Equation ((4.2). The 
uncertain parameters related to the pole strength and applied stress and their c.o.v are 
summarized in Table 4.3.  
 
 
System Component Definition: 
Define failure mode, probability distribution of 
random variables, and moments 
For simulation i, generate random numbers 
for each random variable related to both 
strength and applied load 
Evaluate strength and applied load 
Evaluate limit state function, 
G = capacity - load  
Sum all instances where G < 0. 
Evaluate probability of failure  
= Sum (G<0)/n 





i = i+1 
Select number of simulations, n. 
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c.o.v Source  
Fiber Strength (kPa) Lognormal Varies with time Shafieezadeh et al. (2014b) 
Pole Height above ground (m) Normal 0.03 Assumed  
Wind Area (m2) Normal 0.06 Wolfe and Moody (1997) 
G Normal  0.11 Ellingwood and Tekie (1999) 
Cf Normal  0.12 Ellingwood and Tekie (1999) 
Kz Normal  0.06 ASCE-111 (2006) 
 
The fragility curves of the poles at different ages are shown in Figure 4.7 and Figure 4.8. 
It can be seen that because of decay, the probabilities of failure given wind speed increases 
as the poles age. It can also be seen that compared to the three-phase poles, the single-
phase poles have slightly lower probabilities of failure even though they have a slightly 
smaller ground line diameter. This is because the single-phase poles carry fewer conductors 
as shown in Figure 4.4. 
 
Overhead lateral lines use pole-mounted distribution transformers (DTs) to serve 
customers. Typical 25kVA rated DTs are assumed to serve most of the customers in 
Micropolis and each DT is assumed to serve an average of four customers (Gonen, 2014). 
It is acknowledged that higher rated transformers are required for few of the customers in 
the city such as churches and industrial buildings. For a lateral line like line 20 in Figure 
4.2 and Figure 4.3 which serves 48 residential customers and is about 1.4 km long, it has 
12 poles carrying DTs out of a total of about 30 poles. Based on information from 
commercially available pole mounted DTs, the DTs on the poles are assumed to be 0.39 m 
in diameter, 0.61 m in cylinder height, and weighing about 160 kg.  
 
Fragility curves of new and 60-year-old single-phase poles carrying DTs are shown in 
Figure 4.8. It can be seen that the presence of DTs slightly increases the probabilities of 
failure at different wind speeds. For example, at a wind speed of 60 m/s, new lateral line 
poles without DTs have a probability of failure of 0.19 compared to 0.22 for new poles 
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with DTs. For poles that are 60 years old, the probability of failure at 60 m/s with and 
without DTs is 0.56 and 0.60, respectively.    
 
 
Figure 4.7 Fragility curves of three-phase line poles at 0, 20, 40, and 60 years 
 
 























































New pole with DT
60 yrs old with DT
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The lognormal distribution is assumed to describe the fragility models as recommended by 
Bjarnadottir et al. (2013). A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test was carried out to confirm this 
assumption. The lognormal CDF is given by: 
 
𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅(𝑒𝑒) = 𝛷𝛷 �𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒(𝑒𝑒/𝑚𝑚)𝜁𝜁 � (4.7) 
 
where m is the median of the fragility function, and ζ is the logarithmic standard deviation 
of intensity measure. 
 
 
4.6 Hurricane Risk Assessment 
 
There are two ways to assess hurricane risk (Li, 2012). The first method is probabilistic 
hurricane analysis where historical hurricane records are used to develop probability 
density function for key hurricane parameters such as the location of origin, translation 
speed, heading angle, central pressure, and radius to maximum wind location. Monte Carlo 
simulation is then performed to simulate future hurricanes which can be used to estimate 
maximum wind speeds as demonstrated by Vickery et al. (2000b). The wind speed from 
the above simulation is then modeled as a random variable and convolved with fragility 
model to assess the risk of structures or components as demonstrated by Li and Ellingwood 
(2006). 
 
The second method is a scenario-based approach where the effect of a specific simulated 
or historical hurricane is studied rather than the aggregated effect of all possible hurricanes 
as in the previous approach. Another difference between the two methods is that 
probabilistic analysis considers the probability of occurrence of different levels of 
hurricanes while scenario-based analysis assumes a selected level of hurricane (e.g. 200-
year return period hurricane or category 4 hurricane). 
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4.6.1 Probabilistic Analysis 
 
Using the probabilistic analysis, the annual probability of failure of the poles is estimated 
by convolving the structural fragility with a hurricane wind speed model as proposed by Li 
and Ellingwood (2006). The annual probability of failure is given by: 
 




where FR(v) is the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the structural fragility and 
fv(v) is the probability density function (PDF) of the hurricane wind speed. Vickery et al. 
(2000b) conducted simulations of hurricanes and proposed that the Weibull distribution is 
appropriate for hurricane wind speed prediction. The PDF of the Weibull equation is given 
by: 
 
𝑜𝑜𝑣𝑣(𝑒𝑒) = 𝛼𝛼𝑣𝑣 �𝑒𝑒𝑣𝑣�𝛼𝛼−1 exp �− �𝑒𝑒𝑣𝑣�𝛼𝛼� (4.9) 
 
where v is the wind speed, and u and α are the parameters of the Weibull distribution. The 
wind speed v, is related to the return period (T) of the hurricane by: 
 







The 50, 100, 250, and 500-year return period 3-s gust wind speeds for the chosen location 
are estimated to be 56, 60, 67, and 72 m/s, respectively from Vickery et al. (2009b). The 
Weibull parameters are then calculated using Equation (4.10) as u = 26.7 and α = 1.85. 
The annual probabilities of failure of the poles considering decay over time are calculated 
and plotted in Figure 4.9. It can be seen from the figure that the annual probabilities of 
failure increase with age due to decay of the poles. It can also be seen that the presence of 
55 
distribution transformers (DTs) has little effect on the annual probability of failure of the 
single-phase poles. For subsequent analysis, the fragility results of lateral line poles without 
DTs will be used as they are the dominant network vulnerability.   
 
 
Figure 4.9 Annual probability of failure with age 
 
 
4.6.2 Scenario-Based Analysis 
 
Hurricane Jeanne has been selected for demonstrating the proposed framework. Hurricane 
Jeanne became a tropical storm on 14 September 2004 and made landfall on the east coast 
of Florida on 26 September as a category 3 hurricane (Lawrence & Cobb, 2005). Hurricane 
track data and recorded wind speeds are obtained from the North Atlantic Hurricane 
Database (HURDAT) from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
(NOAA, 2015b) website. The database provides the location (latitude and longitude) as 























Single-phase poles with DTs
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intervals. However, accurate analysis of a relatively small area such as the study area, in 
this case, cannot be done considering 6-hour intervals as the hurricane can cover a long 
distance within this period. 
 
To obtain finer records of the hurricane wind speeds and central pressure, the 6-hour 
records are interpolated linearly to obtain 30-minute interval records. Linear interpolation 
has been shown to produce accurate results (Jayaram & Baker, 2010). At every time instant, 
the wind speed at any location from the hurricane eye can be determined using the wind-























𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜2  (4.11) 
 
where Rmax is the radius to maximum wind speed, r is the distance from hurricane eye to 
point of interest, determined using the Haversine formula, B is the Holland parameter, Δp 
is the central pressure difference, ρ is air density (1.15 kg/m3), and f is the Coriolis 
parameter. Rmax, B, and f are given by (FEMA, 2011; Powell et al., 2005): 
 ln𝑅𝑅max. = 2.556 − 0.000050255∆𝑝𝑝2 + 0.042243032𝜓𝜓 (4.12) 
𝐵𝐵 = 1.881 − 0.00557𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚 − 0.010917𝜓𝜓, 𝜎𝜎𝐵𝐵 = 0.286 (4.13) 
𝑜𝑜 = 2Ω sin𝜑𝜑 (4.14) 
 
where ψ is the storm latitude, Δp is the central pressure difference, Ω is the earth’s angular 
velocity (7.292 x 10-5 rad/s), and φ is the local latitude. The HURDAT data provides the 
central pressure for the hurricanes at each time step. The central pressure difference, Δp, is 
found by subtracting the central pressure from atmospheric pressure at a distance beyond 
the effect of the hurricane which is typically 1,013 millibars (Xu & Brown, 2008b; Wang 
& Rosowsky, 2012).  
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The gradient wind speed above is converted to surface wind speed using a factor of 0.8 
(Vickery et al., 2009a; Vickery et al., 2000a). However, structural damage is more related 
to peak gust wind speed which is the maximum instantaneous wind speed. Therefore, a 
gust factor is needed to convert the surface wind speed. The gust model developed by 
Engineering Sciences Data Unit (ESDU, 1982, 1983) has been shown to be adequate for 
modeling gust factors (Xu & Brown, 2008b). Xu and Brown (2008b) conducted a 1000-
year simulation to estimate the 3-sec gust factor using the ESDU model and found that the 
distribution of the calculated values of the factor is highly concentrated around 1.287 with 
a standard deviation of 0.002. This value has been adopted for use in this research. 
 
The study area, in this case, is relatively small compared to the size of the hurricane. 
Consequently, the variation of wind speed across the study area is very minimal. Therefore, 
only the maximum wind speed at the middle of the power distribution system is considered 
and all the poles are assumed to be subjected to this particular wind speed. Figure 4.10 
shows the variation of the surface wind speed at the middle of the distribution system at 
various time intervals as the hurricane travels along its track.   
 
 






















4.7 System Reliability Evaluation 
 
The system reliability model presented in Chapter 3 is used here. The reliability of line 33 
(which has 19 poles) in Figure 4.3 over time is plotted in Figure 4.11 as an example using 
the lower and upper bounds of the probabilities of failure of the line from probabilistic 
hurricane analysis. As expected, the reliability decreases over time as the poles in the line 
decay. The lower and upper bounds of the probabilities of failure of line 33 for the scenario-
based hurricane analysis are 0.53 and 1.00 respectively, calculated assuming the hurricane 
strikes when the poles are new. It should be noted that failure of cross arms is neglected in 
the above analysis. The probabilities of failure of end poles are also ignored since they are 




Figure 4.11 Reliability of line 33 with age using probabilistic hurricane analysis 
 
As stated earlier, there are an estimated 434 residential, 15 industrial, and 9 
commercial/institutional customers in the Micropolis including 3 schools and 3 churches. 




















line 44 as can be seen from Figure 4.2. Three-phase feeder lines branched off to single-
phase laterals to deliver power to the customers through ‘service drops’ from distribution 
transformers. For simplicity sake, Bagchi et al. (2009) categorized the amount of load 
consumed by customers in Micropolis into few distinct profiles with all customers 
belonging to each profile having a fixed load demand (kVA) all through the year. However, 
in this research, new average demand has been assigned to each customer group based on 
the average power consumption of customers of a utility company in Florida obtained from 
EIA (2013). It is assumed that all customers have a fixed demand shown in Table 4.4 
throughout the year. Based on the fixed consumption, the load served by each line is the 
sum of all loads downstream of the line. 
  
Table 4.4 Load profiles for consumers across Micropolis 
Customer type Consumption 
Residential  1.5kW/h 
City churches 5kW/h 
City schools 10kW/h 
Industrial (Feeder 1) 39.4kW/h 
Central business district (Feeder 2) 10.1kW/h 
Feeder 1 total 1,334kW/h 
Feeder 2 total 394kW/h 
System total 1,728kW/h 
 
The system reliability is plotted in Figure 4.12 using the annual probabilities of failure 
calculated using probabilistic hurricane analysis. The system reliability is calculated using 
both the upper and lower bounds of probabilities of failure of the lines evaluated 
previously. The system reliability using the upper bounds is 97.8% and 60.2% at 0 and 70 
years respectively. Using the lower bounds, the reliability is 99.6% and 96.8% at 0 and 70 
years respectively. The system reliability for the event-based analysis was calculated to be 








4.8 Component Importance Index 
 
In a given system, some components are more important for the reliability of the system 
than others. Determining the relative importance of all components/lines in the distribution 
system is essential for targeted hardening. The component importance index is usually used 
in probabilistic risk assessment to identify components and subsystems whose reliability 
need to be improved to reduce risk to the whole system (Rausand & Høyland, 2004). One 
of the methods of evaluating the relative importance of system components is risk 
achievement worth (RAW). RAW is a measure of the “worth” of component i in achieving 
system reliability. It is defined as the ratio of the conditional system unreliability if 
component i has failed to the actual system unreliability. RAW of component i is defined 
as (Rausand & Høyland, 2004): 
 





















Using lower bound of line failure
Using upper bound of line failure
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where 𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆(𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖 = 1) is the system reliability when component (line) i has failed while 𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆 is 
the reliability of the original system. The risk achievement worth of all the lines in the 
system is calculated using the upper bounds of line failures when the poles are new and 
presented in Figure 4.13.   
  
 
Figure 4.13 Risk achievement worth of lines 
 
 
It can be seen from Figure 4.13 that as expected, lines with higher loads have higher risk 
achievement worth. The main feeder lines have higher RAW than the laterals because the 
delivery of power to the laterals depends on the reliability of the feeder lines. For example, 
line 1 has the highest RAW because the delivery of power to all the laterals on feeder 1 
depends on the reliability of line 1. Line 9 on the other hand, have a relatively high RAW 
because it serves an industrial area with high power consumption. This will guide decision-













































































4.9 Targeted Hardening Strategies 
 
Three strategies will be considered to demonstrate the proposed framework. These are: 
 
i. Strategy 1: Hardening only the main feeder lines 
ii. Strategy 2: Hardening all lines with RAW ≥ 2.5 
iii. Strategy 3: Hardening all lines 
 
In all the above three cases, hardening means using a pole that is one class higher than that 
designed previously. This means using class 3 and 4 poles instead of class 4 and 5 for the 
three-phase main feeder lines and single-phase laterals, respectively. Both strategies 1 and 
2 are considered as targeted hardening measures. Strategy 1 is chosen because power 
delivery to all the laterals lines depends on the reliability of the main feeder lines. However, 
some lateral lines serving heavy loads have higher RAW than some feeder lines as can be 
seen from Figure 4.13. Hence, strategy 2 is chosen and RAW set at ≥ 2.5 so as to harden 
both feeder and lateral lines that have a significant effect on system reliability. Strategy 3 
is chosen to investigate the difference between targeted hardening and hardening the whole 
system. 
 
Figure 4.14 shows the improvement in system reliability using all three strategies for 
probabilistic hurricane analysis. The system reliability is evaluated using the upper bound 
of line failure probability. System reliability at 0 years is improved from 97.8% to 99.1%, 
99.2%, and 99.5% using strategies 1, 2, and 3 respectively. At 70 years, i.e. with poles that 
are 70 years old, the system reliability is improved from 60.2% to 73.4%, 75.2%, and 




Figure 4.14 System reliability improvement after targeted hardening 
 
 
For the scenario analysis, the system reliability improvements are shown in Table 4.5. 
There is no specific requirement on the level of reliability required for a power distribution 
system. Each utility company can assign a required level of reliability based on which the 
level of hardening can be selected.   
 
Table 4.5 System reliability comparison for scenario-based analysis 
State of System Reliability using lower bounds Reliability using upper bound 
Original system 15.3% 3.2% 
Strategy 1 36.8% 3.2% 
Strategy 2 40.3% 3.2% 

































4.10 Cost Analysis 
 
Utility companies and governments are concerned about the monetary costs and benefits 
of any hardening or disaster mitigation strategy. Decisions are usually made by considering 
the cost effectiveness of hardening methods. To evaluate the cost-effectiveness of the three 
proposed strategies above, cost analysis is performed for both probabilistic and scenario-
based hurricane analysis. The net benefit, defined as benefit minus cost, is evaluated for 
each hardening strategy. The benefit of a hardening strategy is the reduction in damages 




4.10.1 Probabilistic Hurricane Analysis 
 
Life cycle cost analysis is performed for the probabilistic hurricane analysis. The method 
proposed by Chang (2003) has been adopted for the cost analysis as it considers indirect 
costs. The various costs considered are explained below.   
 
i. Mitigation cost (CM): this is the cost of hardening the system using the 3 proposed 
strategies. It includes the cost of buying new stronger poles and installation cost.  
 
ii. Maintenance cost: this is the cost of periodic maintenance carried out by utility 
companies. This includes cost of preventive maintenance, tree trimming, wildlife 
protection, and so on. The maintenance cost for the entire life span of a system is 
given by: 
 





where 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 is the annual maintenance cost for element i which depends on material 
properties 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 and the year of analysis t; 𝑧𝑧(𝑝𝑝) is a discount factor; and y is the 
discount rate.  
 
iii. Repair cost: this is the cost of repairing the damage to the system due to hurricanes. 
In this case, it is the cost of replacing failed poles. Failed poles are replaced with 
new poles of the same class. Consequently, the age distribution of poles in the 
system changes every year. The repair cost for the entire lifespan of the system is 
given by: 
 




where 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 is the annual probability of failure of element i, and 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 is the unit repair 
cost of element i.  
 
iv. Revenue loss: this is the cost incurred by the utility company due to interruptions 
in power supply to the customers caused by damage due to hurricanes. The total 
loss in revenue is given by: 
 




where V is the annual demand not met; and p is the unit price of electricity. V is a 
function of time to completely restore the system which in turn depends on the 
amount of damage (number of failed poles) and the number of repair crew units. 
Ouyang and Dueñas-Osorio (2014) assumed the restoration time for each failed 
pole to follow a normal distribution with a mean of 5 hours and standard deviation 
of 2.5 hours. Brown (2009) estimated the mean time to restoration for overhead 
line failure to be 4 hours.  Here, it is assumed that the mean time to restore a failed 
line due to pole failure is 4 hours. It is also assumed that on average, there will be 
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1 repair crew unit allocated to the city throughout a year. It is acknowledged that 
the number of repair crews varies between disaster and non-disaster periods. This 
will be better reflected in the scenario-based hurricane analysis.  
 
The average annual outage hours for each line is found by multiplying the number 
of failed poles by the time to restore each pole. The number of failed poles is the 
product of the annual probability of failure for each pole group and the total 
number of poles for that age group. Finally, the annual unmet demand for each 
line is the product of average annual outage hours and total hourly consumption in 
the line. 
 
v. Societal economic loss: this is the direct economic loss resulting from the 
interruption in power supply. The total economic loss over the lifespan of the 
system is given by:  
 




where E is the expected annual direct economic loss. E for each line is the product 
of average annual outage hours and monetary loss per hour. The monetary loss per 
hour for each customer category is adopted from LaCommare and Eto (2006) and 
shown in Table 6.  
      
The total life cycle cost is then calculated using Equation (4.20). 
 
𝐿𝐿𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 = 𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀 + 𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚 + 𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐 + 𝐶𝐶𝑣𝑣 + 𝐶𝐶𝑒𝑒 (4.20) 
 
To perform the life-cycle cost analysis, the lifespan of the system is required. In this case, 
the lifespan of the system is assumed to be the same as the life span of the distribution 
poles. The service life of wood poles has been a subject of much discussion. According to 
the NESC (2002), wood poles should be replaced or reinforced when their strength falls 
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below 67% of the initial strength. Most utilities use 30 to 40 years as an estimated service 
life (Mankowski et al., 2002). However, research and several surveys show that the service 
life of wood poles can range from 60 to 80 years depending on specie, location, and 
maintenance (Morrell, 2008; Stewart, 1996). Datla and Pandey (2006) determined the 
approximate life expectancy of wood poles to be 69 years based on a study of 100,000 
distribution poles. 
 
The time scale considered for the life-cycle cost analysis is 70 years based on the amount 
of time it takes for the poles to degrade to approximately 67% of their original strength as 
plotted in Figure 4.5. In carrying out the life-cycle cost analysis, the following assumptions 
are made: 
 
i. Maintenance cost remains constant and is the same for original and hardened 
system. Hardening the system might reduce the annual maintenance cost but 
there is a lack of data to quantify this potential reduction. 
ii. Demand remains constant over the years 
iii. Cost per unit of electricity remains constant 
 










Table 4.6 Life cycle cost analysis parameters 
Parameters  Value Source  
Class 3 SP poles (13.7 m) $544/pole ATS (2014) 
Class 4 SP poles (13.7 m) $479/pole ATS (2014) 
Class 5 SP poles (13.7 m) $441/pole ATS (2014) 
Cost of pole replacement under normal condition $2,500/pole Taras et al. (2004) 
Cost of pole replacement under storm condition $4,000/pole Xu and Brown (2008b) 
Annual maintenance cost, 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 $4,000/circuit mile Francis et al. (2011) 
Discount rate, y 4% 
Bastidas-Arteaga and 
Stewart (2015) 
Unit price, p $0.11/kWh Xu and Brown (2008b) 
Economic loss (residential) $2.70/h LaCommare and Eto (2006) 
Economic loss (commercial) $886/h LaCommare and Eto (2006) 
Economic loss (industrial) $3,253/h LaCommare and Eto (2006) 
Average consumption (residential) 1.5kW/h EIA (2013) 
Average consumption (commercial) 10.1kW/h EIA (2013) 
Average consumption (industrial) 39.4kW/h EIA (2013) 
Average consumption (schools) 10kW/h Assumed 
Average consumption (churches) 5kW/h Assumed 
 
 
Two cases are considered for the life-cycle cost analysis. Case 1 is when the hardening 
strategies are carried out at the construction stage of a new system, i.e. the utility company 
decided to build a stronger system from the beginning. In this case, the mitigation cost is 
the additional cost needed to use stronger poles instead of the poles that have been shown 
to be sufficient during the design.  
 
In Case 2, it is assumed the system exist as it is and proactive hardening strategies are 
employed. In this case, however, it will illogical to assume the hardening measures will be 
carried out few years after the distribution system is constructed. According to Bjarnadottir 
et al. (2014), the age of distribution poles in Florida ranges from 0 to 50 years. For Case 2, 
it is assumed that the system and all the poles are 20 years old when the hardening measures 
are carried out. In this case, the mitigation cost includes the cost of buying new stronger 
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poles and the cost of removing and replacing existing poles. The life cycle cost analysis is 
then performed considering a life span of 50 years which is how much longer the 
unhardened system is expected to last.  
 
 
4.10.1.1 Case 1: hardening at construction stage  
 
The results of the LCC analysis for Case 1 of the probabilistic hurricane analysis are shown 
in Table 4.7. It can be seen from the table that as expected, strengthening measures lowers 
the repair cost, revenue loss, and economic loss. It can be seen that all three strengthening 
strategies result in lower life-cycle cost compared to the un-hardened system with strategy 
3 providing the highest net benefit. The savings as a result of hardening comes mostly from 
a reduction in repair cost and societal economic losses which more than made up for the 
initial hardening investment. Strategy 3, which entails hardening the entire system, has the 
lowest life cycle cost because the difference in the costs of the three classes of poles is 
small. For example, a class 3 pole cost about $65 more than a class 4 pole. The effect of 
this can be seen in Table 4.7 where it costs an additional $29, 000 to use stronger poles to 
construct the whole system from the beginning. 
 
Table 4.7 also demonstrates the importance of various components of the life cycle cost. 
For the unhardened system, about 48% of total cost are economic losses suffered by the 
customers due to power outages. This dropped to an average of 31% with the 3 hardening 
strategies. It can also be noted that routine maintenance costs outweigh repair costs and 
revenue losses combined. For example, for the unhardened system, the maintenance cost 
constitutes about 39% of the total cost compared to repair cost and revenue loss which 
combined constitutes about 13% of the total cost.     
 
From a utility company’s perspective, the total cost excluding the societal economic losses 
may be of more interest. All three hardening measures have lower life cycle cost than the 
unhardened system even if economic losses are excluded with strategy 3 having the lowest 
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cost. Again, this is due to the low additional cost needed to construct a system with stronger 
poles. 
  




Strategy 1 Strategy 2 Strategy 3 
Mitigation cost, 𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀 - 9 14 29 
Maintenance cost, 𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚 1,762 1,762 1,762 1,762 
Repair cost, 𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐 588 514 480 268 
Revenue loss, 𝐶𝐶𝑣𝑣 8 5 4 4 
Societal Economic loss, 𝐶𝐶𝑒𝑒 2,155 1,050 992 978 
Total LCC 4,513 3,339 3,253 3,041 
Total LCC w/o Ce 2,358 2,290 2,260 2,062 
Net benefit - 1,174 1,260 1,472 
Net benefit w/o Ce - 68 98 296 
 
 
During disasters such as hurricanes, considerable damage can occur to buildings and other 
infrastructure systems other than power systems. This usually reduces economic activities 
even if the power system is not damaged. It also reduces electricity consumption as 
businesses close and residents evacuate. To account for this reduction, the revenue and 
economic losses in Table 4.7 are reduced. However, due to lack of literature on the estimate 
of the reduction in economic activities and power consumption, four levels of reduction, 
10%, 20%, 30%, and 50%, are considered as shown in Table 4.8. It can be seen from Table 
4.8 that the pattern of the total life cycle cost after reductions of economic and revenue 
losses remains the same as that in Table 4.7. All three strategies resulted in positive net 
benefit with strategy 3 having the highest. However, the contribution of the economic loss 
to the total life cycle cost reduces as expected.    
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Table 4.8 LCCA results with reductions in revenue and economic losses ($1,000s) 
Cost  Strategy 1 Strategy 2 Strategy 3 
Net benefit with 10% reduction in 𝐶𝐶𝑣𝑣 and 𝐶𝐶𝑒𝑒  1,063 1,144 1,354 
Net benefit with 20% reduction in 𝐶𝐶𝑣𝑣 and 𝐶𝐶𝑒𝑒 952 1,027 1,236 
Net benefit with 30% reduction in 𝐶𝐶𝑣𝑣 and 𝐶𝐶𝑒𝑒 841 910 1,118 
Net benefit with 50% reduction in 𝐶𝐶𝑣𝑣 and 𝐶𝐶𝑒𝑒 620 677 882 
 
 
4.10.1.2 Case 2: hardening 20 year-old system 
 
The results of the LCC analysis for Case 2 are shown in Table 4.9. Considering the total 
life cycle cost, all three hardening measures have lower total costs than the unhardened 
system. Among the 3 strategies, strategy 1 gives the highest net benefit followed by 
strategy 2. Strategy 3 gives the lowest net benefit among the three. This shows the 
importance of targeted hardening measures for existing systems because it implies that 
unlike in Case 1, it is more economical to employ targeted hardening than hardening the 
whole system. If societal economic losses are excluded, it can be seen that none of the 
hardening strategies is cost effective as implied by the negative net benefit. This is due to 
the high cost of carrying out the mitigation strategies because existing poles need to be 













Strategy 1 Strategy 2 Strategy 3 
Mitigation cost, 𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀 - 424 652 1,978 
Maintenance cost, 𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚 1,614 1,614 1,614 1,614 
Repair cost, 𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐 689 580 526 199 
Revenue loss, 𝐶𝐶𝑣𝑣 9 5 4 3 
Societal Economic loss, 𝐶𝐶𝑒𝑒 2,524 821 729 707 
Total LCC 4,836 3,443 3,525 4,501 
Total LCC w/o Ce 2,312 2,622 2,795 3,794 
Net benefit - 1,392 1,311 335 
Net benefit w/o Ce - -310 -483 -1,482 
 
 
When a reduction in overall economic activities and electricity demand due to damage to 
buildings and other infrastructure systems is taken into account, the total life cycle costs 
with four levels of reductions are shown in Table 4.10. It can be seen that with a reduction 
of 10% in both economic and revenue losses, the pattern is the same as in Table 9 with all 
three strategies having positive net benefits. However, with a reduction of 20% and higher, 
only strategies 1 and 2 are cost effective.  
 
Table 4.10 LCCA results with reductions in revenue and economic losses ($1,000s) 
Cost  Strategy 1 Strategy 2 Strategy 3 
Net benefit with 10% reduction in 𝐶𝐶𝑣𝑣 and 𝐶𝐶𝑒𝑒  1,221 1,131 152 
Net benefit with 20% reduction in 𝐶𝐶𝑣𝑣 and 𝐶𝐶𝑒𝑒 1,051 951 -30 
Net benefit with 30% reduction in 𝐶𝐶𝑣𝑣 and 𝐶𝐶𝑒𝑒 880 771 -212 





4.10.2 Scenario-based analysis 
 
For the scenario-based hurricane analysis, the total incurred costs due to hurricane damage 
as well as costs of mitigation are computed. The incurred costs due to hurricane damage 
include repair cost, revenue loss, and economic losses. The repair cost is calculated using 
the number of poles that fail which is found by multiplying the probability of failure by the 
number of poles. The revenue and economic losses are calculated by assuming that the 
average time to repair a failed pole is 4 hours. For a category 3 hurricane such as the one 
considered here, utility companies drastically increases the number of repair crew units for 
affected areas including hiring external crews from other utility companies (Xu & Brown, 
2008b). Here, it is assumed that 6 crew units are assigned to the city for speedy restoration.  
 
As in the case of probabilistic hurricane analysis, two cases have been considered here as 
well. Case 1 is when the system is constructed initially with stronger poles based on the 3 
hardening measures and the hurricane strikes the city in the year the system was 
constructed. Case 2 is hardening an existing 20-year old system and the hurricane strikes 
the city immediately following the hardening measures.    
 
 
4.10.2.1 Case 1: hardening at construction stage  
 
The results of the cost analysis for Case 1 are shown in Table 4.11. It can be seen that the 
pattern is similar to the results for the probabilistic hurricane analysis. All the three 
hardening strategies results in lower incurred cost compared with the unhardened system 
with strategy 3 providing the highest benefit followed by strategy 2. However, in this case, 
repair costs are considerably higher than economic losses. The repair costs constitute 64%, 









Strategy 1 Strategy 2 Strategy 3 
Mitigation cost, 𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀 - 9 14 29 
Repair cost, 𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐 1,594 1,400 1,291 663 
Revenue loss, 𝐶𝐶𝑣𝑣 3 2 2 1 
Societal Economic loss, 𝐶𝐶𝑒𝑒 906 448 421 414 
Total Cost 2,503 1,859 1,727 1,108 
Total Cost w/o Ce 1,597 1,411 1,307 693 
Net benefit - 645 776 1,396 
Net benefit w/o Ce - 186 290 904 
 
 
Table 4.12 shows the results of the total life cycle costs with reductions in economic and 
revenue losses. It can be seen that the pattern is the same as in Table 4.11 where all the 3 
hardening strategies result in savings compared with the unhardened system with strategy 
3 giving the lowest cost saving. 
 
Table 4.12 Cost analysis results with reductions in revenue and economic losses 
($1,000s) 
Cost  Strategy 1 Strategy 2 Strategy 3 
Net benefit with 10% reduction in 𝐶𝐶𝑣𝑣 and 𝐶𝐶𝑒𝑒  599 727 1,346 
Net benefit with 20% reduction in 𝐶𝐶𝑣𝑣 and 𝐶𝐶𝑒𝑒 553 679 1,297 
Net benefit with 30% reduction in 𝐶𝐶𝑣𝑣 and 𝐶𝐶𝑒𝑒 507 630 1,248 
Net benefit with 50% reduction in 𝐶𝐶𝑣𝑣 and 𝐶𝐶𝑒𝑒 415 532 1,149 
 
 
The implication of the uncertainties in the assumed values of repair time and number of 
repair crew units on net benefit of mitigation strategies has also been investigated. Figure 
4.15 shows a plot of the net benefit when repair time is varied while the number of repair 
crew units is kept constant at 6 as initially assumed. It can be seen that the net benefit 
75 
increases significantly as the repair time increases for all mitigation strategies. This implies 
that mitigation strategies are more cost-effective in cases where it takes utility companies 
longer to repair failed poles. This is important for decision making especially for areas 
where access is usually hindered after hurricanes. In such cases, adopting measures to 
reduce the level of damage can be highly cost-effective.     
 
Figure 4.16 shows a plot of the net benefit with varying number of repair crew units while 
repair time is kept constant at 4 hours as initially assumed. It can be seen that the net benefit 
decreases as the number of repair crew units increases. However, the impact becomes 
insignificant as the number of crew units exceeds about 15. This implies that for utility 
companies with few repair crew units or for distribution systems with few allocated repair 
crew units, deploying mitigation strategies can result in higher monetary benefit.  
 
 




















Strategy 1 Strategy 2 Strategy 3
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Figure 4.16 Impact of number of repair crew units on net benefit (Case 1) 
 
 
4.10.2.2 Case 2: hardening 20 year-old system 
 
The results for Case 2 are shown in Table 4.13. It can be seen that if total costs are 
considered, only strategies 1 and 2 are cost effective. Strategy 3 results in negative net 
benefit due to the high cost of mitigation. If societal economic losses are excluded, none 
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Table 4.13 Cost analysis results for scenario hurricane – Case 2 ($1,000s) 
Cost category Unhardened system Strategy 1 Strategy 2 Strategy 3 
Mitigation cost, 𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀 - 424 652 1,978 
Repair cost, 𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐 1,625 1,425 1,312 663 
Revenue loss, 𝐶𝐶𝑣𝑣 3 2 2 1 




Total Cost 2,551 2,300 2,387 3,057 
Total Cost w/o Ce 1,629 1,851 1,966 2,643 
Net benefit - 251 164 -506 
Net benefit w/o Ce - -223 -337 -1,014 
 
 
Table 4.14 shows the total life cycle costs after reductions in economic and revenue losses. 
For a reduction of 10%, 20%, and 30%, strategies 1 and 2 are cost-effective as before. 
However, for a reduction of 50%, only strategy 1 is cost-effective. Strategy 3 is not cost-
effective for all reductions.  
 
 
Table 4.14 Cost analysis results with reductions in revenue and economic losses 
($1,000s) 
Cost  Strategy 1 Strategy 2 Strategy 3 
Net benefit with 10% reduction in 𝐶𝐶𝑣𝑣 and 𝐶𝐶𝑒𝑒  203 113 -557 
Net benefit with 20% reduction in 𝐶𝐶𝑣𝑣 and 𝐶𝐶𝑒𝑒 156 63 -608 
Net benefit with 30% reduction in 𝐶𝐶𝑣𝑣 and 𝐶𝐶𝑒𝑒 108 13 -659 
Net benefit with 50% reduction in 𝐶𝐶𝑣𝑣 and 𝐶𝐶𝑒𝑒 13 -88 -761 
 
 
The impacts of repair time and number of repair crew units on net benefit of mitigation 
strategies are shown in Figure 4.17 & Figure 4.18, respectively. From Figure 4.17, it can 
be seen that the cost-effectiveness of the mitigation strategies depends on the repair time. 
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For example, strategy 3 is only cost effective when the average repair time is ≥ 8 hours. 
From Figure 4.18, it can be seen that as the number of repair crew units increases, the 
mitigation strategies become ineffective. This is because increasing repair crew units 
decrease power outage hours which in turn decreases societal economic losses and revenue 
losses. 
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Figure 4.18 Impact of number of repair crew units on net benefit (Case 2) 
 
 
4.11 Conclusions  
 
This chapter presented a framework for evaluating the effectiveness of targeted hardening 
measures for power distribution systems subjected to hurricanes. The framework 
incorporated hurricane hazard analysis, system reliability evaluation, component 
importance measure, cost analysis as well as aging of support structures. A notional power 
distribution system was used to demonstrate the framework.  
 
The results from the case study considered showed the importance of evaluating system 
reliability, component importance as well as targeted hardening of distribution systems. It 
was shown that hardening components or lines that have a greater impact on system 
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From the results, it can be concluded that strengthening an entire distribution system is 
only cost-effective for new systems. Using stronger poles than required by design for the 
entire system at construction stage of new systems resulted in lower life-cycle cost in all 
cases. However, for older systems, targeted hardening was shown to be cost-effective 
relative to hardening an entire system. The case study also showed that mitigation strategies 
can be cost-effective for distribution systems in less accessible areas or areas where fewer 
repair crew units are available which usually leads to prolonged repair time.    
 
The results from the considered case study also showed the importance of considering 
economic losses in evaluating the cost effectiveness of hardening measures. It was shown 
that some hardening strategies that might not be cost effective for a utility company can be 
very cost effective if societal economic losses are considered. This is important especially 
for municipal utilities which are owned by city governments. In such cases, the high cost 
of mitigation measures or additional cost of constructing a stronger system can be easily 












5. Potential Impact of Climate Change on Distribution 




Long-term investment and planning in the power sector need to consider uncertainties in 
future hazard trends. One such uncertainty is the potential impact of climate change on 
hurricane hazard. The Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) noted the variation in weather patterns and projected an increase in the 
intensity of storms (Zamuda et al., 2013; IPCC, 2013). With the potential increase in the 
intensity of hurricanes in the long-term due to climate change, the cost of damage to 
distribution system is expected to rise. Consequently, a report by the members of the 
electric utilities project of the World Business Council on Sustainable Development 
(WBCSD) called on all utility companies to build expertise in analyzing climate 
information to better understand climate change related risks and to develop adaptation and 
resiliency strategies to cope with such risks (WBCSD, 2014).   
 
The potential impact of climate change is magnified when aging of power distribution 
infrastructure is considered, which has been determined to be one of the main issues facing 
the power system in the United States (U.S.) (ASCE, 2013). With the inherent uncertainty 
in the prediction of variation in weather patterns as well as the time-dependent strength of 
infrastructure components, a better understanding of the potential varied risks is essential 
for informed decision making. Therefore, there is a need to investigate the possible impact 
of climate change on power distribution systems and come up with economically feasible 
adaptation strategies. 
 
                                                 
2 A version of this chapter was previously published in Journal of Infrastructure Systems and is re-used herein 
with permission from ASCE. The permission is presented in Appendix D. 
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Bjarnadottir et al. (2013) and (2014) presented a probabilistic framework for evaluating the 
potential impact of climate change on hurricane risk assessment of power distribution poles 
and proposed various adaptation strategies. The framework incorporated probabilistic 
hurricane analysis, age-dependent fragility of poles, and life cycle cost analysis. The effect 
of climate change was modeled by assuming a linear change in wind speed of -5% to 25% 
over a 100-year period. Francis et al. (2011) presented a hybrid economic input-output life 
cycle cost analysis method for evaluating the cost-effectiveness of climate change 
adaptation strategies of distribution systems. Failure of distribution poles, spans, and pad-
mounted transformers was considered in the study. The effect of climate change was 
modeled through the use of count regression analysis and data mining techniques that 
describe the relationship between climate variability and North Atlantic tropical cyclone 
counts in the U.S.        
    
While the above studies constitute great strides in studying the impact of climate change 
on power distribution systems, they are limited to component-level risk assessment. A 
more informed decision on the effectiveness of adaptation strategies can be made when the 
reliability of the entire distribution system is evaluated. This will allow determining the 
parts of the system with greater impact on reliability which ought to be strengthened. 
 
In this chapter, the framework of Chapter 4 is extended to integrate the potential impact of 
climate change on hurricane patterns. A hurricane simulation model is adopted to enable 
the variation in both intensity and frequency to be considered. Adaptation strategies are 
proposed and their cost-effectiveness investigated. Micropolis power distribution system 
is used to demonstrate the framework. Class 4 and class 5 southern pine poles as designed 
in Chapter 4 are used for the three-phase and single-phase lines, respectively. All poles are 






5.2 Hurricane Risk Assessment  
 
Hurricane simulation is the most widely used method of hurricane risk analysis for design 
and assessment of structures and infrastructure (Vickery et al., 2000b). Hurricane 
simulation models involve using site-specific statistics of key hurricane parameters and 
Monte Carlo simulation for assessing hurricane hazard level. Conducting hurricane 
simulation is the best way to account for the potential effect of climate change on hurricane 
hazard as it will allow for the modification of parameters such as frequency and intensity 
within the simulation model.  
  
The distribution and statistical moments of the basic parameters needed for hurricane 
simulation are obtained from records of historical hurricanes. The most complete and 
reliable historical data for north Atlantic hurricanes is provided by the North Atlantic 
Hurricane Data Base (HURDAT) and compiled by the Oceanographic and Meteorological 
Laboratory at National Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration (NOAA, 2015a). 
 
The current HURDAT data contains details for hurricanes from 1851 – 2013. Key 
parameters provided in the HURDAT data include approximate landing position, 
maximum sustained (1-minute) surface wind speed, Saffir-Simpson category, central 
pressure, and affected states. The complete hurricane simulation method is explained 
below.  
 
        
5.2.1 Hurricane Simulation Model 
 
The various parameters, their statistics, and how they are determined are explained below 




i. Annual hurricane frequency 
 
The number of hurricanes for any given year can be simulated according to a Poisson 
distribution (Chen et al., 2004; Huang et al., 2001a; Xu & Brown, 2008b; Mudd et al., 
2014a). The Poisson distribution is modeled as: 
 
𝑜𝑜(𝑚𝑚) = 𝜆𝜆𝑚𝑚
𝑚𝑚! 𝑒𝑒−𝜆𝜆;   𝑚𝑚 = 0,1,2, … (5.1) 
 
where x is the number of hurricanes per year, λ is the average number of hurricanes in a 
given year computed from historical records, and f(x) is the probability of x hurricanes in 
a given year.  
 
ii. Landfall position 
 
The landing position of a simulated hurricane is usually expressed in latitude and longitude. 
The landing position is assigned based on the distribution of historical hurricanes landing 
in a specific area by assuming uniform distribution or by dividing the coastline into bins as 
suggested by Xu and Brown (2008a) and Huang et al. (2001a).  
 
iii. Approach angle 
 
The approach angle shows the direction a hurricane heads to after making landfall. The 
approach angle is measured with North as 0 degrees. Based on historical data, the approach 




√2𝜋𝜋𝜎𝜎1 𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝 �− 12 �𝜃𝜃 − 𝜇𝜇1𝜎𝜎1 �2� + (1 − 𝑝𝑝1)√2𝜋𝜋𝜎𝜎2 𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝 �−12 �𝜃𝜃 − 𝜇𝜇2𝜎𝜎2 �2� (5.2) 
 
85 
where 𝜇𝜇1 and 𝜇𝜇2 are the means, 𝜎𝜎1 and 𝜎𝜎2 are the standard deviations of the approach angle, 
and 𝑝𝑝1 is the weighting factor. The landing position and approach angle determine the path 
of a hurricane after landfall. Xu and Brown (2008a) demonstrated that it is reasonable to 
assume hurricanes travel along a straight path in Florida due to the narrow shape of the 
state. 
 
iv. Translation velocity 
 
Translation velocity is the forward speed of the hurricane. It can be modeled as a lognormal 




√2𝜋𝜋𝑐𝑐𝜁𝜁 𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝 �− 12 �𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐 − 𝜆𝜆𝜁𝜁 �� (5.3) 
 
where c is the translation velocity, 𝜆𝜆 is the logarithmic mean, and 𝜁𝜁 is the logarithmic 
standard deviation. The translation velocity is assumed to be constant after landfall (Xu & 
Brown, 2008a).  
 
v. Central pressure difference 
 
This is the difference between atmospheric pressure at the center and at the periphery of 
the hurricane. The central pressure difference is modeled from historical data using the 
Weibull distribution (Georgiou et al., 1983; Vickery & Twisdale, 1995a; Huang et al., 
2001b; Xu & Brown, 2008a) as: 
 
𝑜𝑜𝑣𝑣(𝑒𝑒) = 𝛼𝛼𝑣𝑣 �∆𝑝𝑝𝑣𝑣 �𝛼𝛼−1 exp �− �∆𝑝𝑝𝑣𝑣 �𝛼𝛼� (5.4) 
 
where ∆𝑝𝑝 is the central pressure difference, and u and α are the parameters of the Weibull 
distribution determined from historical data. 
86 
 
vi. Central pressure filling rate 
 
The rise in central pressure (which results in weakening of intensity) of the hurricane after 
landfall is modeled as (Xu & Brown, 2008a; Huang et al., 2001a; Vickery & Twisdale, 
1995b): 
 
∆𝑝𝑝(𝑝𝑝) = ∆𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝(−𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝) (5.5) 
 
where ∆𝑝𝑝(𝑝𝑝) is the central pressure difference at time t, ∆𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 is the central pressure 
difference at landfall, 𝑝𝑝 is a decay constant. For Florida, a is given by (Vickery & Twisdale, 
1995b): 
 
𝑝𝑝 = 0.006 + 0.00046 ∙ ∆𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀 (5.6) 
 
where 𝜀𝜀 is an error term that is normally distributed with a mean of zero and standard 
deviation of 0.025. 
 
vii. Maximum wind speed at landfall 
 
The maximum wind speed at landfall is proportionally assigned based on the simulated 
central pressure difference as suggested by Xu and Brown (2008a). Table 5.1 shows the 
relationship between hurricane category, minimum central pressure, and maximum 







Table 5.1 The Saffir-Simpson hurricane scale 
Hurricane Category Saffir-Simpson wind speed range (mph) 
Central pressure range 
(mbar) 
1 74 – 95 ≥ 980 
2 96 – 110 965 – 979 
3 111 – 130 945 – 964 
4 131 – 155 920 – 944 
5 > 155 < 920 
 
 
viii. Maximum wind speed decay 
 
Hurricane wind speed decays after landfall due to friction by land mass and reduction in 
storm’s moisture. The most widely used speed decay model is known as KD95 developed 
by Kaplan and DeMaria (1995). The model is based on the assumption that hurricane wind 
speeds decay at a rate proportional to their landfall intensity and decay exponentially over 
land. The wind speed at any given time is given by (Kaplan & DeMaria, 1995; DeMaria et 
al., 2006): 
 
𝑉𝑉(𝑝𝑝) = 𝑉𝑉𝑏𝑏 + (𝑅𝑅𝑉𝑉0 − 𝑉𝑉𝑏𝑏)𝑒𝑒−𝛼𝛼𝑧𝑧 (5.7) 
 
where R is a sea-land wind speed reduction factor with a value of 0.9, Vb = 13.75 m/s and 
is a constant “background” intensity, V0 is the maximum sustained 1-min wind speed at 
landfall, and α = 0.095 h-1 which is a decay constant.  
 
ix. Radius to maximum winds 
 
This describes the range of the most intensive hurricane wind speed. FEMA (2005) 
developed the equation for the radius of maximum winds Rmax as: 
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ln𝑅𝑅𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚 = 2.556 − 0.000050255∆𝑝𝑝2 + 0.042243032𝜑𝜑 (5.8) 
 
where φ is the storm latitude and Δp is the central pressure difference. A similar model can 
also be found in Vickery and Twisdale (1995a). 
 
x. Radial wind field model 
 
The variation of wind speed from hurricane eye to periphery is modeled by a radial wind 
field model. The gradient wind speed (VG) at any location at any time instant is given by 























𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜2  (5.9) 
 
where Rmax is the radius to maximum wind speed, r is the distance from hurricane eye to 
point of interest, B is the Holland parameter, Δp is the central pressure difference, ρ is air 
density (1.15 kg/m3), and f is the Coriolis parameter. The Holland parameter, B, can be 






where Vm is the maximum wind speed, e is the base of natural logarithm, Δp is the central 
pressure difference, ρ is air density.  
 
The gradient wind speed in Equation (5.9) needs to be converted to surface wind speed to 
assess the performance of infrastructure systems. The conversion factor can range from 0.8 
for weaker storms to 0.86 for intense storms (Vickery et al., 2000a; Vickery et al., 2009a). 
Furthermore, the surface wind speed needs to be converted to 3-sec gust wind speed as 
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structural damage is more related to peak gust wind speed which is the maximum 
instantaneous wind speed. Therefore, a gust factor is needed to convert the surface wind 
speed. The gust model developed by Engineering Sciences Data Unit (ESDU, 1982, 1983) 
has been shown to be adequate for modeling gust factors (Xu & Brown, 2008a). Xu and 
Brown (2008a) conducted a 1000-year simulation to estimate the 3-sec gust factor using 
the ESDU model and found that the distribution of the calculated values of the factor is 
highly concentrated around 1.287 with a standard deviation of 0.002. This value has been 
adopted for use in this research.  
 
The steps for the hurricane simulation are shown in Figure 5.1. The simulation is carried 
out for 200,000 hurricane seasons.  
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Figure 5.1 Hurricane simulation model flowchart 
 
 
Randomly sample number of hurricanes (n) in a given year 
based on hurricane frequency 
For hurricane i, randomly sample landing position, 
approach angle, translation speed, central pressure 
difference 
Compute max wind speed at landfall and radius 
to max wind  
Compute wind speed at pt. of interest using 
wind field model 
Determine next location of hurricane 
Update central pressure and max wind speed using 
decay models  
Re-compute wind speed at pt. of interest using 




End of hurricane 
  
i = n? 
  





i = i+1 
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The required parameters for the hurricane simulation can be obtained from historical 
records compiled in HURDAT. For Florida, which is the selected location for this research, 
historical hurricane record in HURDAT are provided for four different regions namely 
southeast, southwest, northeast, and northwest. The selected study area is assumed to be 
located in southeast Florida. Historical hurricanes that made landfall in Florida are 
summarized in Table 5.2 (NOAA, 2015a; Xu & Brown, 2008a). 
 
 
Table 5.2 Hurricane occurrence in different parts of Florida from 1851 – 2014 
Hurricane 
category 
No. of occurrence 
Southeast Northeast Southwest Northwest 
1 8 3 12 20 
2 9 3 7 13 
3 10 0 6 13 
4 3 0 3 0 
5 1 0 1 0 
Total 31 6 29 46 
 
 
The statistical parameters of the variables computed from historical records are given in 
Table 5.3 for different regions of Florida (Xu & Brown, 2008b; Huang et al., 2001a).  
 
Table 5.3 Statistics of hurricane simulation parameters for different regions of Florida 
Variable Distribution  Distribution parameters 
Southeast Northeast  Southwest Northwest  
Annual frequency, λ Poisson  0.2 0.039 0.1871 0.297 
Approach angle, θ 
(degrees) 
Bi-normal  𝜇𝜇1 = 310  
𝜎𝜎1 = 30 
𝜇𝜇2 = 35  
𝜎𝜎2 = 15 
𝑝𝑝1 = 0.9 
 
𝜇𝜇1 = 345  
𝜎𝜎1 = 5 
𝜇𝜇2 = 285  
𝜎𝜎2 = 10 
𝑝𝑝1 = 0.5 
 
𝜇𝜇1 = 40  
𝜎𝜎1 = 25 
𝜇𝜇2 = 300 
𝜎𝜎2 = 30 
𝑝𝑝1 = 0.63 
 
𝜇𝜇1 = 35  
𝜎𝜎1 = 25 
𝜇𝜇2 = 295 
𝜎𝜎2 = 40 




Weibull  𝑣𝑣 = 64.831 
𝛼𝛼 = 3.465 
 
𝑣𝑣 = 42.751 
𝛼𝛼 = 3.929 
Translation velocity Lognormal  𝜆𝜆 = 2.3 − 0.00275𝜃𝜃* 
𝜁𝜁 = 0.3 
*Parameters were found to be correlated with approach angle (Xu & Brown, 2008b, 2008a) 
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Figure 5.2 shows the spatial variation of a simulated hurricane at landfall. Note that in the 
model above, only hurricanes that landed in Florida are considered for evaluating the 
required parameters and the model start at the point of landfall rather than at locations in 
the Atlantic Ocean or the Gulf of Mexico. Furthermore, both central pressure filling rate 
and maximum wind speed decay discussed in the hurricane simulation model above will 
be used as suggested by Xu and Brown (2008a) since there is no empirical equation relating 
the central pressure and wind speed after landfall.  
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5.2.2 Hurricane Simulation Model Validation 
 
The simulation model described above is used to estimate the annual maximum hurricane 
wind speed for 200,000 years at a particular location (27.6oN, 80.4oW) on the east coast 
of Florida which is the assumed location of the case study to be discussed later. The 
maximum annual hurricane wind speed can be modeled by an extreme value (EV) 
distribution (Yeo et al., 2014; Coles & Simiu, 2003; Jagger et al., 2001; Jagger & Elsner, 
2006). All the three types of EV distributions, namely Gumbel, Fréchet, and reversed 
Weibull (or simply Weibull), were fitted to the data as shown in  
Figure 5.3. It can be seen from the figure that Fréchet distribution provides the best fit for 
the data followed by Weibull distribution.  On the other hand, Gumbel distribution does 
not seem to fit the data. Hence it is not considered for further analysis. 
 
The scale and shape parameters of the Weibull distribution determined using the maximum 
likelihood method in MATLAB are 26.24 and 1.88 respectively. The shape, scale, and 






Figure 5.3 CDF of max annual hurricane wind speed with fitted distributions 
To validate the hurricane simulation model, wind speeds corresponding to different mean 
recurrence intervals (MRI) for the chosen location are calculated and compared to values 
in ASCE-7 (2010) as shown in Table 5.4 and plotted as hazard curves in Figure 5.4. The 
wind speeds corresponding to different return periods can be obtained from the fact that, 
assuming independent maximum annual hurricane wind speeds, the probability of 
exceeding N-year MRI wind speed in t years is given by: 
 
𝐹𝐹𝑧𝑧(𝑒𝑒 > 𝑉𝑉) = 1 − �1 − �1N��𝑧𝑧 (5.11) 
 
From Table 5.4, it can be seen that the wind speeds for different MRIs predicted by the 
Weibull distribution are very close to those obtained from ASCE-7 (2010). For the Fréchet 
distribution, however, even though it is a better fit to the data than Weibull distribution, it 
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resulted in unrealistically high wind speeds, especially for larger MRIs. This anomaly has 
been documented in the literature which is why the Fréchet distribution is not 
recommended for modeling maximum annual hurricane wind speeds (Yeo et al., 2014). 
The Weibull distribution is therefore chosen for modeling the wind speed data. Note that 




Table 5.4 Comparison of wind speeds corresponding to different return periods 
MRI (years) ASCE-7 (2010) 
values (m/s) 
Values predicted 
by Weibull (m/s) 
Values predicted 
by Fréchet (m/s) 
10 39  41 40 
25 47  49 54 
50 52  54 66 
100 58  59 80 
300 65  67 108 
700 70  71 129 




Figure 5.4 Wind speeds comparison 
 
5.3 Non-stationary Hurricane Wind Model due to Climate Change 
 
The biggest source of uncertainty for future climate prediction is the level of management 
of greenhouse gas emissions by society (IPCC, 2013). Consequently, studies on the effect 
of climate change on infrastructure are approached by considering various future climate 
change scenarios. Different climate change scenarios are adopted to investigate what might 
happen in the future under a particular assumption. These scenarios provide starting points 
for examining an uncertain future and evaluating the effects such scenarios might have on 
civil infrastructure systems. 
 
The most recent climate change scenarios proposed by IPCC (2013) are based on 
greenhouse gas concentration pathways (CPs) which are determined by their radiative 
forcing at the end of the 21st century. Radiative forcing is defined by ASCE (2015) as the 
“change in the balance between incoming and outgoing radiation caused by changes in 
greenhouse gas concentrations and other atmospheric constituents, while other aspects of 


























were produced by IPCC (2013) that correspond to radiative forcing levels of 8.5, 6.0, 4.5, 
and 2.6 watts/m2 and are termed RCP 8.5, RCP 6.0, RCP 4.5, and RCP 2.6, respectively. 
It might be of interest to note that the forcing level in 2005 was estimated to be 1.6 watts/m2 
(Bernstein et al., 2007). Older climate change scenarios method used by the IPCC is the 
SRES scenarios details of which can be found in IPCC (2000). 
 
The effect of the above scenarios on the frequency and intensity of hurricanes has been a 
subject of much discussion. Bender et al. (2010) modeled the effect of one of the SRES 
climate change scenarios on the frequency of Atlantic hurricanes and concluded that the 
frequency of the most intense hurricanes (category 3-5) is expected to increase through the 
year 2100. Knutson et al. (2010) concluded that the global frequency of tropical cyclones 
will either decrease or remain unchanged with the authors predicting a decrease between -
6 to -34%. Projections for individual basins were reported to be up to ±50% with very low 
confidence. It was however reported that the frequency of the most intense storms will 
“more likely than not increase by a substantially larger percentage in some basins”. 
Knutson et al. (2010) also projected the intensity of tropical cyclones, measured as mean 
maximum wind speed, to increase between +2% to +11% globally. 
 
Some studies have also shown a link between an increase in sea surface temperatures (SST) 
and hurricane frequency (Mann & Emanuel, 2006; Mann et al., 2007; Elsner et al., 2008).  
Mudd et al. (2014a) used the Community Earth System Model (CESM) of the National 
Center for Atmospheric Research (NCAR) to model the increase in sea surface temperature 
(SST) at the year 2100 under RCP 8.5 scenario. The resulting SST was then used in a 
hurricane simulation model that takes into account changes in SSTs. The authors concluded 
that under future climate scenario RCP 8.5 in 2100, the maximum wind speed associated 
with Atlantic hurricanes is expected to increase.  
 
Staid et al. (2014) reported the bounding range for change in hurricane intensity from 
existing literature to be between -20% to +40%. Landsea et al. (2010) on the other hand 
reported the range of future hurricane frequency to be between -30% to +35%. Based on 
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these estimates and the above literature review, the following climate change scenarios 
(CCSs) at the end of the 21st century are assumed for this study: 
 
i. CCS1: no change in frequency, +20% change in intensity 
ii. CCS2: +20% change in frequency, no change in intensity 
iii. CCS3: -20% change in frequency, +20% change in intensity 
iv. CCS4: +20% change in frequency, +20% change in intensity 
v. CCS5: +35% change in frequency, +40% change in intensity 
vi. CCS6: +35% change in frequency, -20% change in intensity 
 
The change in frequency and intensity from the present time to the end of the 21st century 
is assumed to be linear as suggested by Stewart et al. (2014). It is however noted that 
considerable interdecadal and intradecadal variations can occur in the trend (Stewart et al., 
2014; Mudd et al., 2014b). The above climate change scenarios are incorporated into the 
hurricane simulation model by altering certain parameters. For frequency variation, the 
parameter of the Poisson distribution, λ, is altered. For intensity variation, the randomly 
sampled central pressure difference at landfall is increased or decreased by a percentage 
depending on the climate change scenario being considered.  
 
The hazard curves for the chosen location on the east coast of Florida are plotted in Figure 
5.5 for the baseline scenario (no change) and the six CCSs above. It can be noted from the 
figure that changes in intensity have higher effect on wind speeds than changes in 
frequency. For example, CCS1 (no change in frequency, +20% change in intensity) results 
in higher wind speeds at all return periods than CCS2 (+20% change in frequency, no 
change in intensity). The same conclusion can be drawn by comparing CCS2 and CCS3. 
Among the six scenarios, only CCS6 (+35% change in frequency, -20% change in 
intensity) resulted in a decrease in wind speed at all return periods despite 35% increase in 
frequency.   
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Figure 5.5 Hazard curves for different climate scenarios 
 
 
5.4 System Reliability Results 
 
The system reliability results for the no change scenario (baseline) and the six selected 
climate scenarios are plotted in Figure 5.6 for the period 2010 to 2100. It can be seen that 
the pattern of change in system reliability follows the pattern in Figure 5.5 as expected. All 
scenarios except CCS6 (+35% change in frequency, -20% change in intensity) resulted in 
a decrease in system reliability over the years. CCS2 (+20% change in frequency, no 
change in intensity) and CCS5 (+35% change in frequency, +40% change in intensity) 
resulted in the least and highest decrease in reliability over time, respectively. For example, 
at 2080, the system reliability decreased from 67% for the baseline case to 63% and 40% 
for CCS2 and CCS5, respectively. This implies that climate change can have a significant 































According to NESC (2002), wood poles should be replaced or reinforced when their 
strength falls below 67% of the initial strength. This will happen when the poles are around 
70 years old as seen in Figure 4.5 in the previous chapter. Consequently, in this case, the 
poles in the system that survived from 2010 to 2080 will be replaced as part of a periodic 
maintenance program which is not considered in Figure 5.6. This will, however, be 
reflected in the LCCA section when pole replacement due to both periodic maintenance 
and wind-induced failure is considered.  
 
 
Figure 5.6 System reliability results for different climate scenarios 
 
5.5 Adaptation Strategies 
 
Increase in hurricane wind speed due to climate change which consequently causes a 































adaptation strategies to be implemented. Three climate change scenarios, CCS2 (+20% 
change in frequency, no change in intensity), CCS4 (+20% change in frequency, +20% 
change in intensity), and CCS5 (+35% change in frequency, +40% change in intensity) are 
selected to demonstrate the life cycle cost analysis procedure for comparing various climate 
change adaptation strategies. CCS4 and CCS5 are chosen because they resulted in the 
highest decrease in system reliability over time. CCS2 is chosen because it resulted in only 
a slight decrease in system reliability. Therefore, it will give an indication of whether 
adaptation strategies are cost-effective when the level of climate change is very small. Two 
adaptation strategies are proposed below. 
 
Strategy 1: Strengthening entire system  
 
In this strategy, all new distribution systems are to be constructed with poles that are one 
class higher than the required pole class determined using the design method recommended 
in ASCE-111 (2006). The adaptation cost is then the additional cost needed to use stronger 
poles instead of the poles that have been shown to be sufficient during the design. The 
distribution system model in this research is assumed to be strengthened during 
construction in 2010. 
 
Strategy 2: Strengthening parts of a system  
 
This strategy is similar to Strategy 1 except that here, only the main feeder lines, which 
deliver electric power to the laterals, are replaced with poles that are one class higher. 
The improvement in system reliability when the two adaptation strategies are applied to 
CCS5 is shown in Figure 5.7. Strategy 1 results in higher improvement in system reliability 
as expected. At 2080 for example, the system reliability is 40%, 65%, and 56% for the 
unhardened system, strategy 1, and strategy 2, respectively. Note that pole replacement is 




Figure 5.7 System reliability improvement for CCS5 
 
 
5.6 Life Cycle Cost Analysis Result 
 
The LCCA is carried out for the years from 2010 to 2100. The LCCA is first performed to 
compare the baseline case and the three selected climate change scenarios and the results 
are shown in Table 5.5 and Figure 5.8. It can be seen that the LCC increases as the severity 
of climate change increases. In this case, the LCC increased by 2%, 6%, and 12% for CCS2, 































Table 5.5 LCCA results for different scenarios ($1,000s) 
Cost category No climate 
change 
CCS2 CCS4 CCS5 
Maintenance cost, 𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚 1,871 1,867  1,857  1,846 
Repair cost, 𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐 432 448 489 541 
Revenue loss, 𝐶𝐶𝑣𝑣 6 6 7 7 
Societal Economic loss, 𝐶𝐶𝑒𝑒 1,600 1,665 1,802 1,987 
Total LCC 3,909 3,986 4,155 4,381 
Percentage Increase in LCC 
(%) 




Figure 5.8 LCC results for different climate scenarios 
 
The results of the LCCA for the selected climate change scenarios and the adaptation 
strategies are shown in Table 5.6, Table 5.7, and Table 5.8. For all the three scenarios, the 
adaptation strategies lower the repair cost, revenue loss, and societal economic losses. The 
total LCC for all three cases is also plotted in Figure 5.9 and it can be observed that strategy 
1 results in lower LCC in all cases even though it has higher adaptation cost than strategy 
2.  
No change CCS2 CCS4 CCS5



















Table 5.6 LCCA results for CCS2 scenario ($1,000s) 
Cost category Unhardened system Strategy 1 Strategy 2 
Adaptation cost, 𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀 - 29 9 
Maintenance cost, 𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚 1,867  1,897 1,874 
Repair cost, 𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐 448 337 420 
Revenue loss, 𝐶𝐶𝑣𝑣 6 5 5 
Societal Economic loss, 𝐶𝐶𝑒𝑒 1,665 1,211 1,236 
Total LCC 3,986 3,479 3,544 
Total LCC w/o Ce 2,321 2,268 2,308 
Net benefit - 507 442 
Net benefit w/o Ce - 53 13 
 
Table 5.7 LCCA results for CCS4 scenario ($1,000s) 
Cost category Unhardened system Strategy 1 Strategy 2 
Adaptation cost, 𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀 - 29 9 
Maintenance cost, 𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚 1,857  1,889 1,864 
Repair cost, 𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐 489 420 459 
Revenue loss, 𝐶𝐶𝑣𝑣 7 5 5 
Societal Economic loss, 𝐶𝐶𝑒𝑒 1,802 1,312 1,339 
Total LCC 4,155 3,655 3,676 
Total LCC w/o Ce 2,353 2,343 2,337 
Net benefit - 500 479 
Net benefit w/o Ce - 10 16 
 
Table 5.8 LCCA results for CCS5 scenario ($1,000s) 
Cost category Unhardened system Strategy 1 Strategy 2 
Adaptation cost, 𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀 - 29 9 
Maintenance cost, 𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚 1,846 1,880 1,854 
Repair cost, 𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐 541 392 504 
Revenue loss, 𝐶𝐶𝑣𝑣 7 5 6 
Societal Economic loss, 𝐶𝐶𝑒𝑒 1,987 1,402 1,435 
Total LCC 4,381 3,708 3,808 
Total LCC w/o Ce 2,394 2,306 2,373 
Net benefit - 673 573 




Figure 5.9 Total life cycle cost 
 
From Table 5.6, it can be seen that even for a slight increase in hurricane wind speed 
(CCS2), both strategies 1 and 2 resulted in a net benefit of nearly $500,000. This is mainly 
because the cost of upgrading to a pole that is one class higher than the required class is 
very low. For example, class 3 poles cost only $65 higher than class 4 poles while class 4 
poles cost only $38 higher than class 5 poles.   
 
From the results in Table 5.6, Table 5.7, and Table 5.8, the societal economic cost is shown 
to have a significant impact on the total LCC. In all cases, societal economic losses 
constitute at least 35% of the total LCC. The net benefit for all cases dropped considerably 
if societal economic losses are not considered. For example, in Table 5.6, the net benefit 
dropped from $507,000 to $53,000 for strategy 1 if the societal cost is ignored. This is 
important because considering societal economic losses or otherwise in LCCA depends on 
the entity carrying out the analysis. Utility companies might not include societal economic 
losses when making decisions on future investment. However, it might be very important 
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Figure 5.10 shows a plot comparing the net benefit of the adaptation strategies for the three 
selected climate change scenarios. It can be observed that the net benefit of deploying the 
adaptation strategies increases with the severity of the climate change scenario especially 
for strategy 2. For strategy 1, CCS2 and CCS4 showed similar net benefits while the highest 
net benefit is observed for CCS5 which is the worst climate change scenario.    
 
 
Figure 5.10 Net benefit of adaptation strategies 
 
To account for a reduction in economic activities during disasters, the revenue and 
economic losses in Table 5.6, Table 5.7, and Table 5.8 are reduced. However, due to lack 
of literature on the estimate of the reduction in economic activities and power consumption, 
reduction of 0 to 90% is considered as shown in Figure 5.11. It can be seen from Figure 
5.11 that the net benefit decreases linearly with a reduction in revenue and economic losses. 
Both adaptation strategies result in positive net benefits for all climate change scenarios 


























Figure 5.11 Net benefit considering reduction in revenue and economic losses 
 
It should be noted that the results presented in this paper involve a certain degree of 
uncertainties. For example, there is considerable uncertainty in the prediction of variation 
of hurricane intensity and frequency. The consideration of six climate change scenarios 
that cover a range of possible variations is a simple way of taken such uncertainties into 
account. Uncertainties in hurricane simulation parameters such as approach angle and 
central pressure difference were accounted for through their corresponding probability 
distributions as well as by running 200,000 simulations. Uncertainties in the time-
dependent strength of the poles were considered using the coefficient of variation of the 
strength of the poles which also varies with time. As the literature on climate change impact 
on hurricane intensity and frequency as well as the time-dependent strength of poles 
continues to grow, new findings that can be used to better quantify the uncertainties can be 
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5.7 Conclusions  
 
In this chapter, the potential impact of climate change on distribution systems subjected to 
hurricanes is evaluated. The effectiveness of various climate change adaptation strategies 
is also investigated. The framework can be used by utility companies and government 
agencies for decision making in long-term investment planning and pre-disaster 
preparedness in power distribution system infrastructure.   
 
The results of the case study show that climate change can have an impact on system 
reliability and life cycle cost of distribution systems depending on the severity of the 
potential change. For example, a 35% increase in frequency and 40% increase in the 
intensity of hurricanes will reduce the system reliability by 40% in 2080 and lead to a 12% 
increase in life cycle cost by the end of the century. The results also show that adaptation 
strategies can be cost-effective in improving system reliability to adapt to the impact of 
climate change. If the entire system is strengthened at construction stage, the life cycle cost 
could be reduced by about 15% by the end of the century for a climate change scenario that 
resulted in 35% increase in frequency and 40% increase in the intensity of hurricanes. The 
results further demonstrate the importance of considering the cost incurred by society as a 
whole due to power outages during hurricane events. The framework can be applied 








6. Reconfigurability Enhancement for Distribution Systems 
Subjected to Hurricanes3 
 
6.1 Introduction  
 
Most distribution systems in the U.S. are radial systems (Brown, 2008). In such systems, 
there is a unique path from the source of power to each component or customer. 
Consequently, if there is a fault at any point in a line, all customers downstream of the point 
will lose power. In a region with several cities, independent distribution systems, each with 
its own substation/substations are used for power supply. In such a case, a potentially cost-
effective method of storm hardening is rerouting of power from one distribution system to 
another by constructing additional distribution lines and installing control switches to 
improve the redundancy of the systems. This will allow customers downstream of failed 
line to be supplied by a feeder from another substation that is not in the vicinity of a storm. 
This concept is demonstrated using Figure 6.1 which shows three independent distribution 
systems.  
 
Constructing additional distribution lines (dotted lines) with normally open (NO) switches 
to connect feeders from the three independent substations can improve their reliabilities.  
For example, looking at the hurricane path in Figure 6.1, it is very likely that the upstream 
of lines 1 and 2, served by substations A and B, will likely fail and cut off power to all 
customers downstream. In such a case, customers downstream of the affected lines can 
receive power from feeders 3 and 4 emanating from substation C.  
 
 
                                                 


















Figure 6.1 Schematic of proposed storm hardening strategy 
 
While rerouting of power within a single distribution system after minor disturbances has 
been studied over the years (e.g. Viswanadha Raju and Bijwe (2008), Enacheanu et al. 
(2008), Ramos et al. (2005), Chouhan et al. (2009), Faza et al. (2007)), systematic study of 
rerouting between independent systems after a catastrophic event such as hurricane that 
takes into account the topography and the spatial nature of distribution system, as well as 
hurricane wind has not been carried out. This chapter studies the effectiveness of 
constructing new distribution lines with Normally Open switches in improving the 
reliability of radially operated distribution systems subjected to hurricanes. Unlike in 
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Chapters 4 and 5 where a single distribution system (one substation and its feeders) was 
considered, a system of several independent distribution systems is considered here.  
 
 
6.2 Power Distribution System Model 
 
For the purpose of the proposed study, a GIS model of the distribution system of parts of 
Florida is developed as shown in Figure 6.2. It should be noted that only the 3-phase main 
feeder lines are shown in Figure 6.2. The region consists of several unconnected networked 
distribution systems or ‘islands’. Each island consists of one or more substation with 
feeders that are radially operated due to the presence of normally open switches at several 
locations within the system. The entire study area has 20 substations and 73 feeders. Each 
feeder is divided into lines (switchable sections) using sectionalizing switches. The 
distribution system covers an area of approximately 10,000 square miles.  
 
For simplicity, all the laterals lines per feeder mile are lumped as one load point for system 
reliability evaluation. Based on feeder customer density for the study area reported by the 
utility company serving the area, the average number of customers is assumed to be 200 
per feeder mile. The total length of all the feeder lines in the study area is about 1,080 miles 
serving approximately 216,800 customers.  
 
Due to lack of data on location of sectionalizing switches in the systems, the following 
placement points are assumed for the switches in the system:   
 
i. Sectionalizer placement at the beginning of each lateral line 
ii. Sectionalizer placement at every branching point of the main feeder lines 
iii. Sectionalizer placement at every mile of the main feeder lines 
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To enable power reconfiguration in the event of a hurricane, additional lines with tie 
switches will be constructed to connect any two ends of feeders. This is a simple 
combinatorial problem where the number of possible combinations is given by 
𝑒𝑒!/((𝑒𝑒 − 2)! 2!). This will result in a very high number of possible combinations as some 
feeders among the 73 feeders in the area have several ends. To reduce the possible number 
of combinations, the following constraints are set: 
 
i. New lines will only be constructed to connect feeders from different 
substations as the aim is to provide additional independent source of power 
to feeders   
ii. Only new lines that connect feeders from different distribution islands will 
be considered 
iii. New lines should not be more 20 miles long 
 
Among the reduced possible number of new lines, the shortest one is chosen for each feeder 
so as to minimize the cost of construction. In all cases, the radial structure of the system is 
maintained. Topographical constraints are also considered in the construction of new lines, 
i.e. new lines are assumed to follow the road network of the study area just like most of the 
existing distribution lines.  
 
17 new lines are proposed for the study area to demonstrate the framework and are shown 
in Figure 6.2. Manually-operated Normally Open switches are added to the new lines to 
maintain the radial nature of the systems. As the aim of this research is to investigate the 
effectiveness of constructing additional lines with switches to connect feeders between 
different distribution islands, the optimization of switching operations within each 































Figure 6.2 Notional power distribution system of parts of Florida (3-phase feeder lines) 
[Basemap © OpenStreetMap Contributors)
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6.3 Hurricane Hazard Analysis 
 
Studying the effectiveness of constructing new distribution lines require consideration of 
the path and the spatial variation of wind speeds of hurricanes. Hence, for the hurricane 
hazard analysis, a scenario-based approach is proposed in this framework. This entails 
selecting historical hurricanes that passed through a selected study area or simulating 
synthetic hurricanes. Three historical hurricanes are selected for this study. These are 
Hurricane Jeanne, Hurricane Charley, and Hurricane Wilma. Hurricane Jeanne made 
landfall on the east coast of Florida on 26 September 2004 as a category 3 hurricane 
(Lawrence & Cobb, 2005). Hurricane Charley made landfall on the southwest coast of 
Florida on 13 August 2004 as a category 4 hurricane (Pasch et al., 2005). Hurricane Wilma 
made landfall on 24 October 2005 as a category 3 hurricane.  
 
The paths of these hurricanes are shown in Figure 6.2. The variation of gradient wind speed 
with distance from hurricane eye for the three historical hurricanes as they made landfall 
is shown in Figure 6.3. The study area is divided into 10 mile x 10-mile grids. For each 
hurricane, the gradient wind speed at any location at every time instant is calculated and 




Figure 6.3 Vortex shape of gradient wind speed for the 3 historical hurricanes at landfall 
 
 
6.4 Component Vulnerability 
 
The poles supporting the distribution lines are assumed to be southern pine wood poles as 
it is the dominant material used in the U.S. (Gustavsen & Rolfseng, 2000; Wolfe & Moody, 
1997). According to Florida Power & Light, the company serving the selected study area, 
class 2 wood poles are used to support main feeder lines as part of their storm hardening 
plan. It is therefore assumed herein that all the poles supporting the distribution feeder lines 
are class 2 southern pine wood poles.   
 
A typical distribution pole that is 13.7 m high is considered. The poles are assumed to 
support three Aluminum Conductor Steel Reinforced (ACSR) conductor wires with 



































diameter of 11.8 mm. All the poles are assumed to have a span of 46 m for wind pressure 
calculations (Short, 2006). It is acknowledged that the span can vary with location and 
between urban and rural areas. For the purpose of demonstrating the framework, however, 
the span is assumed to be constant. The fragility curve of the poles is shown in Figure 6.4. 
Note that in this study, the poles are assumed to be new, i.e. no decay.  
 
 
Figure 6.4 Fragility curve of main feeder line poles 
 
 
6.5 Cost-Benefit Analysis 
 
To investigate the cost-effectiveness of constructing additional lines for power rerouting, 
cost-benefit analysis is performed. The cost is the money spent in constructing the new 
lines to connect feeders from different substations, while the benefit is the reduction in 

























Adjacent poles (50% increase in
stress)
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calculated by subtracting the cost from the benefit. If the net benefit is positive, then 
constructing additional lines is considered cost-effective. The various costs considered are 
discussed below. 
 
i. Mitigation cost: this is the cost of constructing additional distribution lines with 
NO switches to connect feeders from different substations. 
ii. Repair cost: this is the cost of repairing failed distribution lines due to hurricane 
winds. In this case, it is the cost of replacing failed distribution poles with new 
poles of the same class. The repair cost is given by Equation (6.1). 
𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 = �𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 ∙ 𝑁𝑁 ∙ 𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖
 (6.1) 
where 𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡 is the repair cost for line i; 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 is the probability of failure of a pole; 
𝑁𝑁 is the number of poles in a line, 𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐 is the unit repair cost of poles; and 𝑒𝑒 is 
the number of lines in a system.   
iii. Revenue loss: this is the cost incurred by the utility company due to the 
interruption in power supply. The loss due to unmet demand caused by the 
failure of distribution lines is given by Equation (6.2). 
𝑈𝑈𝐷𝐷 = � 𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖(𝑝𝑝) ∙ 𝑝𝑝(𝑝𝑝)𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝𝑧𝑧𝑟𝑟
𝑧𝑧=0
 (6.2) 
where 𝑈𝑈𝐷𝐷 is the loss due to unmet demand; 𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖(𝑝𝑝) is the average hourly demand 
on line i at time t; 𝑝𝑝(𝑝𝑝) is the unit price of electricity at time t; 𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐 is the time to 
restore service to a line. 𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐 depends on the number of failed poles in a line as 
well as in lines upstream of the line being considered. The total revenue loss is 
then given by Equation (6.3).  
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𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣 = 1𝑅𝑅�(𝑈𝑈𝐷𝐷|𝑄𝑄𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖) ∙ Pr (𝑄𝑄𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖)𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖
 (6.3) 
where 𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣 is the total revenue loss for a system; (𝑈𝑈𝐷𝐷|𝑄𝑄𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖) is the loss due to 
unmet demand given that power is not delivered to line i; Pr (𝑄𝑄𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖) is the 
probability that power is not delivered to line i; R is the number of repair crew 
units; and 𝑒𝑒 is the number of lines in a system.  
iv. Societal economic losses: this is the direct economic loss to customers due to 
the interruption in power supply. The economic loss for a line after a hurricane 
event is given by Equation (6.4).    
𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿 = � 𝐿𝐿(𝑝𝑝)𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝𝑧𝑧𝑟𝑟
𝑧𝑧=0
 (6.4) 
where 𝐿𝐿(𝑝𝑝) is the monetary loss per hour; 𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐 is the time to restore power to a 
line. The total societal economic loss is then given by Equation (6.5). 
𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸 = 1𝑅𝑅�(𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿|𝑄𝑄𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖) ∙ Pr (𝑄𝑄𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖)𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖
 (6.5) 
where 𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸 is the total societal economic loss for a system; 𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿 is the economic 
loss for a line; R is the number of repair crew units; and 𝑒𝑒 is the number of lines 
in a system.  
 
The various costs, restoration times, power consumption, and economic loss for various 
customer types are given in Table 6.1. Due to lack of data on the number and specific 
locations of customer types in the study area, it is assumed that 2 customers per feeder 




Table 6.1 Cost analysis parameters 
Parameters  Value Source  
Cost of constructing new lines (switches included) $350,000 Gregory et al. (2006) 
Cost of pole replacement under storm condition $4,000/pole Xu and Brown (2008b) 
Unit price of electricity $0.11/kWh Xu and Brown (2008b) 
Economic loss (residential) $2.70/h LaCommare and Eto (2006) 
Economic loss (commercial) $886/h LaCommare and Eto (2006) 
Average consumption (residential) 1.5kW/h EIA (2013) 
Average consumption (commercial) 10.1kW/h EIA (2013) 
Number of repair crew units available 10 Assumed  
Restoration time of failed pole 4 hours Brown (2009) 
Discount rate 4% 
Bastidas-Arteaga and 
Stewart (2015) 




6.6.1 System Reliability Results 
 
The results of the system reliability analysis are shown in Figure 6.5, Figure 6.6, and Figure 
6.7. As mentioned earlier, due to the radial nature of distribution systems, each substation 
is considered as a separate system. For each line in a system, the maximum wind speed 
experienced by the line as each hurricane passes through the study area is used in the 
evaluation of system reliabilities shown in Figure 6.5, Figure 6.6, and Figure 6.7.  
 
It can be observed from Figure 6.5, Figure 6.6, and Figure 6.7 that constructing new lines 
with NO switches improved the reliabilities of the systems. However, the level of 
improvement depends on the path of the hurricane, number of new lines connected to a 
system, and length of the new lines. For example, the reliability of system 9 only improves 
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by about 30% when hurricane Jeanne passes through even though there are 3 new lines 
supplying the system from 3 different substations. This is because both the alternative 
sources of energy, as well as the new lines, are in the path of the hurricane. Considering 
system 10, however, which also has 3 new lines connected to it, its reliability improved by 
about 79% because two of the three new lines, as well as the substations feeding them, are 
further away from the path of hurricane Jeanne. The length of the new lines affects the 
level of improvement in system reliability because the longer the lines, the higher the 
probability of failure during hurricanes. In this case, most of the new proposed lines are 
more than 10 miles long. This drastically limits the effect these lines will have in improving 
system reliability.  
 
Figure 6.7 shows that hurricane Charley mostly affected systems 1 – 5 as can be inferred 
from the path of the hurricane in Figure 6.2. Among these 5 systems, only systems 1, 3, 
and 5 have new additional lines. The reliability of system 3 increased from about 1% to 





Figure 6.5 System reliability results for Hurricane Jeanne 
 
 



















































Original System Improved System
 122 
 
Figure 6.7 System reliability results for Hurricane Charley 
 
6.6.2 Cost Analysis Results 
 
The results of the cost analysis are shown in Table 6.2. It can be seen that in general, 
constructing the new distribution lines for the system considered is not cost-effective. This 
is due to the high cost of constructing the new lines which, in this case, is over $50 million 
as seen in Table 6.2. This is mainly due to the long distance between the ends of the feeders 
connected by the new lines. Additionally, some poles in the new lines will fail especially 
for a new line in the path of the hurricane. This leads to increase in repair cost for the 
modified system as compared to the original system. The repair cost increased by about 
17%, 11%, and 11% for the modified system after Hurricanes Jeanne, Wilma, and Charley, 
respectively.  
 
The addition of new lines did not significantly reduce revenue loss and societal economic 
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Wilma, and Charley, respectively. Societal economic losses decreased by 3.7%, 1.4%, and 
0.2%, for Hurricanes Jeanne, Wilma, and Charley, respectively. In fact, the increase in 
repair cost is greater than benefit from the decrease in revenue loss and societal economic 
losses combined. This implies that in this case, repair cost should be the main concern for 
utility companies.   
 
Table 6.2 Cost analysis results ($1,000s) 
Cost Category 













Mitigation - 50,190 - 50,190 - 50,190 
Repair 1,471 1,722 2,059 2,289 3,004 3,329 
Revenue loss 76 74 136 134 232 231 
Societal economic loss 5,049 4,864 8,972 8,849 15,317 15,291 
       
Net benefit (NB) - -50,254 - -50,295 - -50,489 





This chapter studies system reliability improvement due to power reconfiguration through 
the construction of additional lines with normally open (NO) switches to connect systems 
supplied by different power sources. Cost analysis to study the cost-effectiveness of the 
proposed risk mitigation strategy is also performed. The case study used indicate that 
constructing new lines to connect feeders from different substations can improve the 
reliability of the systems. However, the level of improvement depends largely on hurricane 
path, the number of new lines constructed as well as the length of the new lines. 
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In the case study considered, construction of additional lines is not cost-effective mainly 
due to the high cost of constructing the lines. It can be concluded that the cost-effectiveness 
of such strategy will largely depend on the length of the new lines that need to be 
constructed. While the mitigation strategy might not be attractive economically, the 
improvement in system reliability can improve customer satisfaction and help maintain 
power supply to critical facilities during natural disasters. Additionally, increase in repair 
cost due to the addition of new distribution lines can outweigh savings from both revenue 
loss and societal economic losses. Consequently, mitigation strategies that lower the repair 
cost might be more attractive, economically, for utility companies. This includes using 
stronger poles for the lines or shortening the spans of the lines.        
 
In this study, a topological-based method of evaluating system reliability was used. This 
method only takes into account the topological constraint in distribution system 
reconfiguration and does not incorporate the engineering or physical aspects of the system 
which will require performing complex power flow analysis. To account for electrical 
constraints such as voltage drop and equipment overload, a complete power flow analysis 
















Natural hazards can be concurrent/non-concurrent and dependent/independent. For 
example, high winds, waves, and storm surge during hurricanes are dependent and 
concurrent hazards. Earthquakes can cause tsunamis, landslides, and fires which make 
them dependent hazards. Seismic and hurricane hazards can be described as independent 
and non-concurrent hazards. Regardless, within the life span of infrastructure systems 
located in regions vulnerable to both hazards, there is a possibility of such infrastructure 
being subjected to such independent hazards that are different in nature. Therefore, 
effective mitigation of risks to infrastructure due to natural hazards requires understanding, 
evaluation, and interaction of (a) all hazards that can cause significant threats and, (b) the 
vulnerability of infrastructure subjected to the hazards. Consequently, the United Nations 
(UN) in its Johannesburg Plan called for increased effort in integrated, multi-hazard risk 
assessment as part of a comprehensive disaster management plan (UN, 2002). 
 
Hazard events differ in nature, intensity, return periods, and magnitude measurement 
method. Therefore, the first challenge of multi-hazard risk analysis is comparability of 
hazardous events (Carpignano et al., 2009; Li et al., 2012; Marzocchi et al., 2012). Hazards 
with different probabilities of occurrence, such as earthquakes and hurricanes, are difficult 
to compare. For example, a low probability/high consequence earthquake can cause as 
much damage as recurrent high probability/low consequence hurricanes. The second 
difficulty in multi-hazard risk analysis is the comparison of vulnerabilities of exposed 
elements (Carpignano et al., 2009). Different hazards can affect different elements in a 
region or different components of a system. For example, substations and transmission 
lines can be more vulnerable to different hazards and the parameters used to measure their 
vulnerabilities are not the same.    
                                                 
4 A version of this chapter has been submitted to ASCE Journal of Structural Engineering. 
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Multi-hazard risk assessment pertaining dependent concurrent hazards is approached in 
two ways. One way is to analyze each single hazard independently and then calculate multi-
hazard risk by weighted summation of single-hazard risk results or indices (Bell & Glade, 
2004; Mosquera-Machado & Dilley, 2009). The other approach is a truly integrated 
analysis of hazards, exposure, and vulnerability through joint probability distribution of 
hazards, multi-dimensional vulnerability, and integration of vulnerability surface with joint 
hazard distribution (Ming et al., 2015). Multi-hazard risk assessment of independent non-
concurrent hazards is usually carried out through comparative approach using a common 
index. This is feasible because risk is not measured in hazard-specific units but in damage 
or loss-specific units such as damage to properties or disruption to economic activities 
(Kappes et al., 2012).    
 
While development of multi-hazard risk analysis framework for buildings and bridges have 
been ongoing in recent years, risk analysis of spatially-distributed civil infrastructure 
systems such as electric power and water systems have so far been limited to mostly single-
hazard considerations (e.g. Adachi and Ellingwood (2010), Winkler et al. (2010), Song and 
Ok (2010), Duenas-Osorio and Hernandez-Fajardo (2008), Kim and Kang (2013), Ryan et 
al. (2014a)). As these systems usually cover large areas and can be subjected to multiple 
hazards within their lifetime, there is a need to develop a framework to study the impact of 
multiple hazards on such systems. This is essential for pre-disaster decision making 
regarding mitigation strategies as certain mitigation strategies for one hazard might be 
ineffective or even increase the risk for other hazards. 
 
Ouyang et al. (2012) conducted a multi-hazard study of electric power systems subjected 
to concurrent hazards as part of a multi-stage resilience framework. The concurrent hazards 
considered are hurricane hazard and random hazards (equipment failure, trees, animals, 
human errors) whose co-occurrence was modeled by a Poisson process. Multi-hazard effect 
of concurrent hurricane and random hazards was also studied in the context of cascading 
failure of interdependent infrastructure systems by Ouyang and Dueñas-Osorio (2011). The 
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hazards considered in the above studies differ greatly in terms of frequency and 
consequence. Whereas hurricanes usually cause large disruptions and widespread damage 
to infrastructure systems, damage due to random hazards is usually localized and relatively 
short in duration.      
 
This chapter presents a framework for multi-hazard risk assessment of electric power 
systems under seismic and hurricane wind hazards. Two multi-hazard risk assessment 
methods are also presented. The first method is a comparative approach using proposed 
risk curves due to multi-hazard, while the second method is a cumulative approach based 
on the annual probability of system failure. The proposed multi-hazard risk assessment 
models can be used to prioritize investment in mitigation strategies by ranking hazards 
based on the level of risk they pose in the short- and long-term.  
 
Figure 7.1 shows a flowchart of the proposed framework. In this chapter, the risk 
assessment part of the framework (items 1 to 4 of the left side of Figure 7.1) is discussed. 
Multi-hazard risk mitigation strategies and their cost-effectiveness are discussed in Chapter 
8. The framework is demonstrated using a notional power system assumed to be located in 
Charleston, SC, New York, NY, and Seattle, WA. The proposed framework considers the 
fragilities of transmission lines and substations. The proposed framework can also be 
extended to carry out multi-hazard risk assessment of distribution systems when data for 
fragilities of distribution components (lines and poles) subjected to earthquakes, hurricane 




Figure 7.1 Flowchart of proposed multi-hazard risk assessment framework 
SYSTEM DEFINITION 
Location, system topology, etc.  
Hurricanes Earthquakes 
Fragility analysis of transmission lines 




1. Hazard Identification: 
Identify hazards that may impact the system 
  
3. System-level Risk Assessment: 
Quantify risk to entire system due to each 
hazard using indicators such as system 
reliability, cost of damage etc. 
   
4. Multi-Hazard Risk Assessment: 
Aggregate or compare risks using common 
index 
 
5. Risk Mitigation: 
Identify critical system components and select 
mitigation strategies   
Probabilistic or scenario-
based hazard analysis 
Topological-based system reliability 
evaluation 
Evaluate component importance index 
Select mitigation strategy 
Re-evaluate system reliability 
Perform cost analysis 
6. Cost-effectiveness evaluation: 
Assess effectiveness of mitigation strategy 
using cost-benefit analysis, life-cycle cost 
analysis etc.  
Strategy cost-effective? 







Select desired mitigation strategy based on 
system reliability and cost consideration  
2. Component-level Risk Assessment 
(a) Hazard analysis: choose probabilistic or 
scenario-based hazard analysis 
(b) Component vulnerability analysis: quantify 
vulnerability of components to hazards 
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7.2 Electric Power System 
 
The electric power system adopted to demonstrate the proposed framework is shown in 
Figure 7.2 and is based on the electric power system of Shelby County, Tennessee modified 
from Shinozuka et al. (1998). It is assumed herein that the system is located in three cities, 
namely Charleston, New York, and Seattle. The power system is superimposed on the map 
of the three locations using the georeferencing tool in ArcGIS. This allows the coordinates 











Medium voltage substation (M)































































































Figure 7.2 Notional electric power system
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The power system consists of high voltage gate stations, medium voltage substations, and 
low voltage substations. The gate stations are assumed to be the source nodes or supply 
stations in this case since the system doesn’t have generating plants of its own. The medium 
and low voltage substations are the demand nodes which are distribution substations that 
directly serve customers. Power flow through the network is modeled so that edges 
connected to supply nodes are unidirectional while all other edges are bidirectional except 
those supplying terminal substations such as L5 and M5 in Figure 7.2. To estimate the 
number of transmission structures in each line, the span is assumed to be 800 ft. (Philipson 
& Willis, 2006; Davidson et al., 2003). 
 
Number of customers is adopted for use in evaluating system reliability. The number of 
customers served by the system in its original location in Shelby county, Tennessee is about 
400,000 (Shelby-County, 2015). Based on this information and for the purpose of 
demonstrating the proposed framework, all the low voltage substations are equally 
assumed to serve 10,000 customers each while the medium voltage substations are assumed 
to serve 14,000 customers each. The total number of customers served by the system is 












Table 7.1 Notional power system information 
Description  
Number of high voltage gate stations (supply nodes) 8 
Number of medium voltage distribution substations (demand nodes) 17 
Number of low voltage distribution substations (demand nodes) 16 
Approximate area covered by system  2,590 km2 
Total number of customers served by system (based on actual numbers 
from Shelby-County (2015))  
398,000 
Number of customers served by low voltage substations 10,000 
Number of customers served by medium voltage substations 14,000 
Number of transmission lines 66 
Span of transmission line support structures 244 m (800 ft.) 
Total number of transmission structures 1,715 
Location of G1 in Charleston, SC  33oN, 80.2oW 
Location of G1 in New York, NY 40.76oN, 73.47oW 
Location of G1 in Seattle, WA 47.6oN, 122.3oW 
 
     
7.3 Hazard Analysis 
 
Hazard analysis for structures and infrastructure systems can be carried out in two ways, 
namely probabilistic analysis and scenario-based analysis (Adachi & Ellingwood, 2010; 
Li, 2012). Probabilistic analysis considers the aggregated effect of all possible hazard 
levels. In a probabilistic analysis, hazard levels are weighted by their respective probability 
of occurrence. In a scenario-based approach, the effect of a specific hazard level is 
considered (e.g. 200-year return period hurricane or a magnitude 6.5 earthquake).  
 
In the context of multi-hazard analysis where risks due to different hazards are compared 
using an index, adopting a scenario-based approach such as comparing worst case scenarios 
of various hazards can be biased (Li & Ellingwood, 2009). In such a case, all possible 
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intensities of hazards should be considered which makes probabilistic hazard analysis more 
suitable for multi-hazard risk assessment. However, application of probabilistic seismic 
hazard analysis to spatially distributed infrastructure systems has been shown to be limited 
by Adachi and Ellingwood (2010). This is because the spatial variation of intensity for a 
severe earthquake is lost in the aggregation process of probabilistic analysis. The 
probabilistic approach, however, allows risks to be annualized which is essential in 
decision making regarding long-term investment in mitigation strategies. This approach 
also provides a way for risk comparison due to different competing hazards. In this chapter, 
both probabilistic and scenario-based hazard analysis are considered and discussed. The 
limitation of both approaches can be overcome by adopting a probabilistically weighted 
deterministic hazard scenarios approach. This will be discussed in Chapter 8.   
 
7.3.1 Seismic Hazard Analysis 
 
To perform probabilistic seismic hazard analysis (PSHA), seismic-hazard source and 
attenuation models are used. Seismic-hazard source model describes the location, 
magnitude and occurrence time of an earthquake while attenuation models describe the 
decay of seismic intensity from source to a particular site. The end result of PSHA is a 
seismic hazard curve that gives the annual rate of exceedance of a ground motion intensity 
measure (e.g., peak ground acceleration or spectral acceleration). The most extensively 
used hazard curves are developed by the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) based on the 
mainshock records of the U.S. (USGS, 2015a; Petersen et al., 2014). The annual rate of 
exceedance of seismic intensity measure, IM, is often modeled by a power law expression 
such as the one given by Equation (7.1) (Cornell et al., 2002; Sewell et al., 1996; 
Kameshwar & Padgett, 2014). 
 
𝑒𝑒(𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀) = 𝑅𝑅0(𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀)−𝑘𝑘 (7.1) 
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where 𝑒𝑒(𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀) is the annual probability of exceeding intensity measure, IM; and 𝑅𝑅0 and 𝑅𝑅 
are empirical constants. The power law in Equation (7.1) is linear on a log-log space. 
Bradley et al. (2007) demonstrated that the above power law overestimates the hazard 
within the low and high-intensity regions of the hazard curve and underestimates the hazard 
between the design basis earthquake (DBE) and maximum considered earthquake (MCE) 
intensity levels (see Figure 7.3). To remedy such anomaly, Bradley et al. (2007) proposed 
a hyperbolic function in a log-log space as given by Equation (7.2). 
 






where 𝑒𝑒� is the annual probability of exceeding a certain peak ground acceleration; 𝑝𝑝, 𝑝𝑝 and 
𝑐𝑐 are constants determined by fitting the above equation over a hazard curve such as the 
one obtained from USGS (2015a).  
 
Figure 7.3 shows the hazard curve plotted using data from USGS (2015a) for a location in 
a coastal area of South Carolina. The power model in Equation (7.1) is fitted to the USGS 
hazard curve using the method proposed by Jalayer (2003) while the hyperbolic model in 
Equation (7.2) is fitted using non-linear least square regression analysis. The constants 𝑅𝑅0 
and 𝑅𝑅 in Equation (7.1) are found to be 0.000192 and 1.072, respectively. The constants 𝑝𝑝, 
𝑝𝑝, and 𝑐𝑐 in Equation (7.2) are found to be 0.33, 30.02, and 42.36, respectively. It can be 
seen from Figure 7.3 that the hyperbolic function is more suited to the curve for the entire 
range of seismic intensities. The hyperbolic function is therefore adopted for use in this 




Figure 7.3 Seismic hazard curve for Charleston, SC (32.8oN 79.9oW) 
 
 
Figure 7.4 Probabilistic seismic hazard analysis 
 
In a scenario-based approach, the seismic intensity at various locations away from the 
epicenter of a given earthquake is determined using available attenuation models. Toro et 
al. (1997) developed a stochastic attenuation relationship from extensive analysis of ground 
motion data for central and eastern North America. The result of the study can be directly 
applied to hard rock and can be applied to soil sites by using amplification factors. The 
proposed attenuation equation is: 
 ln(𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝐴𝐴) = 𝐶𝐶1 + 𝐶𝐶2(𝑀𝑀− 6) + 𝐶𝐶3(𝑀𝑀− 6)2 − 𝐶𝐶4 ln𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀
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𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀 = �𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏2 + 𝐶𝐶72 (7.4) 
 
where PGA is the peak ground acceleration in units of g; 𝐶𝐶1 through 𝐶𝐶7 are constants; M is 
either moment magnitude or body wave magnitude; 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑏𝑏 is the closest horizontal distance 
to the earthquake rupture in km; and 𝜀𝜀𝑒𝑒 and 𝜀𝜀𝑎𝑎 are measures of epistemic and aleatory 
uncertainties respectively and depend on magnitude and distance. This model is adopted 
for use in this research. 
 
The 1886 Charleston earthquake which is the strongest earthquake on record to hit South 
Carolina is selected for demonstrating the framework. The earthquake occurred on August 
31, 1886, and had a magnitude of 7.3 and epicenter at 32.9oN and 80oW shown in Figure 
7.2 (USGS, 2015b). The attenuation model given by Equation (7.3) and soil amplification 
factors from FEMA (2009) are then used to estimate the PGA at the location of each 
component.  
 
7.3.2 Hurricane Hazard Analysis 
 
The probabilistic and scenario hurricane hazard analysis discussed in Chapter 4 is used 
here. Figure 7.5 shows the steps for the probabilistic approach. The hazard curves for 
Charleston, New York, and Seattle are shown in Figure 7.6. Hurricane Hugo, the strongest 
hurricane on record to strike South Carolina, has been selected for the scenario-based 
hurricane hazard analysis. Hurricane track data and recorded wind speeds are obtained 
from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA, 2015b).  
 
 
Figure 7.5 Probabilistic hurricane analysis 
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Figure 7.6 Hurricane hazard curves  
Charleston (32.8oN 79.9oW), New York (40.71oN 74oW), and Seattle (47.6oN 122.3oW) 
 
 
7.4 Component Vulnerability Analysis 
 
The structural components of electric power systems considered in this study are the 
substations and transmission structures/lines. Since the objective of this study is to model 
multi-hazard risk assessment, the fragilities of the system components are taken from 
existing literature.  
 
7.4.1 Substation Fragility 
 
Due to the nature and weight of substation components, substations are rarely damaged by 
hurricane winds. Rather, flooding resulting from storm surge is of greater concern for 





























is assumed that substations are not affected by hurricanes. Substations are however 
vulnerable to earthquakes due the presence of brittle components that have considerable 
mass (Vanzi, 1996; Eidinger & Kempner, 2012). FEMA (2010) modeled the seismic 
fragility of substations subjected to seismic hazard using lognormal distribution and 
provided the fragility parameters. The seismic fragility parameters provided are for high 
voltage, medium voltage, and low voltage substations. The substations are also classified 
based on whether the subcomponents are anchored to resist seismic loads or not. 
 
FEMA (2010) considered five damage states for the seismic fragility of substations. These 
are none, slight/minor, moderate, extensive, and complete. These damage states are defined 
based on the percentage of subcomponents being damaged rather than power flow within 
the substation. In this study, it is assumed that substations in extensive or complete damage 
states will lose their functionality and are considered failed (Dueñas‐Osorio et al., 2007). 
Since exceeding extensive damage state is a prelude to exceeding complete damage state, 
the substations are hence considered failed in extensive damage state.  The fragility 
parameters for extensive damage of the three classes of substations are shown in Table 7.2 
(FEMA, 2010). In Chapter 8, all the damage states will be considered for evaluating the 
cost-effectiveness of mitigation strategies.  
 
Table 7.2 Lognormal parameters for seismic fragility of substations with anchored 
components  
(Damage state: extensive) 
Substation 
Classification  
Median PGA (g) Dispersion  
Low voltage 0.45 0.45 
Medium voltage 0.35 0.40 
High voltage 0.20 0.35 
 
Figure 7.7 shows the seismic fragilities of the substations for the damage state of extensive 
damage based on the lognormal parameters in Table 7.2. The seismic fragilities of the 
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substations are calculated with respect to peak ground acceleration (PGA) because facilities 
such as substations and distribution circuits are mostly vulnerable to PGA unless they are 
located in liquefiable or landslide zones in which case they will sometimes be vulnerable 
to peak ground displacement (PGD) (FEMA, 2010). 
 
 
Figure 7.7 Seismic fragility curves of substations for extensive damage state 
 
 
7.4.2 Transmission Line Fragility 
 
Transmission towers are rarely damaged by the actual shaking of the ground during 
earthquakes as they are designed for severe loads such as combined wind and ice, extra 
loads due to the collapse of adjacent towers and so on. Instead, the damage is mostly due 
to foundation failures caused by landslides, ground fracture, and liquefaction. However, 
there is a lack of data to include such failures in analytical studies (Shinozuka et al., 2005). 
































The fragility of transmission line support structures subjected to wind load depends on 
several factors such as variability in tower types, load direction, and the potential for 
cascading failure. These factors make analytical fragility analysis of transmission lines 
quite complex. Another viable approach is through the use of empirical failure data to plot 
the fragility curve of transmission structures. One advantage of transmission structure 
fragility developed from empirical data over fragility curves developed using analytical 
methods is that in analytical method, it is difficult to combine several failure mechanisms 
such as flexural and foundation failure together. In most cases, only one failure mechanism 
is considered at a time in analytical fragility analysis. Fragility curves developed based on 
empirical data remedy this shortcoming to a greater extent.  
 
Brown (2009) developed a fragility curve for transmission support structures subjected to 
hurricane winds based on 10-year storm-related damage data provided by four coastal 
utility companies. According to the data, a total of 1,947 transmission structures were 
damaged or replaced in the 10-year period. The exponential model fitted to the damage 
data is given by Equation (7.5). The fragility curve is shown in Figure 7.8. It should be 
noted that the fragility of transmission structures depends on the type of structure as well 
as the conductor span. The fragility function given by Equation (7.5) however did not take 
these factors into account. Rather, it based on general damage data collected by the utility 
companies. Therefore, the adoption of Equation (7.5) here is for the purpose of 
demonstrating the proposed framework. Accurate fragility data can be developed by 
individual utility companies to guide decision making.      
 
𝑃𝑃(𝐶𝐶 < 𝐷𝐷) = 𝑚𝑚𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒{[(2 ∙ 10−7)𝑒𝑒0.0834∙𝑣𝑣], 1} (7.5) 
 
where 𝐶𝐶 is capacity; 𝐷𝐷 is demand; and 𝑃𝑃(𝐶𝐶 < 𝐷𝐷) is the probability of failure at a given 
wind speed, 𝑒𝑒. For hurricane hazard analysis, all the structures in a single line are assumed 




Figure 7.8 Fragility curve of transmission support structures 
 
 
7.5 Component Risk Assessment  
 
The seismic risk to infrastructure components using the probabilistic seismic hazard 
analysis is performed by convolving component fragility with the seismic hazard curve. 
The annual probability of exceeding a certain damage state is given by Equation (7.6). 
 
𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴 = � 𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅(𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀) ∙ � 𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒�𝑑𝑑(𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀)� 𝑑𝑑(𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀)∞0  (7.6) 
 
where 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴 is the annual probability of exceeding a specified damage state; 𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅(𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀) is the 
fragility function given a certain level of intensity measure, IM, which is modeled with a 
lognormal function for substations in this case; and 𝑒𝑒� is the seismic hazard function given 






















For scenario-based seismic hazard analysis, the risk to components of an infrastructure 
system is defined as the probability of failure given a specific level of seismic intensity. 
The risk is evaluated directly from the fragility curves of the components.  
 
Using the probabilistic hurricane analysis, the risk to infrastructure components is 
quantified using the annual probability of failure which is estimated by convolving the 
structural fragility with a hurricane wind speed model as: 
 




where FR(v) is the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the structural fragility given 
a wind speed v; and fv(v) is the probability density function (PDF) of the hurricane wind 
speed.  
 
For the scenario-based hurricane analysis, the risk to components is defined as the 
probability of failure given a specific level of wind speed. The risk is evaluated directly 
from the fragility curves of the components.   
   
The results of the components risk analysis are shown in Figure 7.9 for Charleston. It can 
be seen from Figure 7.9(a) that the seismic risk to substations increases with increasing 
voltage rating. The high voltage gate stations (G1 – G8) are more vulnerable while the low 
voltage substations are generally the least vulnerable. This can also be inferred from the 
fragility curves of the substations in Figure 7.7. For the seismic risk result shown in Figure 
7.9(b) based on the scenario earthquake, the seismic risk depends on both the substation 
voltage rating as well as the location of each substation relative to the epicenter of the 
earthquake. The component fragility results for the transmission lines subjected to 
hurricane winds are given in Figure 7.9(c) & Figure 7.9(d). The fragilities of the lines 






















































































































































































Figure 7.9  Component risk results for Charleston 


















































7.6 System Reliability Results 
 
System reliability depends on the accessibility of each substation from supply gate stations. 
Accessibility here is modeled as the probability of power not being delivered to a substation 
which is discussed in Chapter 3. The results of the accessibility of the demand substations 
are given in Figure 7.10 for Charleston. It can be seen from Figure 7.10(b) that a lot of the 
substations will not be able to receive power following the scenario earthquake as most of 
the supply stations (G1 to G8) will likely fail following the earthquake as can be seen from 
their fragilities in Figure 7.9(b).  
 
From Figure 7.10(c) & Figure 7.10(d), it can be seen that accessibility of the substations 
under hurricane hazard depends largely on the topology of the transmission lines supplying 
power to each substation. For instance, M5 has one of the highest probability of power not 
delivered in Figure 7.10(c) because, despite the fact that it can be supplied by 5 gate stations 







































































































































































Figure 7.10  Accessibility of demand substations in Charleston 



























































































































































The result of the system reliability analysis is summarized in Table 7.3 for Charleston. It 
can be seen from the table that for both the probabilistic seismic and hurricane hazard 
analysis, the system reliability is similar to probabilistic seismic hazard analysis resulting 
in a slightly lower reliability. Considering the scenario-based approach, on the other hand, 
the scenario earthquake has a much more devastating impact on system reliability (30.27%) 
than the scenario hurricane (90.93%). This can be attributed to the fragility of system 
components under both hazards. The gate stations and substations have much higher 
probabilities of failure under the giving earthquake than the transmission lines have under 
the giving hurricane as seen in Figure 7.9(b) & Figure 7.9(d). Another reason has to do 
with the fact that the failure of a transmission line will have far less impact on system 
reliability than the failure of a substation or most especially supply gate stations. Further 
discussion on comparison of the two hazards will follow in the next section. 
 
Table 7.3 Electric power system reliability results for Charleston 
Hazard Analysis Type Hazard Description System 
Reliability (%) 
Probabilistic seismic hazard 
analysis (annual risk) 
Aggregated effect of all possible 
seismic hazard levels 
99.89 
Scenario-based seismic hazard 
analysis (risk due to one event) 
7.3 magnitude earthquake (strongest 
earthquake on record to hit SC) 
30.27 
Probabilistic hurricane hazard 
analysis (annual risk) 
Aggregated effect of all possible 
hurricane hazard levels 
99.96 
Scenario-based hurricane hazard 
analysis (risk due to one event) 
Category 4 hurricane Hugo (strongest 








7.7 Multi-Hazard Risk Assessment 
 
7.7.1 Risk Comparison Based on Risk Curves 
 
For comparison of seismic and hurricane risks, it is imperative to use some kind of a 
common risk indicator. In this research, system reliability is used. Here, the concept of a 
multi-hazard risk curve is introduced. Such a risk curve shows a plot of system reliabilities 
against corresponding return periods (or exceedance probabilities). This allows direct 
quantitative comparison of the risks for the range of return periods covered by both hazards. 
To construct the multi-hazard risk curves, several return periods (or annual probabilities of 
exceeding various hazard levels) are selected and their corresponding PGA and wind speed 
at locations of all substations and lines calculated. System reliability corresponding to each 
hazard level (PGA and wind speed) is then evaluated. The multi-hazard risk curves of the 












Figure 7.11 Multi-hazard risk curves 






























































From Figure 7.11(a), it can be seen that at higher return periods (lower exceedance 
probabilities) greater than about 460 years, the risk is clearly dominated by seismic hazard 
in Charleston. For instance, at a return period of 700 years, the system reliability due to 
seismic hazard is 12% compared to 62% due to hurricane hazard. It can also be seen that a 
2000-year return period earthquake will cause a complete shutdown of the system (0% 
reliability) as compared to a 10,000-year return period hurricane that will cause the same 
impact. 
 
For more frequent events with return periods less than 460 years, it can be seen from Figure 
7.11(a) that hurricane hazard has more impact on the system than the seismic hazard. Both 
hazards have the same effect on system reliability at a return period of about 460 years. 
From Figure 7.11(b), it can be seen that the pattern in New York is similar to that in 
Charleston with seismic hazard dominating the risk at return periods higher than 2,200 
years. Compared to Charleston, however, it can be seen that both the seismic and hurricane 
risks are lower in New York.  
 
Looking at the multi-hazard risk curve for Seattle in Figure 7.11(c), it can be seen that 
earthquake is clearly the dominant hazard at all return periods. Windstorms seem to pose 
very little risk to the system in this location. For instance, at a return period of 1000 years, 
the system reliability is about 1% for the corresponding seismic hazard level while it is 
98% for windstorms. At lower return periods, 200 years, for example, the system reliability 
is 78% and 99% for seismic and storm hazards, respectively.        
 
The information gathered from the multi-hazard risk curves is valuable in decision making 
regarding risk mitigation investment as it gives information on the impact of both low-
probability high-consequence events as well as frequent events on system reliability 
(Ellingwood & Wen, 2005). 
 
The wind speeds used to develop the hurricane curves in Figure 7.11 were obtained from 
ATC (2015) as mentioned earlier, which were developed based on hurricane simulations 
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by Vickery et al. (2000b) in which 20,000 hurricane years were simulated. Therefore, it 
should be noted that the maximum simulated year of 1,000,000 years shown in Figure 7.11 
is for demonstrating the change of system reliability vs return period of seismic and 
hurricane hazards.  
 
Risk comparison can also be made based on stipulated design hazard level. The design 
wind speed is the wind speed with a return period of 50 years (2% exceedance annually) 
as suggested by ASCE-74 (2009). The design PGA is the PGA with traditionally a return 
period of 475 years (ASCE, 2005; Li & Ellingwood, 2009). The design hazard levels and 
the corresponding system reliabilities are shown in Table 7.4. Note that the PGA and wind 
speeds in Table 4 are those for the locations of G1 and line 13, respectively, and are shown 
to give an indication of the general variation of the hazards in the three locations. 
 
It can be seen from Table 7.4 that for Charleston, the design seismic hazard level has a 
higher impact than hurricane hazard with corresponding system reliabilities of 76.8% and 
99.8%, respectively. Both design hazard levels have a similar impact on the system in New 
York while, in Seattle, design seismic hazard level has far greater impact than hurricane 
hazard with corresponding system reliabilities of 13.9% and 99.9%, respectively.    
 
Note that the variation of system reliability between the three locations especially when 
considering seismic hazard is the fact that while design hazard levels vary (for example, 
design PGA is 0.303g in Seattle as compared to 0.042g in New York), the power system, 
in this case, is exactly the same in all three locations. In practice, structural components of 







Table 7.4 Multi-hazard risk comparison based on stipulated design hazard level  
(PGA and wind speed are for location of G1 and line 13, respectively) 
Location 
Seismic Hazard Hurricane Hazard 








Charleston  0.199 76.8 43 99.8 
New York  0.042 100 39 99.9 
Seattle 0.303 13.9 37 99.9 
 
 
7.7.2 Multi-Hazard Risk Based on Annual Probability of System Failure 
 
The comparisons based on multi-hazard risk curves in the previous section is conditional, 
as the system reliability evaluations are based on scenario-based hazard analysis. Here, the 
comparison is made based on the aggregated effect of all possible hazard levels which is 
the basis for probabilistic hazard analysis. The system reliability results calculated based 
on the annual probability of damage to system components in the three locations are given 
in Table 7.5. The annual probability of system failure, defined as the complement of system 
reliability is plotted in Figure 7.12. The results show that in Charleston and Seattle, seismic 
hazard has a greater effect on the annual measure of system reliability, unlike in New York 
where hurricane hazard has a slightly higher effect. Considering the combined effect of 
both hazards, the system has a higher annual probability of failure in Seattle followed by 
Charleston and New York. 
 
Even though hurricanes and earthquakes are independent non-concurrent hazards, 
annualizing the risk (measured as system unreliability in this case) allows for the 
summation of the risks due to both hazards. For example, in the case of Charleston, there 
is a 0.11 annual probability of system failure due to earthquakes and 0.04 annual 
probability of system failure due to hurricanes. The total annual probability of system 
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failure due to both hazards is thus 0.15. It should be noted that the risks due to both hazards 
cannot be summed in the case of comparison based on scenario hazard.   
 
Table 7.5 Multi-hazard risk comparison based on annual probability of damage of 
components 
Risk Indicator 
Charleston  New York Seattle 
Seismic  Hurricane Seismic  Hurricane Seismic Hurricane 
System reliability 
(%)  




Figure 7.12 Annual probability of system failure 
 
The similarity in the impact of the two hazards on system reliability in Table 7.5 is because 
all hazard levels are weighted by the probabilities of their occurrence. Consequently, even 
though a high magnitude earthquake can cause severe damage to the system, for example, 
the probability of its occurrence is low. Similarly, a low-intensity hurricane with a high 





























probability of system failure is “by average”, which means a hazard event could 





A multi-hazard risk assessment framework has been presented in this chapter for 
considering the impact of seismic and hurricane hazards on electric power systems. A more 
comprehensive risk assessment that takes into account the potential impact of all possible 
natural hazards on power systems will help to guide pre-disaster preparation as well as 
decision making regarding cost-effective mitigation strategies. A notional electric power 
system assumed to be located in Charleston, SC, New York, NY, and Seattle, WA was 
used to demonstrate the proposed framework. Multi-hazard risk curves developed using a 
topological-based system reliability indicator were used to compare the two hazards. 
Furthermore, system reliability evaluated based on stipulated design hazard levels as well 
as the annual probability of damage to structural components of the system were also used 
for risk comparison. 
 
The case study considered shows that multi-hazard risk assessment enables the comparison 
and/or aggregation of different risks to electric power systems and can reveal the 
contribution of each hazard to the overall risk to the system. The case study also illustrates 
the importance of considering low-probability high-consequence events in disaster 
mitigation decisions. Based on the results obtained, mitigation efforts should be considered 
to reduce the potential impact of such events. However, the cost-effectiveness of deploying 









Decision making regarding mitigation of multiple hazards differs from that of single hazard 
mitigation in the sense that before the level or type of mitigation strategy is selected, a 
decision needs to be made on which of the various competing hazards deserves greater 
attention. This is compounded by the fact that there are limited resources available for 
mitigation of risks from competing hazards. For example, by 2020, the investment gaps for 
distribution and transmission infrastructure are estimated to be $57 billion and $37 billion, 
respectively (ASCE, 2013). Therefore, both identification and prioritization of risks are 
essential for decision making regarding investment in mitigation strategies.    
 
Multi-hazard assessment and mitigation were investigated for residential construction (Li 
& Ellingwood, 2009), bridges (Kameshwar & Padgett, 2014), and commercial buildings 
(Wen & Kang, 2001). However, there have not been studies on mitigation strategies for 
electric power systems. Existing studies on mitigation strategies for electric power systems 
focus on single hazards (e.g. Romero et al. (2015), Chang (2003), Shinozuka et al. (2005), 
Salman et al. (2015)). However, investment in long-term mitigation of risks needs to take 
into account all possible hazards that can affect the system over its entire lifespan. 
Therefore, there is a need to investigate the cost-effectiveness of mitigation strategies in 
reducing the overall risks to infrastructure that are vulnerable to multiple hazards. This 
requires a comprehensive multi-hazard risk-based assessment.  
 
As resources for risk mitigation strategies are limited, any framework for multi-hazard risk 
mitigation should attempt to identify risk-critical parts of a system that when strengthened, 
will have a greater impact on overall system performance. To determine critical parts of a 
                                                 
5 A version of this chapter has been submitted to Reliability Engineering & System Safety. 
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system for resource allocation, some form of component importance measure is required. 
This, in turn, requires evaluating a measure of system reliability.     
 
This chapter presents the second part of the framework in Chapter 7 to study the 
effectiveness of multi-hazard risk mitigation strategies for electric power systems subjected 
to hurricanes and earthquakes. Unlike in Chapter 7, probabilistic and scenario-based hazard 
analysis are combined into a probabilistically weighted deterministic hazard scenarios 
model that consider both spatial variation in hazard intensity as well as probabilistic nature 
of hazard occurrence. A new component importance measure that considers multi-element 
failure in a networked system is also proposed. Cost-effectiveness of various mitigation 
strategies is investigated through life cycle cost analysis. The framework is demonstrated 
using the same notional electric power network in Chapter 7. However, in this case, two 
locations: Charleston, SC, and New York, NY are used. Seattle is not considered here due 
to lack of data to perform hurricane simulation which is necessary for the probabilistically 
weighted deterministic scenarios approach.  
 
 
8.2 Hazard Analysis 
 
As discussed earlier, application of probabilistic hazard analysis to spatially distributed 
infrastructure systems has been shown to be limited (Adachi & Ellingwood, 2010). This is 
because the spatial variation of intensity for a severe hazard event is lost in the aggregation 
process of probabilistic analysis. Furthermore, in carrying out cost-effectiveness analysis, 
estimation of revenue loss and direct economic losses to society due to power outage 
depends on power outage duration following a specific event. Scenario-based approach, on 
the other hand, cannot capture all possible hazard levels in an area. In such a case, a 
probabilistically weighted deterministic hazard scenarios approach can be employed. This 
entails selecting a suite of hazard events under which system performance can be measured. 
The risk assessment is then carried out by weighing each hazard event with its respective 
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probability of occurrence. Consequently, the probabilistic nature of hazard occurrence and 
spatial variation of hazard intensities are reconciled. 
 
8.2.1 Seismic Hazard Analysis 
 
To model the seismic risk in the two chosen locations, a suite of earthquake scenarios with 
their corresponding annual probabilities of occurrence is required. The aim is to select 
enough earthquake scenarios to closely replicate the seismic hazard curves obtained from 
USGS (2015a). The scenario earthquakes, in this case, are selected from a catalog of 
earthquakes for Central and Eastern United States (CEUS) compiled in the Central and 
Eastern United States – Seismic Source Characterization (CEUS – SSC) for Nuclear 
Facilities report (EPRI et al., 2012). The scenarios are selected to represent all seismic 
source zones in the area, as well as the range of damaging earthquakes that are possible in 
the area as suggested by Chang et al. (2000). Nine and eight scenario earthquakes from a 
shortlist are selected for Charleston and New York, respectively, from the CEUS-SSC 
report. The selection is made so as to cover all possible hazard levels as accurate as possible 
and also to reduce computational effort. 
 
The selected scenario earthquakes from CEUS-SSC are from historical records and might 
not represent the entire risk in a given location, i.e., earthquake events of higher magnitude 
than those recorded are possible. Therefore, the maximum probable earthquake (MPE) 
from de-aggregation analysis of earthquakes from USGS (2008) at a risk level of 2% in 50 
years is also included in the list of scenario earthquakes for Charleston. The MPE 
corresponding to a risk level of 2% in 50 years and 1% in 200 years are selected for New 
York. The MPEs account for future events of higher magnitudes as MPE is defined as the 
largest predicted earthquake a fault is capable of generating (Robert, 2002). This makes a 
total of 10 scenario earthquakes for both locations as shown in Table 8.1.  
 
For each scenario earthquake, the peak ground acceleration (PGA) at any location within 
the power network is evaluated using the attenuation relationship developed by Toro et al. 
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(1997). An initial annual probability of exceeding the calculated PGA level is assigned so 
as to closely match the hazard curve from USGS (2015a) at a particular site. The annual 
probability of exceedance is then revised iteratively to minimize the error between the 
actual hazard curve from USGS (2015a) and the hazard curve based on the chosen scenario 
earthquakes.  
 
The locations of the 8 gate stations (G1 – G8) are used as control points to adjust the annual 
probabilities of exceedance. This is because if only one location is used to assign the 
probabilities, the resulting scenarios and their corresponding probabilities might not 
accurately model the hazard curves in other locations. Using 8 control points will ensure 
that the resulting scenarios and their corresponding probabilities can model the hazard in 
the entire area covered by the electric power system. Figure 8.1 shows the hazards curves 
for the locations of G1, G5, and G8 for Charleston and New York. It can be seen that the 
hazard curves based on the selected scenario earthquakes match the actual hazard curves 
from USGS (2015a). 
 
Note that the annual probability of exceedance assigned to each seismic event or PGA level 
is cumulative of the probabilities of occurrence of events that will produce the same level 
of PGA or higher. Therefore, the probability of occurrence of an event is found by 
subtracting the appropriate annual probabilities of exceedance as shown in Table 8.1.  
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Table 8.1 Selected scenario earthquakes and their annual probabilities of occurrence 











Annual prob. of 
occurrence Lat. Long. Lat. Long. 
33.75 81.38 4.5 0.021 0.006 40.79 74.25 3.1 0.0225 0.0085 
34.01 80.8 5.2 0.015 0.006 40.8 74 2.7 0.0140 0.0010 
32.9 80 4.0 0.009 0.003 40.1 74.5 4.4 0.0130 0.0015 
33.4 80.42 5.3 0.006 0.002 40.46 74.3 4.1 0.0115 0.0024 
32.9 80 5.5 0.004 0.0024 41 74.5 4.7 0.0091 0.0021 
32.9 80 6.7 0.0016 0.0001 41.11 73.85 4 0.0070 0.0006 
32.9 80 6.8 0.0015 0.0001 40.98 73.83 3.7 0.0064 0.0034 
32.9 80 6.9 0.0014 0.0003 40.8 74 4.8 0.0030 0.0020 
32.9 80 7.3 0.0011 0.0008 40.85 73.5 4.8* 0.0010 0.0003 
33.05 80.17 7.4* 0.0003 0.0003 40.85 73.5 5.4* 0.0007 0.0007 





Figure 8.1 Seismic hazard curves  




















































































































































8.2.2 Hurricane Hazard Analysis 
 
For hurricane hazard, the hurricane simulation model used in Chapter 5 is also used here. 
The flow chart of the simulation model is shown again in Figure 8.2 for convenience. The 
required parameters for the hurricane simulation in South Carolina are taken from Huang 
et al. (2001a) and shown in Table 8.2. The parameters for New York City are found by 
fitting probability distributions to histograms of the parameters from Lin et al. (2010). It 
should be noted that while the simulation parameters for South Carolina from Huang et al. 
(2001a) are obtained from records of historical hurricanes, the parameters for New York 
from Lin et al. (2010) are based on simulated hurricanes due to lack of adequate historical 
data for New York.  
 
Wind speed decay after landfall due to friction and reduction in storm’s moisture for 
Charleston and New York is modeled using the model developed by Kaplan and DeMaria 
(1995) and Kaplan and DeMaria (2001), respectively. As the location of the power system 
is within approximately 50 miles of the coast in both locations, each hurricane is assumed 
to travel in a straight line from landfall to when it will pass through the study area. This 
assumption has been shown to be reasonable for areas within 50 miles of the coast (Brown, 





Figure 8.2 Hurricane simulation model flow chart 
 
 
Randomly sample number of hurricanes (n) in a given year 
based on hurricane frequency 
For hurricane i, randomly sample landing position, 
approach angle, translation speed, central pressure 
difference 
Compute max wind speed at landfall and radius 
to max wind  
Compute wind speed at pt. of interest using 
wind field model 
Determine next location of hurricane 
Update central pressure and max wind speed using 
decay models  
Re-compute wind speed at pt. of interest using 




End of hurricane 
  
i = n? 
  





i = i+1 
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Table 8.2 Statistics of hurricane simulation parameters 
Variable Distribution  Distribution parameters 
South Carolina New York 
Annual frequency, λ Poisson  0.306 0.26 
Approach angle, θ (degrees) Normal/Uniform  μ = 2.19 
σ = 42.77 
0 – 75 
Central pressure difference Weibull  u = 51.12 
k = 3.155 
u = 32.34 
k = 2.85 
Translation velocity Lognormal  λ = 1.787 
ζ = 0.513 
λ = 2.545 
ζ = 0.437 
 
For each hurricane, the maximum wind speeds at the middle of each transmission line are 
recorded as the hurricane passes through the study region. The maximum wind speed at 
the location of G1 is also recorded based on which the annual probability of exceedance is 
assigned to each recorded wind speed so as to match the resulting hazard curve with that 
obtained from ASCE 7-10 model which can be accessed from ATC (2015) for any location. 
Figure 8.3 shows a plot of the hazard curves at the location of G1 using wind speeds from 
ATC (2015) and from the hurricane simulation model described. 
 
 
Figure 8.3 Hurricane hazard curves  


























































Using the probabilistically weighted deterministic hazard scenarios approach, the annual 
probability of failure of any system component can be calculated using Equation (8.1). 
 




where 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴 is the annual probability of failure of a component;  Pr(𝐹𝐹|𝐸𝐸𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝 𝑅𝑅) is the 
probability of failure of the component given the occurrence of hazard event i; Pr (𝐸𝐸𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝 𝑅𝑅) 
is the annual probability of occurrence of hazard event i; and n is the total number of hazard 
events. Note that Equation (8.1) assumes independence between hazard events occurrence. 
 
 
8.3 Component Vulnerability 
 
Fragilities of substations and transmission structures discussed in the previous chapter are 
used here. However, in the original system, the substations are assumed to have standard 
(unanchored components). The fragility parameters of the three classes of substations are 
shown in Table 8.3 (FEMA, 2010). All four damage states will be considered in the cost 
analysis section. However, for the purpose of demonstrating other parts of the framework, 
it is assumed that substations in extensive damage state will lose their functionality and are 











Damage State Median PGA (g) Dispersion  
Low voltage 
Slight/minor 0.13 0.65 
Moderate  0.26 0.50 
Extensive  0.34 0.40 
Complete  0.74 0.40 
Medium voltage 
Slight/minor 0.10 0.60 
Moderate  0.20 0.50 
Extensive  0.30 0.40 
Complete  0.50 0.40 
High voltage 
Slight/minor 0.09 0.50 
Moderate  0.13 0.40 
Extensive  0.17 0.35 
Complete  0.38 0.35 
 
 
8.4 Multi-Hazard Risk Assessment 
 
As explained in the previous chapter, multi-hazard risk assessment of independent non-
concurrent hazards such as earthquakes and hurricanes is usually carried out through 
comparative approach using a common index. This is feasible because risk is not measured 
in hazard-specific units but in damage or loss-specific units such as damage to properties 
or disruption to economic activities (Kappes et al., 2012). The common risk indicator 
adopted here is system reliability (or unreliability). This allows direct quantitative 
comparison of the risks for the range of return periods (or annual probabilities of 
exceedance) covered by both hazards. Figure 8.4 shows the multi-hazard risk curves for 





Figure 8.4 Multi-hazard risk curves 

















































It can be seen from Figure 8.4(a) that at lower annual exceedance probabilities in 
Charleston, the risk due to seismic hazard is higher than that from hurricane hazard. For 
example, the annual probabilities of exceeding a system unreliability of 80% are about 
0.0012 and 0.0008 for seismic and hurricane hazards, respectively. At higher annual 
exceedance probabilities, the risk due to hurricane hazard is higher. In other words, there 
is a higher probability that seismic hazard will cause major disruption to the system than 
hurricane hazard while there is a higher probability that hurricanes will cause minor 
disruptions to the system. 
 
In the case of New York, it can be seen from Figure 8.4(b) that risk due to hurricane hazard 
is higher for the entire range of data plotted. In general, it can be seen that risk to the system 
due to both hurricane and seismic hazards is higher in Charleston than New York. For 
example, the annual probabilities of exceeding a system unreliability of 6% due to 
hurricane hazard are about 0.0045 and 0.0017 for Charleston and New York, respectively. 
Similarly, the probabilities due to the seismic hazard are 0.0045 and 0.0009 for Charleston 
and New York, respectively.        
 
Even though hurricanes and earthquakes are independent non-concurrent hazards, 
annualizing the risk (measured as system unreliability in this case) can make the summation 
of risk due to both hazards feasible. Risk can be annualized by weighing each hazard level 
with its annual probability of occurrence. This is important when it comes to evaluating 
the cost-effectiveness of mitigation strategies as will be discussed later on.  
 
For the sake of comparison, the probabilistic method used to plot the multi-hazard risk 
curves in Figure 7.11 in the previous chapter is used to plot the curves for the range of 
return periods in Figure 8.4. The comparison for Charleston is shown in Figure 8.5. It can 
be seen that risk curves from the two methods are similar. Relatively, the probabilistically 
weighted deterministic scenarios approach overestimates the risk in some sections of the 
curves. The comparison for New York is shown in Figure 8.6 where the probabilistically 
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weighted deterministic scenarios approach results in higher risk than the probabilistic 
analysis.  
 
The advantage of the probabilistic analysis used in the previous chapter is that it considers 
the entire range of hazard levels. However, the hazard levels corresponding to different 
return period at different locations does not necessarily occur at the same time or during 
the same hazard event. This is why the spatial variation of hazard intensity is lost in the 
aggregation process. The probabilistically weighted deterministic scenarios approach on 
the other hand models the spatial variation of hazard intensity during each event. However, 
due to the limitation on computational effort, the number of hazard events that can be 
considered is limited. Consequently, the approach might not cover the entire range of 
possible hazard levels. 








Figure 8.5 Comparison between probabilistically weighted deterministic scenarios 
method and probabilistic method for Charleston  






















































Figure 8.6 Comparison between probabilistically weighted deterministic scenarios 
method and probabilistic method for New York  




















































8.5 Component Importance Measure 
 
Mitigation strategies for distributed infrastructure systems such as electric power systems 
invariably involve strengthening system components (substations and transmission line 
support structures in this case). Strengthening an entire system may, however, not be cost-
effective as some components have a greater effect on overall system reliability than others. 
Decisions on investment in mitigation strategies can be better made if the impact of 
strengthening different components on system reliability can be quantified. This can be 
achieved using some form of a measure of component importance. 
 
One of the most widely used measures of component importance is Risk Achievement 
Worth (RAW). RAW is an indicator of two measures, (i) the ‘worth’ of a component in 
achieving the current level of system reliability, and (ii) the importance of maintaining or 
improving the current reliability of a component. RAW of each component, i, is given by 
Equation (8.2) (Rausand & Høyland, 2004). 
 
𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅(𝑅𝑅) = 1 − 𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆(𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖 = 1)1 − 𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆         𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑅𝑅 = 1,2, … ,𝑒𝑒 (8.2) 
 
where 𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆(𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖 = 1) is the system reliability when component i has failed while 𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆 is the 
reliability of the original system. The risk achievement worth of all the substations and 
transmission lines in the system is presented in Figure 8.7 for the system in Charleston 









Figure 8.7 Risk achievement worth of components in Charleston  





























It can be seen from Figure 8.7(a) that the RAW of the substations in each class is very 
similar. All gate stations (G1 – G8) have RAW of about 1.2, medium voltage substations 
(M1 – M17) have RAW of about 24.4 (with two exceptions), and low voltage substations 
(L1 – L16) have RAW of about 17.8. The lack of variation in RAW for each substation 
class is due to the redundancy in the system. For example, the gate stations should have 
had the largest RAW considering the fact that they are the supply stations, however, there 
is always more than one gate station supplying power to each demand substation. 
Consequently, failure of any one gate station will have a minimal impact on system 
reliability. 
 
Looking at the demand substations (low and medium voltage), their RAW is very similar 
for each class because there is always an alternative path for power delivery from gate 
stations to demand stations even if a substation along a certain path of power delivery fails. 
Hence, failure of any demand substation will only cut-off power to the customers directly 
connected to it. The only exception is M3 and M14. This is because looking at Figure 7.2, 
it can be seen that power delivery to M4 depends on the reliability of M3 because there is 
no alternative path from any gate station to M4. Hence, failure of M3 will not only cut-off 
power to customers directly connected to it, but also to customers connected to M4. 
Similarly, power delivery to L5 depends on M14. A similar observation can be made from 
Figure 8.7(b) for transmission lines where lines such as 12 and 26 have higher RAW 
because of lack of redundancy to the substations they serve. 
 
In general, it can be seen that RAW (and other similar component importance measures 
that consider the failure of single elements such as Risk Reduction Worth (RRW)) is not 
an effective measure of component importance in a complex system with high redundancy 
such as the power system considered in this case. This is because failure or removal of a 
single component will not significantly impact system reliability because the failure of the 
system or a significant part of the system is caused by combinations of failure of several 
components which make up the various minimal cut sets of the system.   
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A better measure of component importance for redundant systems such as the power 
system in this study should take into account the number of minimal cuts that a component 
affects. The Fussel-Vesely importance measure takes this into account by defining 
component importance as a ratio of the probability of failure of at least one minimal cut 
containing the component in question at time t to the probability that the system is failed 
at time t (Fussell, 1975). In other words, the component contributes to system failure when 
a minimal cut set containing the component failed. This is, however, applicable to binary 
systems that can be defined as either functioning or not. That is, it applies to systems where 
the failure of at least one minimal cut set leads to overall system failure. In the case of 
electric power networks with several load points, failure of power delivery to one 
substation or one minimal cut set does not imply system failure. This implies that the 
system has several functional states. 
 
To overcome the above shortcomings, the following component importance index is 
proposed: 
 
𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 = 1 − 𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆_𝑎𝑎𝑣𝑣1 − 𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆         𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑅𝑅 = 1,2, … , 𝑒𝑒 (8.3) 
 
where 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 is the importance index of component 𝑅𝑅; 𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆_𝑎𝑎𝑣𝑣 is the average system reliability 
among all scenarios where a minimal cut set containing component 𝑅𝑅 is failed; and 𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆 is 
the reliability of the original system. The proposed component importance index models 
multi-element failure which is required to bring about overall system failure in a networked 
system. This is important as natural hazards such as earthquakes usually results in the 
failure of multiple elements at a time. Hence, the proposed index models the likelihood that 
a combination of failed elements that contain the element in question contributes to overall 
system failure. 𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆_𝑎𝑎𝑣𝑣 takes into account the fact that a component can appear in several 
minimal cut sets that govern power delivery to several subsystems or substations. Figure 
8.8(a) & Figure 8.8(b) show the importance index of substations and transmission lines in 





Figure 8.8 Importance index of components in Charleston  



























































































































From Figure 8.8(a), it can be seen that the substations with the lowest importance index (Ii 
< 20) are L4, L5, L6, L8, L14, and L16. This is because their failure does not affect power 
delivery to other substations. All the gate stations show relatively high importance index 
as they are the supply stations and failure of a combination of gate stations will cut power 
supply to several demand stations. Looking at Figure 8.8(b), it can be seen that transmission 
lines with Ii < 20 are lines whose failure will not affect power delivery to more than one 
substation. Transmission lines such as lines 33 and 40 whose failure, especially in 
combination with other lines, will cut-off power supply to several substations have 
relatively higher Ii.    
        
 
8.6 Multi-Hazard Mitigation Strategies 
 
Seven mitigation strategies have been selected to demonstrate the proposed framework, 
based on the result of component importance measure above. These are: 
 
1. Strengthening substations with 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 > 100 (7 substations = 17%) 
2. Strengthening substations with 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 > 70 (16 substations = 39%) 
3. Strengthening transmission lines with 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 > 100 (7 lines = 11%) 
4. Strengthening transmission lines with 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 > 80 (24 lines = 36%) 
5. Strengthening substations and transmission lines with 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 > 100 
6. Strengthening substations with 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 > 70 and transmission lines with 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 > 80 
7. Strengthening entire system (substations and transmission lines)    
 
The first 6 strategies are selected to represent different levels of targeted hardening of the 
system. The last mitigation strategy is chosen to investigate the effectiveness of targeted 
hardening as opposed to hardening the entire system. 
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Strengthening substations involve substituting standard components with anchored/seismic 
components. While the current requirement for substation component design called for 
anchored components, a lot of existing substations are composed of standard unanchored 
components (Knight & Kempner Jr, 2009a). The fragility of anchored substations is taken 
from FEMA (2005) in which it is modeled with lognormal distribution with parameters 
given in Table 8.4.  
 




Damage State Median PGA (g) Dispersion  
Low voltage 
Slight/minor 0.15 0.70 
Moderate  0.29 0.55 
Extensive  0.45 0.45 
Complete  0.90 0.45 
Medium voltage 
Slight/minor 0.15 0.60 
Moderate  0.25 0.50 
Extensive  0.35 0.40 
Complete  0.70 0.40 
High voltage 
Slight/minor 0.11 0.50 
Moderate  0.15 0.45 
Extensive  0.20 0.35 




Strengthening transmission lines involve strengthening existing transmission line support 
structures to conform with the current National Electrical Safety Code (NESC) standard 
which requires all transmission structures over 60 ft. to be designed for extreme wind and 
ice loadings (IEEE, 2012). The fragility function for upgraded transmission structures 
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developed based on damage data from utility companies is given by Equation (8.4) (Brown, 
2009). 
 
𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆 = 𝑚𝑚𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒{[(2 ∙ 10−8)𝑒𝑒0.0834∙𝑣𝑣], 1} (8.4) 
 
where 𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆 is the probability of failure of a transmission support structure at a given wind 
speed, 𝑒𝑒.  
 
The fragility curves of existing transmission structures using Equation ((7.5) and upgraded 
transmission structures using Equation ((8.4) are plotted in Figure 8.9. 
 
 






























8.7 Evaluation of Cost-Effectiveness through Life-cycle Cost 
Analysis 
 
To investigate the effectiveness of mitigation strategies and prioritize investment, a 
decision-supporting tool is required to estimate costs and benefits, as well as the economic 
efficiency of mitigation policies. In this study, the net discounted benefit is used as a 
decision-support tool to estimate the benefit of the proposed mitigation strategies. The net 
discounted benefit is evaluated by calculating and discounting the costs and benefits arising 
over time, and the difference taken. The total costs and benefits are calculated through a 
life-cycle cost analysis over the remaining lifespan of the system. The benefit is the 
reduction in damages due to mitigation, while the cost is the cost of implementing the 
mitigation strategy. A fixed discount rate is used to convert costs over time to their 
equivalent present value. If the net discounted benefit is positive (benefits exceed costs), 
then the mitigation strategy is considered effective. 
 
 The various costs considered in the life cycle cost analysis are discussed below: 
 
i. Mitigation cost: this is the cost of implementing a specific mitigation strategy which 
is assumed to be carried out in the first year of analysis. 
 
ii. Maintenance cost: this is the cost of periodic maintenance performed by the utility 
company on the substation and transmission lines. The total maintenance cost for each 
component for the entire analysis period is given by Equation (8.5). 
 
 





where 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 is the annual maintenance cost for element i at year t; and λ is the discount 
rate.  
 
iii. Repair cost: this is the cost of repairing damage to the system after an earthquake or 
hurricane. For damage to substations due to earthquakes, the annual repair cost for 
each substation is given by Equation (8.6) which is based on the theorem of total 
probability. 
 




∙ (1 + 𝜆𝜆)−𝑧𝑧 (8.6) 
 
where 𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 is the annual repair cost per substation;  Pr(𝑑𝑑|𝐸𝐸𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝 𝑅𝑅) is the probability 
of occurrence of damage state d given the occurrence of seismic event i; Pr (𝐸𝐸𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝 𝑅𝑅) 
is the annual probability of occurrence of seismic event i; 𝐶𝐶𝑑𝑑 is the cost of repairing 
the substation in damage state d; D is the total number of damage states; and n is the 
total number of seismic events.  
 
For damage to transmission lines after hurricanes, the repair cost is the cost of 
replacing failed transmission structures. Failed structures are replaced with new ones 
of the same class. The repair cost for a line for the entire lifespan of the system is 
given by Equation (8.7). 
 
𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿 = ��Pr(𝐹𝐹𝑠𝑠|𝐸𝐸𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝 𝑅𝑅) ∙ Pr(𝐸𝐸𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝 𝑅𝑅)𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1




where 𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿 is the repair cost of transmission line; Pr(𝐹𝐹𝑠𝑠|𝐸𝐸𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝 𝑅𝑅) is the probability of 
failure of a structure given hurricane event i; Pr (𝐸𝐸𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝 𝑅𝑅) is the annual probability 
of occurrence of hurricane event i; 𝑁𝑁 is the total number of structures in a line; and 
𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐 is the unit repair cost of structures in a line. Note that unlike substations, 
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transmission structures and lines are modeled with only one damage state which is 
defined as failure. 
 
iv. Revenue loss: this is the cost incurred by the utility company due to the interruption 
in power supply caused by earthquakes and hurricanes. It is a function of unmet 
demand, the time to restore the system after an event, and the unit cost of electricity. 
For failure of substations due to seismic hazard, the unmet demand for a substation 
is given by Equation (8.8). 
 




where 𝑈𝑈𝐷𝐷 is the unmet demand; 𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖(𝑝𝑝) is the demand on substation i at time t; 𝑝𝑝(𝑝𝑝) is 
the unit price of electricity at time t; 𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐 is the time to repair the substation. The time 
to repair substations depends on the type and damage level of the substation. The 
revenue loss due to the failure of a substation is then given by Equation (8.9).  
 




∙ (1 + 𝜆𝜆)−𝑧𝑧 (8.9) 
 
where 𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑠𝑠 is the total revenue loss due to failure of substation; (𝑈𝑈𝐷𝐷|𝑑𝑑 ∙ 𝐸𝐸𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝 𝑅𝑅) is 
the unmet demand given damage state d and event i; Pr(𝑑𝑑|𝐸𝐸𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝 𝑅𝑅) is the probability 
of occurrence of damage state d given the occurrence of seismic event i; Pr (𝐸𝐸𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝 𝑅𝑅) 
is the annual probability of occurrence of seismic event i.   
 
For transmission line failure due to hurricanes, failure of a single transmission line 
does not necessarily cut power to customers if there are other routes available for 
power to reach a particular substation. Hence, revenue loss due to hurricane hazard 
is calculated by considering the failure of all transmission lines supplying power to a 
substation. The unmet demand for a substation due to the failure of transmission lines 
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is also calculated using Equation (8.8), where 𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐 is the time to repair the transmission 
lines in this case. The revenue loss for a substation due to the failure of transmission 
lines is then calculated using Equation (8.10).  
 
𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿 = ��(𝑈𝑈𝐷𝐷|𝐹𝐹 ∙ 𝐸𝐸𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝 𝑅𝑅) ∙ Pr(𝐹𝐹|𝐸𝐸𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝 𝑅𝑅) ∙ Pr (𝐸𝐸𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝 𝑅𝑅) ∙𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1𝑧𝑧
(1 + 𝜆𝜆)−𝑧𝑧 (8.10) 
 
where 𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿 is the annual revenue loss due to failure of transmission lines; (𝑈𝑈𝐷𝐷|𝐹𝐹 ∙
𝐸𝐸𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝 𝑅𝑅) is the unmet demand given failure of all lines and event i; Pr(𝐹𝐹|𝐸𝐸𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝 𝑅𝑅) 
is the probability of failure of all transmission lines supplying power to a substation 
given the occurrence of hurricane event i; Pr (𝐸𝐸𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝 𝑅𝑅) is the annual probability of 
occurrence of hurricane event i. 
 Pr(𝐹𝐹|𝐸𝐸𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝 𝑅𝑅) =  Pr (𝐿𝐿1 ∩ 𝐿𝐿2 ∩ …∩ 𝐿𝐿𝑘𝑘|𝐸𝐸𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝 𝑅𝑅) (8.11) 
 Pr (𝐿𝐿1 ∩ 𝐿𝐿2 ∩ …∩ 𝐿𝐿𝑘𝑘) is the probability of failure of all transmission lines supplying 
power to a substation, where the failures are assumed to be independent. 
 
v. Societal economic loss: this is the direct economic loss to customers resulting from 
the interruption in power supply. For damage to substations due to earthquakes, the 
economic loss for a substation during a seismic event is given by Equation (8.12). 
 




where 𝐿𝐿(𝑝𝑝) is the monetary loss per hour; 𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐 is repair time of the substation. The total 
societal economic loss for each substation is then given by Equation (8.13). 
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∙ (1 + 𝜆𝜆)−𝑧𝑧 (8.13) 
 
where 𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑠𝑠 is the total societal economic loss due to failure of substation; (𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿|𝑑𝑑 ∙
𝐸𝐸𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝 𝑅𝑅) is the expected economic loss given damage state d and event i; Pr(𝑑𝑑|𝐸𝐸𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝 𝑅𝑅) is the probability of occurrence of damage state d given the 
occurrence of seismic event i; Pr (𝐸𝐸𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝 𝑅𝑅) is the annual probability of occurrence of 
seismic event i. 
 
As in the case of revenue loss, failure of one transmission line due to hurricane might 
not necessarily lead to a power outage and economic loss to customers. Hence, the 
failure of all lines connected to a substation is considered. The economic loss for a 
substation due to the failure of lines is given by Equation (8.14). 
 
𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿 = ��(𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿|𝐹𝐹 ∙ 𝐸𝐸𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝 𝑅𝑅) ∙ Pr(𝐹𝐹|𝐸𝐸𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝 𝑅𝑅) ∙ Pr (𝐸𝐸𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝 𝑅𝑅) ∙𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1𝑧𝑧
(1 + 𝜆𝜆)−𝑧𝑧 (8.14) 
 
where 𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿 is the annual societal loss due to failure of transmission lines; (𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿|𝐹𝐹 ∙
𝐸𝐸𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝 𝑅𝑅) is the economic loss given failure of all lines and event i; Pr(𝐹𝐹|𝐸𝐸𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝 𝑅𝑅) is 
the probability of failure of all transmission lines supplying power to a substation 
given the occurrence of hurricane event i; Pr (𝐸𝐸𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝 𝑅𝑅) is the annual probability of 
occurrence of hurricane event i. 
 
The remaining service life of the system, i.e., the period of time over which the life cycle 
cost analysis is performed is assumed to be 50 years. Information regarding cost, time to 
repair failed elements, economic loss per customer, and average power consumptions are 
given in Table 8.5. It is acknowledged that the relevant data for cost analysis will vary from 
region to region and utility companies should use their own data when performing the 
analysis. The data in Table 8.5 is adopted to demonstrate the proposed framework. Low 
voltage substations are assumed to contain one 25 MVA transformer, medium voltage 
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substations are assumed to contain two 25 MVA transformers, while high voltage 
substation are assumed to contain four 75 MVA transformers. It is also assumed that 1% 
of all customers served are commercial customers, 0.01% are industrial customers while 





















Table 8.5 Life cycle cost analysis parameters 
Parameters  Value Source  
Mitigation cost for transmission lines $60,000/structure Brown (2009) 
Cost of transmission structure replacement 
under storm condition 
$120,000/structure Brown (2009) 
Annual maintenance cost (transmission lines) $40/mile Brown (2009) 
Unit price of electricity, p $0.11/kWh Xu and Brown (2008b) 
Economic loss (residential) $2.70/h LaCommare and Eto (2006) 
Economic loss (commercial) $886/h LaCommare and Eto (2006) 
Economic loss (industrial) $3,253/h LaCommare and Eto (2006) 
Average consumption (residential) 1.5kW/h EIA (2013) 
Average consumption (commercial) 10.1kW/h EIA (2013) 
Average consumption (industrial) 39.4kW/h EIA (2013) 
Transmission line repair time 3 days Romero et al. (2015) 
Substation repair time (minor/slight damage) 1 day FEMA (2010) 
Substation repair time (moderate damage) 3 days FEMA (2010) 
Substation repair time (extensive damage) 7 days FEMA (2010) 
Substation repair time (complete damage) 30 days FEMA (2010) 
Cost of low voltage substation $2.8 million Balducci et al. (2006) 
Cost of medium voltage substation $5.6 million Balducci et al. (2006) 
Cost of high voltage substation $33.7 million Balducci et al. (2006) 
Mitigation cost for substations 2% of cost Assumed 
Substation repair cost (damage state: 
slight/minor) 
5% of cost 
Assumed based on definition of 
damage states from FEMA 
(2010) 
Substation repair cost (damage state: moderate) 40% of cost Same as above 
Substation repair cost (damage state: extensive) 70% of cost Same as above 
Substation repair cost (damage state: complete) 100% of cost Same as above 
Annual maintenance cost (low voltage) $30,000 Assumed 
Annual maintenance cost (medium voltage) $60,000 Assumed 
Annual maintenance cost (high voltage) $90,000 Assumed 
Discount rate 4% 





The results of the life cycle cost analysis are presented in Table 8.6 & Table 8.7. The net 
benefit, as well as the net benefit excluding societal economic losses, are plotted in Figure 
8.10 & Figure 8.11. It can be seen that the mitigation strategies reduce the repair cost, 
revenue loss, and the societal economic losses. Looking at the results for Charleston in 
Table 8.6 and Figure 8.10, it can be seen that only strategies 1 and 2, which entails 
hardening only substations, resulted in positive net benefit when societal economic losses 
are considered. Recall that strategy 1 entails strengthening 7 substations or 17% of the total 
substations while strategy 2 entails strengthening 16 substations or 39% of all substations. 
It can be seen from Table 8.6 and Figure 8.10 that strategy 2 yields more benefit than 
strategy 1. Strategy 7, which entails hardening the entire system, resulted in the highest 
reduction in losses. For example, the societal economic losses reduced from about $93 
million for the unhardened system to about $59 million for strategy 7. However, the high 
cost of implementing the mitigation strategy outweighs the total benefit which renders the 
strategy the most cost ineffective.   
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Table 8.6 Cost analysis results for Charleston, SC ($1000s) 
Cost Category Unhardened system Strategy 1 Strategy 2 Strategy 3 Strategy 4 Strategy 5 Strategy 6 Strategy 7 
Mitigation - 3,594 6,064 8,940 36,780 12,534 42,844 111,092 
Maintenance 49,830 49,830 49,830 49,830 49,830 49,830 49,830 49,830 
Repair 24,703 23,083 21,495 24,655 24,505 23,035 21,297 19,881 
Revenue loss 1,127 1,062 1,007 1,120 1,112 1,055 993 714 
Societal economic loss 93,282 87,900 83,376 92,718 92,051 87,336 82,145 59,050 
         
LCC 168,942 165,470 161,773 177,263 204,279 173,791 197,109 240,566 
LCC w/o societal loss 75,661 77,569 78,397 84,546 112,228 86,454 114,964 181,516 
Net benefit (NB) - 3,473 7,169 -8,321 -35,336 -4,848 -28,167 -71,624 
NB w/o societal loss - -1,909 -2,737 -8,885 -36,567 -10,794 -39,304 -105,856 
 
Table 8.7 Cost analysis results for New York, NY ($1000s) 
Cost Category Unhardened system Strategy 1 Strategy 2 Strategy 3 Strategy 4 Strategy 5 Strategy 6 Strategy 7 
Mitigation - 3,594 6,064 8,940 36,780 12,534 42,844 111,092 
Maintenance 49,830 49,830 49,830 49,830 49,830 49,830 49,830 49,830 
Repair 3,322 2,862 2,617 3,297 3,219 2,837 2,514 2,232 
Revenue loss 67 66 64 67 66 65 63 27 
Societal economic loss 5,582 5,496 5,315 5,505 5,444 5,418 5,177 2,236 
         
LCC 58,802 61,848 63,890 67,639 95,340 70,685 100,428 165,418 
LCC w/o societal loss 53,220 56,353 58,576 62,134 89,896 65,267 95,251 163,181 
Net benefit (NB) - -3,046 -5,089 -8,837 -36,538 -11,883 -41,627 -106,616 
NB w/o societal loss - -3,133 -5,356 -8,914 -36,675 -12,047 -42,031 -109,961 
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Figure 8.10 Net benefit of mitigation strategies (Charleston, SC) 
 
 












































NB w/o Societal loss
 190 
On the other hand, strategies 3 and 4, which entails hardening only transmission lines, are 
not cost effective in Charleston. This is because, based on the costs in Table 8.5, it is far 
more expensive to harden transmission lines than substations. With resources for 
mitigation strategies usually limited, it will be far more rewarding, economically, to invest 
in strengthening substations against seismic hazard in this case than strengthening 
transmission lines against hurricane hazard.  
 
It can also be seen from Table 8.6 and Figure 8.10 that if the societal economic losses are 
not included in the analysis, none of the mitigation strategies is cost effective in Charleston, 
with the highest net benefit being -$1.9 million for strategy 1. The decision to include 
societal economic losses will depend on the entity carrying out the cost analysis. Privately 
owned utility companies might not consider societal economic losses in their analysis. 
Municipal utilities owned by city governments, on the other hand, will likely consider all 
aspects of the costs.     
 
Comparing Charleston and New York, it can be seen that while some of the mitigation 
strategies are cost effective in Charleston, none is cost effective in New York. This is 
because both the seismic and hurricane hazard risks are lower in New York than 
Charleston. This is evident from the total life cycle cost (LCC) of the system in the two 
locations. For example, the LCC in Charleston for the unhardened system is about $169 
million, while the corresponding LCC in New York is about a third of that (about $59 
million). This implies that the system will be subjected to considerably higher risk from 
earthquakes and hurricanes in Charleston. 
 
The mitigation strategies are largely ineffective, economically, due to the high cost of the 
mitigation strategies. As stated earlier, all the costs adopted in Table 8.5 are for 





If the discount rate of 4% in Table 8.5 is reduced by half to 2%, i.e., the present value of 
future cost is increased, then mitigation strategies 1 and 2 are cost effective in Charleston 
with higher net benefit than using a discount rate of 4% as seen in Figure 8.12. For example, 
the net benefit of strategy 1 increased from about $3.5 million to about $6.5 million for 
discount rates of 4% and 2%, respectively. Even with a discount rate of 2%, none of the 
mitigation strategies is cost effective in New York as seen in Figure 8.13.   
  
It is interesting to note that if the cost of mitigation for substations, which is assumed as 
2% of substation cost in Table 8.5, is changed to 5% of substation cost, none of the 
mitigation strategies is cost effective in both locations with a discount rate of 4%. 
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A framework for evaluating the effectiveness of multi-hazard risk mitigation strategies for 
electric power systems is presented. The framework consists of hazard analysis modeling 
through probabilistically weighted deterministic scenarios approach, component 
importance measure that considers multi-element failure, as well as a probabilistic life-
cycle cost analysis model. The comprehensive framework can be used to take into account 
multiple hazards that can impact a system during its lifetime. The framework is 
demonstrated using a notional electric power network assumed to be located in Charleston, 
SC, and New York, NY. 
 
The developed framework can be used by decision makers to prioritize investment on 
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was shown based on the case study considered that it will be more cost effective to invest 
in seismic risk mitigation of substations in Charleston than it is to invest in hurricane risk 
mitigation of transmission lines.    
 
It can be concluded that the cost effectiveness of multi-hazard risk mitigation strategies 
depends on the level of risk on the system in any given location. For regions with relatively 
moderate seismic and hurricane risks such as Charleston, certain mitigation strategies can 
be cost effective. For regions such as New York where both the seismic and hurricane 
hazard risks are relatively low, mitigation strategies might not be attractive, economically. 
However, mitigation strategies can lead to improvement in system reliability which can 
positively impact customer satisfaction and reduce power outage to critical facilities during 
disasters. 
 
It can also be concluded based on the case study that whole scale hardening of a system is 
not cost effective. Rather, targeted hardening that entails identifying critical components 
of the system should be considered by utility companies. Critical components can be 
identified based on their impact on overall system reliability using the proposed component 
importance measure, or criticality can be evaluated based on facilities connected or served 














This research developed a framework for system-level risk assessment and management 
for electric power systems subjected to hurricanes and earthquakes. Parts of the framework 
include a topological-based system reliability model, probabilistic and scenario-based 
hazard analysis, climate change modeling, component vulnerability, component 
importance measure, multi-hazard risk assessment method, and cost analysis. Notional 
electric power systems assumed to be located in various regions of the U.S. were used to 
demonstrate the proposed framework. Several risk mitigation strategies were also proposed 
and their efficiency and cost-effectiveness studied. The research and its contributions are 
summarized below. 
 
1. A topological-based system reliability method was developed for both radial 
topology typical for distribution systems as well as networked topology typical for 
transmission systems. This was done by formulating the accessibility of system 
components using reliability block diagrams, fault tree diagrams, and enumeration 
of minimal cut sets in a networked system. 
 
2. A framework for targeted hardening of distribution systems subjected to hurricanes 
was presented. The framework can be used to identify critical parts of the systems 
for risk mitigation strategies. The framework was demonstrated using a distribution 
system assumed to be located in Florida. 
 
3. The potential impact of climate change on hurricane hazard was modeled through 
a hurricane simulation model that allows the variation in both intensity and 
frequency to be considered. 
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4. A multi-hazard risk assessment approach for electric power systems subjected to 
hurricanes and earthquakes was presented. A comparative approach using risk 
curves as well as a cumulative approach based on annualized risk were proposed.  
 
5. A component importance measure appropriate for networked systems was 
proposed. The proposed measure considers multi-element failure to take into 
account redundancy in transmission networks as well as widespread damage 
observed during natural hazards.  
 
6. A probabilistic-based cost analysis approach for multi-hazard risk assessment was 
presented to take into account the uncertainties in both hazard occurrence and 
damage estimation. 
 
7. Several risk mitigation strategies were proposed and their efficiency in improving 
system reliability as well as their cost-effectiveness was evaluated.        
 
 
9.2 Conclusions  
 
Major conclusions and findings from the proposed framework and the case studies 
considered are summarized below. 
 
1. The limitation of the topological-based system reliability method depends on the 
type of risk mitigation strategy being considered. For example, in the case of risk 
mitigation using stronger support structures for distribution and transmission 
systems, or anchoring substations, the system exist as it is and its engineering 
properties such as voltage are not changed. Consequently, the topological-based 
approach can appropriately model the damage in the system which is basically 
related to structural component strength. In other mitigation strategies, however, 
such as constructing new distribution lines to connect feeders from different 
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substations, the applicability of the topological-based model is limited. Power flow 
analysis is required to determine whether a given substation can supply power to 
additional customers not in its primary area as well as check other factors such as 
voltage drop which can be prohibiting for the mitigation strategy. 
 
2. Implementing risk mitigation strategies to entire systems is usually not cost-
effective. Identifying and strengthening critical components of a system can be 
cost-effective and should be considered by utility companies.    
 
3. Designing and building stronger systems at the construction stage can be more cost-
effective than strengthening existing systems. As such, natural hazard risk 
mitigation strategies should be considered at the design stage of new systems. 
 
4. Societal economic losses can constitute a huge percentage of total losses after a 
hazard event. Results from the risk assessment of all levels of power systems and 
all types of mitigation strategies considered point to the considerable impact of 
power outages to the economy. Policy makers and especially municipal utility 
companies owned by governments should consider such losses in any risk 
mitigation studies. 
 
5. Considerable uncertainty exists in climate modeling and the impact of climate 
variation on hurricane hazard. As such, a scenario-based approach should be 
adopted by utility companies to study what might happen under different climate 
scenarios. 
 
6. Multi-hazard risk assessment and management for electric power systems can be 
carried out using probabilistically weighted deterministic hazard scenarios 
approach. While this approach might not consider the entire range of possible 
hazard levels, it does allow the modeling of spatial variation of hazard intensity for 
distributed infrastructure systems.       
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7. Finally, it can be noted from the formulations and results that considerable 
uncertainties exist in all stages of risk assessment of infrastructure systems 
subjected to natural hazards. From hazard occurrence, to damage quantification, to 
consequence analysis, aleatory and epistemic uncertainties exist. The aim, 
therefore, as summarized astutely by the quote below, is to find a basis for damage 
reduction. 
 
 “Only if we accept that complete prevention is ultimately unattainable, our 
rethinking of disasters leads us towards a policy of long-term loss reduction. 
And for this type of mitigation policy, the precise measure of risks (prediction 
of damages; assessment of uncertainty or complexity) might not be necessary, 
or even important. The crucial point is to provide the basis for damage 
reduction, i.e., to identify which areas are subject to different levels of 
potential damage and which factors determine such damage. This, in turn, can 
be used to identify the actions that must be taken to reduce future damage, 
even if we cannot quantify them exactly.” -  Weichselgartner (2001) 
  
 
9.3 Applications and Recommendations for Future Study 
 
In general, the proposed framework can be used for pre-disaster preparation, mitigation, 
and post-disaster response planning. The specific ways in which the framework can help 
achieve these are summarized below. 
 
1. The proposed framework incorporates uncertainties inherent in risk due to natural 
hazards by adopting a probabilistic-based approach in hazard analysis, component 
vulnerable, and quantification of risk through a probabilistic system reliability 
measure. As such, the framework can be used as a tool for risk assessment to 
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evaluate existing power systems or proposed new systems considering various 
sources of uncertainties.      
 
2. The framework can also be used at the design stage to investigate the cost-
effectiveness of building a more reliable system than otherwise required. 
 
3. The framework can be used to determine critical parts of the system to strengthen, 
compare the cost-effectiveness of various mitigation strategies, and prioritize risk 
from competing hazards. 
 
4. Identification of critical systems components based on system topology can help 
decision making regarding post-disaster repairs which can lead to improvement in 
resilience. 
 
5. The framework can also be used to make post-disaster decisions regarding whether 
to restore the system to its original state or to replace failed components with 
stronger, more reliable ones. 
 
The present research has also helped to identify the following areas for future studies: 
 
1. Electric power systems are critical to the operation of many infrastructure systems. 
Therefore, risk mitigation strategies employed for electric power systems will 
inevitably improve the performance of other infrastructure systems during natural 
hazard events. As such, cost savings from such improvement can be incorporated 
in future studies of the cost-effectiveness of mitigation strategies. 
 
2. While the proposed framework can help with post-disaster response planning, a 
comprehensive method for systematic restoration of electric power systems is 
needed to improve resilience. Such method should consider not only component 
importance but restoration times and repair crew allocations. 
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3. While the current study focused on hurricanes and earthquakes which are 
independent and non-concurrent hazards, there is a need to develop a framework 
for risk assessment of concurrent and/or dependent hazards such as earthquakes and 
tsunamis, and hurricanes and storm surge. 
 
4. In this study, aging of wood distribution poles was considered. However, aging and 
deterioration of other system components need to be considered in a long-term risk 
assessment approach. This requires testing and data collection to be able to quantify 
deterioration in component strength and how it affects system functionality as well 
as costs. 
 
5. Other natural hazards such as ice storms, floods, tornados etc. also pose a great 
threat to electric power systems across the world. Modeling of such hazards and the 
risk they pose needs to be explored.    
 
6. Finally, a methodology for community resilience can be developed through an 
integrated risk assessment that considers the complex interdependent nature of 
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Appendix E: Permission to use base map of Figure 6.2  
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